a resident of Edgewood for 1 year, and prior thereto had resided in the borough of Braddock, where he had practiced his profession for 17 years and upwards. H. J. Learn is a merchant engaged in the dress goods business. His place of business and residence is in the borough of Braddock, where he had resided for 16 years and upwards. George Weil is an attorney at law, practicing at the Allegheny county bar, and is and for a number of years has been a resident of Braddock. He was largely interested in the placing of loans secured by mortgages upon real estate in the borough. In part his duty was to examine and appraise properties offered as security, necessitating inquiry respecting the prices at which property was held and sold. Edward M. Brackmeyer was a resident of and had resided in Braddock for 37 years. He is engaged in the steamship, foreign exchange, insurance, and brokerage business. S. C. Richards is an architect and had resided in Braddock for 16 years. Each of the witnesses testified that prior to October, 1905, they knew the Brennan lots or pieces of ground, were familiar with the area of the lots, the improvements thereon, and how affected by the construction of defendant's road, had knowledge of the market value of properties, and knew of sales and prices of real estate in that

vicinity.

"It is urged by counsel for defendant that the sales and prices testified to by certain of the witnesses were sales made to and prices paid by the defendant company. In Pittsburg & Lake Erie R. R. Co. v. Robinson, 95 Pa. 426, cited and approved in Hope v. Phila. & Western R. R. Co., 211 Pa. 401, 60 Atl. 996, Gordan, J., delivering the opinion of the court, said: "Though his (witness') knowledge of the value of lands in that neighborhood may have rested solely upon a few purchases made by the railroad company, and from no other purchases in the real estate market, yet he had some knowledge upon which to base an opinion, and the value of that was for the jury.' We are of the opinion that these witnesses were competent to estimate the value of the Brennan lots and to express an opinion as to the difference between the value of the lots before and the value after and as affected by the appropriation of a part of the lots by the railroad company.

"2. Counsel for defendant moved to strike out the testimony of W. J. Holland for the reason that he had not shown sufficient knowledge of sales or of prices paid or asked for the property in the neighborhood of and similar to the Brennan property, further, that he bases his opinion on sales made to the railroad company; and of H. J. Learn for the reason that his opinion is based on the peculiarity of the location of the land, the uses to which it could be put, and sales of

of the Brennan property.

"Mr. Holland had knowledge of sales made about the time of the appropriation and prices paid on property in the vicinity of the Brennan property, and testified that he knew of the sales of the McCredy property, the P. J. Brennan, the Petty, the Corado, the James McCune, the John Lowe, the Catherine Lowe, the McClelland, the Costello, and other properties. Mr. Learn was the owner of real estate, and in 1905 had purchased property in the borough. He knew of the asking and selling prices of property in the vicinity of the Brennan property, and, referring to the time of appropriation, testified: 'I am familiar with some selling prices and have heard of some asking prices. That made me familiar with them.' He knew of the Worthington and the Robinson sales, both to the railroad company, and the prices at which other properties were held for sale. Mr. Holland and Mr. Learn based their opinion upon their knowledge of values, the size and location of the properties, the then use, and the uses to which the properties were adapted. The motion to strike out was properly refused.

"3. It appears from the testimony taken and filed in support of the rûle for a new trial that on the day of the trial, after testifying, Dr. G. H. McGarey met George C.

Watt in the corridor or hall of the court

house. The trial and testimony given by Dr. McGarey was referred to and commented upon. A few days later Paul D. Remington had a conversation with Dr. McGarey in which Dr. McGarey referred to his testimony. There is a conflict in the testimony taken on the rule in relation to what was said by Dr. McGarey in the conversation with Mr. Watt and with Mr. Remington. It is not necessary to determine the language nor import of the language used by the witness Dr. McGarey.

"Evidence which merely impeaches the credibility of a witness cannot be successfully urged as the ground for a new trial. In the case of Com. v. Laird, 14 York, Leg. Rec. 128, Mr. Justice Stewart held that three witnesses testifying that a material witness for the commonwealth had received $10 for testifying was not a sufficient cause for a new trial. In Com. v. Yot Sing, 7 Kulp, 349, Mr. Justice Rice refused a new trial where the principal witness made affidavit that he had perjured himself on the trial, and three witnesses testified to like effect. In Com. v. Flanagan, 7 Watts & S. 415, the defendants alleged that they were entitled to a new trial because several witnesses had, since the conviction of the prisoners, either admitted that they did not testify to the facts truly, or made statements inconsistent with the evidence given on the trial, and it was held that: 'The rule of law is that the testimony must go to the merits of the case and not testified on a former trial, a new trial is never granted.' The statements made by Dr. McGarey to Mr. Watt and to Mr. Remington, if made in terms as by the witnesses for the defendant testified, tended to impeach his credibility and affect the weight to be given to his opinion as to values.

