The distribution of rain through the day, both as regards depth and frequency, is given in the following Table derived from an hourly rain gauge in operation from April to November inclusive : PERIODS Per centage of depth..... " 9.2 12.7 22.8 23.5 17.9 (( frequency.. 14.0 14.0 17.0 17.7 13.9.100 18.0 19.3 100 Where 10 inches of snow are considered as equivalent to 1 inch of rain. On February 7th, a heavy snow-storm occurred, accompanied by a strong gale and intense cold. At one part of the day, when the These numbers include the cases in which both rain and snow have fallen in the same day, and which have been reckoned both in the rain and in the snow tables. GENERAL METEOROLOGICAL Provincial Magnetical Obser LATITUDE, 43° 39′ 4′′ North; LONGITUDE, 5h, 17m. 33s. West.-Elevation ab Mean temperature Difference from average (22 years). 19.86 26.06 Thermic anomaly (Lat. 43° 40' N.)...-12.94-8.64-13.18 Mean height of barometer O 26.92 42.02 47.50 8.18-10.60 29.6517 29.5441 29.6206 29.5640 29.5454 29.5698 29.550 years)...+.0183.0681+.0383-.0230.0392+.0074-.0509 30.330 30.144 30.200 30.120 29.955 29.810 29.830 29.006 28.979 29.034 29.055 28.644 29.176 29.269 1.324 1.165 1.166 1.065 1.311 0.634 0.561 velocity of the wind Mean velocity (miles per hour) 6.11 Difference from average (14 years)...+1.44 +2.50 +1.96 +1.03 +2.55 +0.84 -0.25 N 86 w N 77 WN 54 W N 37 EN 47 WN 39 WN 74 W 2.92 3.86 4.33 2.31 3.60 2.29 1.43 9.30 10.58 10.56 8.90 9.17 4.66 Total amount of rain 4 0.685 0.815 2.125 1.619 3.380 2.329 2.635 Difference from average (21 & 22 yrs )-0.722 -0.231 +0.577 -0.779 +0.139 -0.771-0.855 Number of days rain REGISTER FOR THE YEAR 1861. atory, Toronto, Canada West. ove Lake Ontario, 108 Feet; approximate Elevation above the Sea, 342 Feet. AUG. SEPT. Ост. Nov. DEC. 1861. 1860. 1859. 1858. Year Year Year Year Year Year 1857. 1856. Year 1855. 42.16 43.96 65.48 59.07 48.74 37.14 31.13 44.22 44.32 44.19 44.74 0.541.16 + 3.22 + 0.45 +5.02+0.10+ 0.20 + 0.07 +0.62 3.022.43 -5.06 6.064.87-6.78 -6.686.81-6.26 42.73 14.42 14.24 13.66 13.84 16.38 18.29 18.19 33.3 30.7 39.8 31.2 37.0 44.2 39.4 29.6530 29.6084 29.6191 29.5371 29.7461 29.6008 29.5923 29.6209 29.6267 29.6054 29.5999 29.6249 +.0317.0545-.0309.0768+.0981 -.0125 -.0210+.0076+.0134.0079-.0134 +.0116 29.902 30.104 30.054 30.000 30.182 30.330 30.267 30.392 30.408 30.361 30.480 30.552 29.382 29.076 28.998 29.005 29.171 28.644 28.838 28.286 28.849 28.452 28.459 28.459 0.520 1.028 1.056 0.995 1.011 1.686 1.429 2.106 1.559 1.909 2.021 2.093 N 8 EN 71 WN 61 WN 46 WN 72 WN 56 WN 60 WN 61 WN 41 WN 74 W N 71 W N 62 W 0.46 1.39 1.06 1.94 3.50 2.11 3.32 2.24 1.59 2.54 3.03 2.51 4.21 4.81 5.96 7.44 7.96 7.47 8.55 8.17 -0.96 -0.59 +0.10 -0.05 -0.22 +0.70+1.78 +1.40 7.64 7.99 8.31 8.14 +0.87 +1.22 +1.54 +1.37 2.953 3.607 1.993 4.294 0.560 26.995 23.434 33.274 28.051 33.205 21.505 31.650 +0.002 -0.366 -0.492 +1.154 -0.985-3.329-6.890 +2.950-2.273 +2.881-8.819 +1.326 15 17 15 ... 3.2 6.8 74.8 45.6 64.9 45.4 73.8 65.5 99.0 0.84+0.10- 7.86 +13.17-16.03 +3.27-16.23 +12.17+ 3.87 +37.37 temperature was 14°.3 below zero, the wind was blowing more than 33 miles an hour, with heavy falling and drifting snow. The temperature afterwards fell to 20.98 below zero, but at that time the gale had subsided. he accompanying table is a general abstract of the meteorological observations made at the Magnetic Observatory, Toronto, during the year 1861. AN ATTEMPT AT A NEW THEORY OF HUMAN EMOTIONS. BY WILLIAM HINCKS, F.L.S., ETC., PROFESSOR OF NATURAL HISTORY, UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, TORONTO. In a paper laid before the Canadian Institute on a former occasion, (Journal, Vol. IV., p. 396), I offered some explanation and defence of the Sensationalist Philosophy in relation to the human mind and its operations, which, altogether rejecting innate ideas and instinctive forms of thought, regards the