life. But we have seen with Boussinesq that absolute determinism is not universally true in mathematics, and therefore need not be universally true in Nature, though we do not think it probable that indeterminism and Freedom actually enter in the way indicated by Boussinesq's reasoning. We have seen with Sabatier that the variability which is so remarkable in the organic world, and, according to Darwin, makes possible the evolution of organic forms, appears to show a sensible though very minute degree of indetermination in the physiological and formative, as well as the motor actions of living beings. And we have seen with Delboeuf that the manner in which the Will most probably determines action, without being itself capable of exerting motive power, is by determining the transformation of stored-up energy in the organism into active energy.

We do not deny that all this is hypothetical. But we have to do with questions in which certainty demonstrative certainty, at least is at present unattainable, and may ever remain so. But the doctrine that mind is bound fast in the same chain of fate with inorganic matter is as hypothetical and as incapable of proof as the doctrine of a certain limited freedom of the Will. We are not now replying to those who deny the freedom of the Will on metaphysical grounds; our arguments are directed against those only who deny it on grounds of physical science, and we believe their argument may be refuted on purely scientific grounds.

The so-called scientific argument against the possibility of Freedom has been stated already; namely, that Freedom is inconsistent with the Conservation of Energy; and we have stated Delbœuf's reply to it, which we think sufficient and satisfactory. This, however, is not all that is to be said. If it is true, as the argument implies, that no mental determination can alter the direction in which physical causation acts, much more is involved in this than the denial of Freedom. Moral Freedom was denied on metaphysical grounds before any one had thought of bringing the laws of motion and force into the argument; but, if we deny it on purely physical grounds, we must deny the possibility of Mind being an agent at all. When we shrink from pain or seek pleasure, the older Necessarianism did not think of denying that the fear of pain and the hope of pleasure, which are mental affections, are the cause of the appropriate muscular actions. But if it is true that the law of the Conservation of Energy makes it impossible for any mental determination to change the action of physical causation, then mental determination can neither produce nor influence muscular motion, and con

sciousness misleads us in making us believe that our mental determinations-our desires and our fears-determine our bodily actions.

To mere common sense this conclusion must appear impossible and absurd. Nevertheless it has been accepted by Professor Huxley* and many others of the same school, and is known as the theory of Automatism. It may be thus stated :--"Consciousness, though an effect of physical action, is never its cause, but only its sign. The action of the legs of the patient who kicked violently in response to tickling which he could not feel, is the type of all nervous and muscular action whatever. All such action, whether conscious or unconscious, goes on as if in unconsciousness."

This is a paradox, but many paradoxes are true. To go no further than our present subject, it is a paradox that the Will cannot produce nervous or muscular energy; yet it is quite certain that the Will cannot produce energy, and can at most only direct it. But the paradox which the theory of Automatism requires us to believe is not only great but enormous and monstrous. If Automatism is true, then consciousness is mere surplusage, and not a cause, but only a sign of physical action; and all human history might, without violation of any law of causation, have gone on in unconsciousness; the development of art, science, and faith might have appeared to go on with unconscious puppets for actors, without a throb of pain or a glow of pleasure; wars might have been waged without ambition, pictures painted and statues carved without a sense of beauty, music composed and performed without a sense of harmony, science built up without a love of truth, and prayer uttered without hope or fear,all as the result of nervous action never translating itself into consciousness. Rather than assent to such a paradox as this, we should believe with Sir John Herschel what is scarcely a paradox at all, that the Will has the power of creating energy to an infinitesimally small amount;-though, as we have shown, we do not think this is necessary to a belief in the freedom and self-determining power of the Will.

It may be said that a reductio ad absurdum, however forcible, is worth little outside the domain of pure mathematics and abstract logic. We do not assent to this; but we think a conclusive direct refutation of the theory of Automatism has been given by Mr. Romanes, a writer who is, we believe, beyond any suspicion of theological or meta

* See his address on Autómatism, at the Belfast Meeting of the British Association, as published in the Fortnightly Review, November, 1874.

physical prejudice on such a question. It is simply this:that if consciousness were only an effect without being a cause, and were consequently mere surplusage, it never could have been evolved at all. Whether it is true or not that "natural selection among spontaneous variations" has been the chief cause of vital evolution, it is certain that all vital evolution has been effected under the law of natural selection; and natural selection cannot perfect a useless function, which consciousness would be if Automatism were true.

If, then, the dicta of instinct and common sense are scientifically true; if consciousness can affect matter, and desire and fear can determine bodily actions, all arguments from physical science against Moral Freedom and self-determination are irrelevant and worthless, and the question of the reality of Moral Freedom is left to be decided, or to remain undecided, on the old metaphysical, moral, and, we will add, theological ground.