"4. It is contended by the defendant that the verdict of $53,000 for the plaintiff is excessive.

"The defendant company filed its bond October 21, 1905, and shortly thereafter entered upon the land condemned. There is a marked difference in the value of the property be fore and after the widening of the railroad between the estimates or opinions of the witnesses for the plaintiff and for the defendant. The highest values shortly before the appropriation, as given by a witness for the plaintiff, was $158,848; by a witness for the defendant, $34,430. The highest value immediately after and as affected by the appropriation, as given by a witness for the plaintiff, was $42,239; by a witness for the defendant, $15,851. It has uniformly been held that the court will not grant a new trial because the verdict is too high when the court cannot say that in no view of the case can it be justified. We have carefully reviewed and considered the testimony. Disregarding the estimate of Dr. McGarey, the highest estimate of the depreciation upon the part of the plaintiff is that of W. J. Holland, who testified that the depreciation was $90,172; upon the part of the defendant, the highest estimate of the depreciation was $18,591. The jury evidently weighed the opinions as to values of the witnesses for both the plaintiff and defendant, and ascertained

the amount of the damages from a fair consideration of all the facts and circumstances in evidence. A careful review of the testimony does not convince us that the verdict of the jury should be disturbed.

"Now, July 14, 1910, the motion for a new trial is discharged."

Argued before BROWN, MESTREZAT, POTTER, ELKIN, STEWART, and MOSCHZISKER, JJ.

Edward T. Noble and Johns McCleave, for appellant. Edmond Englert and Thomas M. & Rody P. Marshall, for appellee.

ELKIN, J. This is a proceeding to assess damages for land appropriated for railroad purposes under the right of eminent domain. The lots affected belong to appellee and are located in the borough of Braddock. Buildings and improvements were erected thereon, all of which facts appear in the testimony Most of the assignments of error raise questions as to the competency of witnesses produced by the plaintiff in the court below to

value of the properties affected by the appropriation upon which to base an opinion. After a careful examination of the testimony, the charge of the trial judge, and the opinion of the learned court below refusing a new trial, we have reached the conclusion that all of the witnesses complained of were qualified to express an opinion as to the fair market value of the properties in question before and after the appropriation. The objection to these witnesses is in the nature of an attack upon their credibility and as to the value and weight of the opinions expressed by them. Such questions are for the jury and not for the court. A witness may be fully competent to testify as to the value of a lot of ground because of his general knowledge of land values in the neighborhood, or of his knowledge of the value of the lot in controversy by reason of location, area, improvements, adaptability for certain uses, and other like considerations, and yet his testimony when given may show prejudice or bias to such an extent as to weaken or impair its value. A court, however, would not be warranted in refusing to hear the testimony of a competent witness, or in striking out such testimony when given, because such witness may show bias, or prejudice, or interest. The credibility of the witnesses complained of in the present case and the value and weight of their testimony were for the jury. Lewis v. Water Co., 176 Pa. 230, 35 Atl. 186.

It is argued with much force that the witnesses complained of based their opinions of the general selling value of properties in the neighborhood upon the price paid by the appellant railroad company for adjoining prop

erties in the same block. The rule is well established that particular sales for a particular purpose are not evidence of general market value in the neighborhood. Our latest case on this subject is Friday v. Railroad Co., 204 Pa. 405, 54 Atl. 339, and this decision is strongly relied on by appellant in the case at bar. If the facts disclosed by the record supported this contention, there would be great force in the argument. We do not so read or understand the testimony. The qualification of the witnesses did not depend upon the knowledge they had of the price paid by the railroad company for adjoining properties in the same block, and they did not so testify. It is true they had knowledge of the sales to the railroad company; but these facts were developed on cross-examination by counsel for appellant. They did not say this was the only knowledge they had; but, on the other hand, all testified to knowledge of other sales and showed familiarity with the properties affected by the appropriation, their size, location, improvements, adaptability for business purposes, and mar

party of the second part should receive the appointment, he will accept as full compensation of his services, the sum of six thou sand ($6,000) dollars, and pay over to the city treasurer the amount of the commission allowed by the ordinance, less his compensation as above fixed and the expenses of his office not to exceed an amount to be audited and adjusted by the city controller. And further, that all collections made by him shall be daily paid over to the city treasurer. In witness whereof, the parties above named have hereunto set their hands and seals. [Signed] L. R. Goshorn. Attest: Geo. W. Guthrie." It appeared from the case stated that Goshorn claimed that the agreement which he signed was without consideration and null and void, and that he was entitled to commissions on collections notwithstanding the contract which he had executed.

