Does a mere "series of perceptions," each of which gives place in turn to its successor, know itself as a series, and that this series is all that can be known of mind? Has a series of ever-changing, ever-vanishing impressions a continuity of consciousness, a power of retention as memory, and of discrimination as judgment? There can be no criticism without comparison, without remembrance, without selection, without discriminating judgment; and the question forces itself home to the school of Hume, If the mind "is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions," where or what is that faculty which examines and compares these impressions, and which reduces them to an "exact verbal expression" as fact or knowledge? The truth is that Mr. Hume and Professor Huxley necessarily assume a something within man which, though it cannot be known" by direct observation," yet knows itself, and knows other things. The existence of this something, which we call mind, is asserted by the consciousness of all mankind and in the language of every people. It is proved by the consciousness which every man has of personal identity and of individuality; by his exercise of memory and of will; and above all by his sense of right and wrong, and his spontaneous emotions in view of good or of evil. This something knows itself as a Cause, as a Power, and as possessing free will; that is, in all actions having a moral quality it has power to choose a course of action and also power to choose the contrary. Whatever the motive which finally determines its choice-say, if you please, the greatest apparent good-there is always the power of contrary choice. Every man knows these things to be true of himself. But it is absolutely impossible to predicate any of these things of a mere "series of perceptions." Though the existence and the properties of mind may "lie beyond the reach of observation,”—as the term observation is applied to the study of nature,—yet the existence of mind is known in consciousness with a certainty as absolute as that which pertains to the phenomena of nature observed and reported through the senses. In either case the conviction of certainty is given in the mind, or it could not exist at all. How can I know anything if I do not first know the I who knows, so far as to have full confidence in the observations which I make, and in the judgments which I form?

Now, there are also truths which the mind knows by intuition, of which it is as certain as of any fact ascertained by observation, and indeed as certain as of its own existence. Such truths do not depend upon experience but are assumed in all experience. They could not be made a whit more clear or certain by reasoning or observation than they are seen to be by direct cognition. Of this class of truths are the axioms of mathematics. Hume admits that there are "necessary truths,' but he would not class with these the axiom of causation, "That whatever event has a beginning must have a cause." Professor Huxley is more inclined to class causation with necessary truths, and this upon scientific grounds. Thus, on p. 121, he says, "The scientific investigator who notes a new phenomenon may be utterly ignorant of its cause, but he will, without

hesitation, seek for that cause. If you ask him why he does so, he will probably say that it must have had a cause; and thereby imply that his belief in causation is a necessary belief." What is true of the man of science is equally true of the human mind under all possible conditions. It is an intuitive conviction of a necessary truth, that every event must have a cause. It is absolutely impossible for the mind to conceive the contrary. Let any one conceive of absolute universal Nothingness and he will find it impossible to conceive of anything as beginning to be! Either, then, we must have recourse to the unphilosophical conjecture of an infinite series, or we must believe in an eternal Creator of the universe.

In like manner, that adaptation points to a purposing intelligence is an intuitive cognition of the human mind. This does not arise from experience of adaptive power in other men; and though continually verified by experience, it does not rest in experience for its proof. Here too, as above, it is impossible for the mind to conceive the contrary.

Having already exposed the fallacy of Hume on this point, and having traced the notions of causation and of power to their seat in the mind itself, I trust I have opened anew the way for the evidence of God in Nature, which physics is more and more unveiling, for metaphysics to take note of and classify.

The reader who is interested in the preceding points of metaphysical inquiry, but who lacks facilities for studying German philosophy in the original, can put himself in communication with two of the greatest thinkers of Germany, by reading A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant, by Professor Edward Caird, of the University of Glasgow; and The Logic of Hegel, by William Wallace, M.A., Fellow of Merton College, Oxford. Kant was not satisfied with the argument from design, or as it is better called, the physico-theological argument for the being of God; and while controverting Hume on some points, he agreed with him that the existence of order in the universe could at most establish a finite cause. This point I have considered on page 142. But another form of reply presented by Professor Caird is so thoughtful and suggestive that I give the gist of it here, referring the reader to the full argument in his eighteenth chapter.

Why do we seek in things, in the world, and in ourselves, a truth, a reality, which we do not find in their immediate aspect as phenomena of the sensible world? It is because the sensible world as such is inconsistent with itself, and thus points to a higher reality. We believe in the infinite, not because of what the finite is, but quite as much because of what the finite is not; and our first idea of the former is, therefore, simply that it is the negation of the latter. All religion springs out of the sense of the nothingness, unreality, transitoriness-in other words, of the essentially negative character of the finite world. Yet this negative relation of the

mind to the finite is at the same time its first positive relation to the infinite. 'We are near waking when we dream that we dream,' and the consciousness of a limit is already at least the germinal consciousness of that which is beyond it. The extreme of despair and doubt can only exist as the obverse of the highest certitude, and is in fact necessary to it."