THE CHAIRMAN (W. N. West, Esq.).-Although the learned author of the paper just read has unfortunately not been able to come to England to attend this evening, I am sure all present will accord him a vote of thanks for this addition to our proceedings, and at the same time feel that his absence has, as far as possible, been compensated for by the clear and distinct manner in which Mr. Cadman Jones has read it. We shall now be glad to hear any observations that may be offered.

Sir J. FAYRER, K.C.S.I., F.R.S. (Vice-President).—Mr. Murphy's paper is not one which I should have felt myself able to discuss, even had it been on a matter to which I had given special attention. One could hardly be expected to take up a subject so abstruse, and containing so much matter for close thought, and discuss it at once. I am glad, however, to have had the opportunity of hearing the paper read, as I like to know that questions of this kind are brought before the Institute, and am glad to see the subject so reasonably argued and fairly considered. I think that a good deal of strong language is occasionally used in reference to great thinkers of the present day, because they do not hold the same views as others who have not had the same opportunities for studying the questions with which they deal.

The subject of to-night is one of importance and interest, and I will not offer any further opinion upon it, except to say that I think conclusions in regard to our organic nature ought not to be accepted as regards our moral nature and our will: at least, I decline so to accept them. An hour ago I did not think I should be standing here in response to a call from the chairman to say a few words. I feel satisfied that in doing this my own will is operating, and that what I am saying is not the result of any precedent cause, other than what may have been excited by the chairman's remarks. There was one point which specially interested me, and that had reference to heredity. There can be no doubt as to the great importance of that subject philosophically and physically; perhaps sufficient attention has not been given to it. The illustrations which the author has given us are those of the pointer and the setter. The peculiarity of these animals is spoken of as being to a certain extent hereditary; and no doubt it is so, for, although the pointer is trained to point and act as a hunting-dog, yet it is also true that he points the first time he goes into the field, and before any teaching can have affected his proceedings. Most sportsmen know that a good young dog will sweep the field after grouse as though it had done the same thing for years. Of course it, needs the keeper to direct and teach it. There are other remarkable examples of it. The following illustration has just occurred to me. Since telegraphic wires have bccome so common on the grouse moors, the number of birds killed by the wires has diminished. It would seem to have become hereditary among the grouse not to fly against the wires and kill themselves, as they formerly did; for one grouse so killed now, the number some years ago was probably tenfold. It is not to be supposed that the grouse which are shot in August can have learned anything more than the birds which have preceded them: the inference is that they have acquired the habit which enables them to avoid the wires in their flight by heredity. It seems very strange that this faculty should be so transmitted. What one would like to know is, the nature of the molecular condition of brain which effects this. Such subjects are of great interest. I will not attempt to discuss them, but as I have been asked to speak, I have thought it right to make the few remarks I have offered.

MR. ST. GEORGE LANE Fox, F.G.S.-I would suggest, in the first place, that there appears to me to be a slight discrepancy between the title of the paper and the author's concluding remarks. Whilst

listening to it, I was not quite sure whether the author intended to put forward a new theory, or to destroy some theories that seem hitherto to have prevailed among scientific men. I now gather that he merely intended to show the futility of attempting to arrive at a solution of the question of moral freedom from a purely physical standpoint. One idea that has been dealt with in the course of the paper is that the operation of the human will is in the direction of suspending the manifestations, as it were, of energy, -of converting latent energy or what the physicists call "potential energy" into the kinetic form, or vice versâ. I think, however, the author has not quite realised that there is a very great distinction between individual action from the standpoint of consciousness, and the operation of force in the physical universe. It seems to me that this is the difficulty with which the author had to contend; that he had not grasped the distinction between the microcosm and the macrocosm, which distinction is, to my mind, the key of the great and perplexing problems we see constantly present in regard to moral action. The operation of physical matter according to recognised laws, that is to say, laws that have been more or less determined by experiment,-is dependent upon a certain phase of material development, upon certain conditions of force and certain limitations of time and space. Now, in the case of the individual man we deal, as it were, with the universe from the microcosmic point of view. There is the will, in the individual effort, as distinct from the operation of force in the physical world, without hypothetically, at any rate, believing in the operation of the universal will. It seems to me that there lies the clue. If we can only conceive that the individual man has a potential universe in himself, and that there are certain relations between his material being, which forms a mere atom, as it were, in the outer universe of which his body is a component part, in its physical aspect, we may gain some insight as to how an interchange of energy takes place between the universal and the individual. This conception of a universal and individualised will may, perhaps, although not affording an explanation of the difficulty, offer a clue to the direction in which it can be found. It is, however, almost impossible to deal adequately with theso questions from the nomenclature available to modern science. There is one other point to which I would like to draw attention; it is this. That the constant use of the word "proof" or "disproof" appears to be an exceedingly arbitrary mode of dealing with a difficult question. This is one of the failures of modern