by bigoted admirers of the present condition of society. The recent action of the Vatican closes the lips of moderate writers they do not care to criticize those who go further than themselves when they are in adversity; and they are silent, lest in their temperate works something should be discovered which is not agreeable to the present temper of the Curia.

What is to be the future of Modernism we cannot say. We are no prophets, but gatherers of sycomore fruit which sometimes wrings our lips. If we are honoured by finding readers among the Modernists, we trust they will not resent a word of frank advice. We would urge them to remember the not unjustified prejudices of many of their brethren; not to shock them unnecessarily by hasty conclusions harshly propounded. We know that their aim is not to call out from the Roman Church a small body of enlightened men, but to spread light through the whole Church. The task will need infinite patience and charity. They must shun all temptation to court martyrdom. They will study and write, but, in spite of our strong dislike of anonymous publication, it may be desirable to keep their authorship secret. We hope that they will avoid all inclination to form a party, and to set many heads on one neck for the benefit of Domitian. We hope that no difficulties will induce them to separate from that part of the Catholic Church in which God has placed them. Not that we doubt for an instant that the Anglican conception of a Catholic Church without papal supremacy is true, though Anglicans have done little to commend it by their practice; nor do we take it upon ourselves to condemn the Old Catholics for taking a different course amid different circumstances. But in Italy and France, where the movement is mainly clerical, where it would win few adherents among a listless laity, separation would cast away the only hope of gaining a hearing. It may be well to say that the recent consecration of an Old Catholic bishop for England did not look towards the enlistment of recruits among the Modernists; and the English Church will not waver from her traditional course of making no converts from other portions of the Catholic

Church. Here and there a person may have paltered with his convictions and made an insincere submission; here and there a man may have yielded to despair and thrown away the Christian faith which the Vatican travesties. Some may have sought a refuge in some Protestant society; though it should not be taken for granted that those who have taken this course were led to it by what the Encyclical calls Modernism. A certain amount of interest has been taken in the recent case of Don G. Bartoli, formerly a professor in a Jesuit college in India, who has to some extent identified himself with the Waldensian Church; but he is an ardent and not very generous opponent of what he regards as Modernism, and is moved by principles which were more in place in the sixteenth century than in the twentieth. There are those who say that Modernism is past. Such persons may have said after Novara that United Italy was extinguished, or when the tide turned flattered Knut that the sea obeyed him. Experience shews how frequently a time of depression is a time of consolidation.

Rome has pursued an uniform effort after autocracy. We cannot detach the campaign against Modernism from the resolute setting aside of the French episcopate in the reorganization of their suffering Church, from the Pope's quiet determination to take the right of appointment to vacant bishoprics, from the supersession of local metropolitans by Cardinals of the Holy See. Whether this despotism can yet be tempered by reform, or whether it will find its only cure in revolution, we cannot tell; but at least we can pray and hope.

HERBERT H. JEAFFRESON.

ART. II. THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MORAL IDEAS.

The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas. By E. WESTERMARCK, Ph.D. In two volumes. Vol. II. (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd. 1908.)

IN a review of the first volume of the work before us1 attention was called to what then appeared-and, after a perusal of the second volume, still appears to us-to be a fundamental inconsistency in the treatment of moral ideas. On the one hand, Dr. Westermarck said 2: Moral emotions are of two kinds: disapproval and approval,' on which it may be remarked that approval implies a judgement, and a judgement is a proposition; and a proposition must either be or not be true. On the other hand, Dr. Westermarck also maintained that moral emotions cannot be said in any intelligible sense to be either true or untrue: the contents of an emotion fall entirely outside the category of truth.' 3 To this point, however, we shall return hereafter. Now that Dr. Westermarck's work is completed, our first words ought to express the impression left upon the mind by the book as a whole.