The court entered judgment for the plaintiff for $31,649.06; Carnahan, J., filing the following opinion:

"The defendant, Lawrence R. Goshorn, was collector of delinquent taxes of the city of Pittsburg from July 5, 1906, until April 5, 1909, in virtue of an appointment by George W. Guthrie, mayor, by and with the consent of select council, in accordance with the law providing for the appointment of heads of departments of the city government. During his term of office Mr. Goshorn collected as taxes and water rents an aggregate sum of $4,604,081.63, and has paid to the city, in aggregate, $4,510,613.16. Subsequent to April 5, 1909, in virtue of the powers vested in him as city controller by the charter act of March 7, 1901, Eustace S. Morrow stated an account between the city and Mr. Goshorn, and filed the same of record in this court. On November 26, 1909, Mr. Goshorn paid to the city the sum of $41,406.97, which includes interest from November 17, 1909. This payment is included in the amount, $4,510,613.16, above stated as the aggregate of payments to the city. Mr. Goshorn appealed from the statement of account so filed, and, as a result of such appeal, this case stated, in which the city of Pittsburg is plaintiff, and the appellant, Mr. Goshorn, is defendant, has been agreed upon, argued by counsel, and submitted.

"The amendment to the charter act of the city of Pittsburg, of June 20, 1901, contains this provision in reference to the collector of delinquent taxes: "The collector of delinquent taxes shall be the head of the department of delinquent taxes. The head of this department shall receive such compensation, either by a stated salary or by fees, as may be fixed by councils.'

*

* *

"By ordinance, duly approved by the mayor March 8, 1906, it was provided: 'Sec. 3. That the compensation of such collector for the collection of all city taxes and water rents hereafter becoming delinquent shall be

by him actually collected and paid into the city treasury; which said five per centum shall be added to all delinquent taxes and water rents hereafter becoming delinquent, as a penalty for nonpayment of the same at the time prescribed by the act or acts of assembly relating thereto; provided, that the said penalty shall only be collected on the amounts collected by said collector, and shall not be added to any exonerations legally made.' This ordinance was not, during the term of Mr. Goshorn. repealed or amended.

"On June 20, 1906, Mr. Goshorn executed and delivered to George W. Guthrie, mayor, a paper of the same date, purporting to set forth an agreement between him and the city of Pittsburg, from which it appears that at that time, he was an applicant for appointment to the office of collector of delinquent taxes; that it was mutually agreed that the compensation of said officer, as provided by ordinance, was excessive; that he agreed that, in case he should receive the appointment, he would accept as full compensation for his services the sum of $6,000, pay to the city treasurer the amount of commissions allowed by ordinance, less the compensation fixed by this agreement, and the expenses of his office not to exceed an amount to be audited and adjusted by the city controller; and that all collections made by the office be daily paid to the city treasurer. This paper was signed by L. R. Goshorn, attested by Geo. W. Guthrie, and is marked 'Exhibit No. 2,' as a part of the stated case. It is not signed by the city of Pittsburg, nor is the official seal of the city attached. Obviously, it was an agreement between the mayor, who was the appointing power, and the defendant, who was an applicant for the appointment; and, while it is not stated in the agreement that the sum of $6,000 was to be the compensation for services in full per annum, apparently it was so understood and acted upon.

"On the day of which the agreement bears date, namely, June 20, 1906, Mr. Guthrie, as mayor, nominated and appointed Lawrence R. Goshorn collector of delinquent taxes of the city of Pittsburg, and the appointment was approved by the select council of the city, in accordance with the statute law so provided. Lawrence R. Goshorn is the L. R. Goshorn who executed and delivered the agreement marked 'Exhibit No. 2.' Mr. Goshorn, having served his full term as collector, is now called upon to meet a claim of the city that he is short in his account to the extent of $30,476.44. It is this sum for which the city claims judgment, together with interest thereon from November 17, 1909. He replies that he is not indebted to the city for any amount, because, at the time of his appointment, and during the whole of his term, his compensation was fixed by law, namely, by ordinance of councils, pursuant to the pro