Hegel, who was fond of reducing every conception to the last possible analysis, says, "We must decidedly reject the mechanical mode of inquiry when it comes forward and arrogates to itself the place of rational cognition in general, and when it seeks to get mechanism accepted as an absolute category." He then shows how even the argument from design has been vitiated by a mechanical tone.*

"Generally speaking, the final cause is taken to mean nothing more than external design. In accordance with this view of it, things are supposed not to carry their vocation in themselves, but merely to be means employed and spent in realizing a purpose which lies outside of them. That may be said to be the point of view taken by Utility, which once played a great part even in the sciences. Of late, however, utility has fallen into disrepute, now that people have begun to see that it failed to give a genuine insight into the nature of things. It is true that finite things as finite ought in justice to be viewed as non-ultimate, and as pointing beyond themselves. This negativity of finite things, however, is their own dialectic, and in order to ascertain it we must pay attention to their positive content.

Teleological modes of investigation often proceed from a well-meant desire of displaying the wisdom of God, especially as it is revealed in Nature. Now in thus trying to discover final causes, for which the things serve as means, we must remember that we are stopping short at the finite, and are liable to fall into trifling reflections. An instance of such triviality is seen, when we first of all treat of the vine solely in reference to the wellknown uses which it confers upon man, and then proceed to view the corktree in connection with the corks which are cut from its bark to put into the wine-bottles. Whole books used to be written in this spirit. It is easy to see that they promoted the genuine interest neither of religion nor of science. External design stands immediately in front of the idea but what thus stands on the threshold often for that reason gives the least satisfaction."

The burden of my paper is to lead up through this external design to the idea that lies behind it. And here Hegel has given food for thought in his profound saying that Objectivity contains the three forms of Mechanism, Chemism, and the nexus of Design." This neaus holds the world and the universe together in our intuitive conception.

* Pages 291 and 299.

I have the honour to state that your opinion upon the following points will be of much value:

1. What Special subjects should be considered during the coming Session, and who shall be asked to write thereon?

2. What steps shall be taken in regard to a communication from the Chaplain to the Bishop of Madras,* calling attention to the growing Scepticism among Europeans in India, and the large importations, for their use and that of the educated natives, of English pseudo philosophical and quasi scientific publications of a class avowedly intended to promote Scepticism? He states that it is a matter of anxious thought how such a state of things should be met, and that it seemed to him that the papers in the Journal of the Institute might be very suitable for the purpose.t

The following statement mainly refers to the Society's progress since the Report was issued in June.

* Others have sent communications in regard to several of the Colonies, where the circumstances are similar.

Letters lately received from Members and Non-members in the United Kingdom, many Colonies, and also in the United States, urge the great value of the Papers in the Society's Journal, on account of their CAREFUL and IMPARTIAL character; they also contain special references to the discussions; many speak of the usefulness of both, as aids in arranging lectures, and for reference.

So far as the limited amount of the "People's Edition Fund" has allowed, the Institute has sought to carry out the arrangements (see last Report), for placing the "People's Edition" of the few papers republished in that form, within the reach of the public in the United Kingdom, America, and the Colonies;-in doing this it has derived special facilities from the assistance given by its local Members.

*

The Institute has availed itself of the Autumnal Public Meetings to make its organization and objects more known. At Sheffield, among the preparations made by the Institute, previous to the Meeting of the British Association, arrangements were made with Messrs. W. H. Smith, and the local Booksellers, for the sale of the "People's Edition," which was also permitted at the Stationery Stall in the Reception Hall of the Association. The Institute's publications were specially brought under the notice of all the Members of the British Association, and many residents.

adopted at Swansea.

A somewhat similar plan was

A noteworthy article has just appeared in a periodical. It draws attention to the improvement of late years (the article says 14 years, which happens to be the time during which the Institute has been in existence) in the attitude of scientific men towards Revealed Religion; it adds that the contemptuous tone once prevalent at the British Association Meetings was absent at Sheffield; it refers to remarks made by various leading men who spoke,

* The increasing demand for the "People's Edition" has now caused Messrs. W. H. Smith & Son to include them amongst the works sold at their Railway Stalls.