first sensation as the commencement of its enquiries, and endeavours to ascertain the connection of mental states with the physical frame, and the laws according to which they combine and succeed one another. The grand fundamental law, called the law of association, is considered as sufficient to explain all the various intellectual states of which our nature is susceptible; and, according to Hartley, this law depends on physical sympathy between different portions of nervous matter acted upon simultaneously or in immediate succession. Assuming that the law of association has been well expounded by Hartley Brown and James Mill, and that Hartley has given, to say the least, an intelligible and highly probable explanation of its origin, I now propose to extend the application of the same principle so as to offer a consistent and rational explanation of the emotional part of our nature, of the real difference between intellectual states and emotions, and of the common relation between the various passions to which our nature is subject. Writers on the emotions, passions, or active powers, have often given a long list of what they suppose to be different and independent simple mental states, incapable of definition, and only to be known by being experienced or by observing their effects, but perceived to have such a general resemblance as properly to be referred to one class. These they have classified in what seemed to them a convenient manner with a view to considering their influences on our condition, and their moral qualities. Others have endeavoured by analysis to lessen the number of primary passions or emotions, shewing how different names really express the same emotion excited under somewhat different circumstances. With these I agree so entirely that I would carry out their principle to the utmost by admitting only an emotion belonging to pleasure and one belonging to pain, and defining all the others by naming one of these, and pointing to the kind of objects or the condition of things around us in which the peculiar form appears. Such analytical view of the nature and relations of the various emotions would form no unimportant part of a treatise on this branch of the philosophy of mind, but need not be examined in detail in the present connection. There is a very general agreement among philosophers that emotions, passions, or active powers differ essentially in nature from intellectual states, and are felt to have something common to them all as a class, in whatever degree they may differ from each other. This is not indeed a universal sentiment, for both Hartley and James Mill suppose that by due regard to the character of our sensations as pleasurable and painful, and a proper application of the law of association, all the varieties of emotions may be fully explained. I cannot help thinking, however, that the general feeling of those who reflect on the subject is that there is a real well marked difference between intellectual states and emotions, and fully admitting that this difference depends on pleasure and pain as actual sensations, or as ideas intermingling with sensations, I think it desirable, if possible, to ascertain the exact nature and causes of the phenomena. All sensations are commonly said to be pleasurable, painful, or indifferent. The truth seems to be, that every sensation, if not too intense-in which case it becomes painful-is naturally, before it has been affected by frequent repetition, a source of pleasure. Those which we describe as indifferent are such as we have frequent occasion to experience, which causes them to be familiar, and as are not now impressed with any peculiar vividness. The sensation which causes pleasure is either novel or unusually vivid, and if its vividness be in excess it becomes a pain. Thus pleasures repeated become indifferent, scarcely receiving from the mind any notice, |