In 'The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas' Dr. Westermarck has written, perhaps, a great work, at any rate a big book. The more one thinks over it the greater grows one's respect for its author's industry. The labour that has gone to amass the vast collection of facts contained in the book will be patent to every reader, even though it most impresses those who have themselves laboured to collect facts. The honesty and impartiality with which the facts and all the facts-are stated, whether they point, apparently, in favour of the conclusions which Dr. Westermarck wishes to draw, or against them, win one's trust and confidence so thoroughly and deservedly that one is tempted—until one reflects-to accept his conclusions because he draws them. His self-respect is shewn in the 'C.Q.R. July 1907, Evolution and Morality.' 2 Vol. i. p. 21. • Ibid. p. 17.

courtesy which he displays to those who differ from him. His dignity is austere, with an austerity verging at times on the inhuman.

Let so much be said, as in barest justice it should be said by anyone who, differing from Dr. Westermarck's conclusions, undertakes a criticism of the arguments which are, so far as logic is concerned, their basis. As the work culminates, and evidently was designed to culminate, in half a dozen chapters which deal with the belief in supernatural beings,' 'duties to gods,' and 'gods as guardians of morality,' we are brought by the 'Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas' to ask ourselves what is the relation of religion to morality. From the point of view of some religions at least, as Dr. Westermarck himself would probably admit, the gods are supposed to ordain and maintain the moral law: the sacred law of Zoroastrianism' enjoins various virtues and condemns various vices; 'we also find a great variety of social duties inculcated in the sacred books of India'; in the national religion of China the heaven-god 'is the author and upholder of the moral order of the world, watching over the conduct of men, rewarding the good, and punishing the wicked'; the gods of ancient Greece acted as administrators of justice'; to the Prophets of Israel' righteousness was the fundamental virtue of Yahveh.' From the point of view of philosophy, the relation between religion and morality may be felt to be so intimate that it leads to the belief in a deity when no other proof of his existence is found convincing,' and a future life is then postulated to redress the balance and repair the evils and injustice of the present world. As Dr. Westermarck says, ' not even Voltaire could rid himself of the notion of a rewarding and avenging deity, whom, if he did not exist, "it would be necessary to invent.' From the point of view of Humanitarianism, however necessary the invention or belief may have been in the past to protect the growth of morality and to foster the development of man's sense of duty to his fellow-man, we have now reached, or are now reaching, in the course of evolution, the stage in which our duty to our neighbour

is strong enough to stand by itself, and the crutch which once supported it must be cast aside, as being now an impediment to further growth. From the Humanitarian point of view Dr. Westermarck, we apprehend, must differ, even if he differs only for the sake of reaching ultimately a more profound agreement. If morality can stand now and henceforward independently of religion, it must always have stood upon an independent basis; so far as religion is now a clog upon morality, and an impediment to its development, so far it must, from the beginning and always, have impeded and retarded it. To prove that, we take it, is the purpose and object of 'The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas': religion and morality have different origins; and their development must also have been different, for religion is waning away whilst morality is, or has been, waxing more and more: 'religious influence has reached its greatest extension at certain stages of culture which, though comparatively advanced, do not include the highest stage.'

What, then, are these different origins? The moral ideas clearly originate, in Dr. Westermarck's view, in the mind of man; the moral emotions on which they are based exist in the heart of man; morality has been created by man. But man also, Dr. Westermarck tells us more than once, created his gods in his own image and likeness': for the strange and startling events which befel him he required an explanation, and he found it in the assumption that they were due to the will of a supernatural being, that is to say, an unfamiliar, mysterious' being. The origin of the religious idea, then, is in the mind, and the emotion on which it is based is that which goes with the mysterious; for 'religion is in its essence mystery.' After all, then, it would seem that morality and religion have a common origin, in so far as they both have their origin in the heart and mind of man, and stand upon that common basis.

Again, if man created his gods in his own likeness, the only morality with which he could endow them was such morality as he had himself. But Dr. Westermarck seems to think that in the beginning, and for some time afterwards,