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the Foreign Secretary is himself required to do what may be called expert work. He is not merely the political chief of his Department, but he also takes the leading share in its technical operations. He personally performs a good deal of the active business of diplomacy. It is not the Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Office but the Minister himself who dictates the dispatches and actually conducts those confidential conversations with Ambassadors on which the course of our policy and the fate of nations may turn. Thus it would seem much more necessary in his case than in that of his colleagues that the collective control of the Cabinet should be effectively exercised upon him; whereas he is more independent than any of them, since it is rarely possible for busy politicians, much occupied with the affairs of their own offices, to follow out in detail the conduct of diplomatic proceedings.

All these considerations have led to the revival of the idea that a Foreign Affairs Committee should be appointed to discuss with the Minister the general outlines of our policy. It is some years since I put forward this suggestion, and at the time I cannot flatter myself that it was received with any particular respect; it was, indeed, regarded as little more than the amiable fantasy of a political theorist. But the progress of recent events has given the theory a very practical application. It seems doubtful whether we can justifiably leave the power to shape the destinies of onefifth of the human race in the hands of one or two gentlemen who have risen to distinction by success in the political arena.

The Committee of Foreign Affairs is now no longer regarded as a merely academic suggestion. It has been taken up by a considerable number of practical persons, and its merits and possibilities are freely discussed. And all the arguments that could be brought forward in its favour a dozen years ago can be urged with increased validity to-day. It can be pointed out, again, that while the direct management of foreign affairs must still remain in the hands of responsible Ministers, a larger power of supervision and information might well be entrusted to the representatives of the people in some form. In more than one country where both the general administration and the conduct of external affairs compare not unfavourably with our own, this expedient has been attempted with success. In France the Bureaux of the Chamber are almost executive bodies, and their activity and the continuity of policy they are able to promote go some way to compensate for the weakness and instability produced by frequent Ministerial changes. In America the Constitution allows the Senate the right to confirm or reject all engagements

made with alien Powers, and this in practice gives it a rather wide, if somewhat loose and indefinite, control over the foreign policy of the Republic. The Committee on Foreign Relations may not be able to shape the policy pursued by the President, but it is, at any rate, regularly informed as to any important step contemplated by the Executive. It sits with closed doors, and its debates are, even in that country of an omnipresent Press, never prematurely communicated to the newspapers. It can, if it thinks

proper, remonstrate with the President when it considers that the State Department is engaged on an impolitic or injudicious course of action; and as the American Constitution requires that all treaties and international conventions must be ratified by the Senate, it is necessary that this Chamber should be fully informed of their purport and meaning before such agreements can be provisionally concluded by the Government. "The Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations is in frequent communication with the President. He can give the Chief of the State a pretty shrewd idea as to whether a particular arrangement is likely to be accepted by the Senate, and he can tell him what modifications will be required if it is to be confirmed."

There is a good deal to be said for constituting a similar Committee on Foreign Relations in the Imperial Parliament. There might be one for the House of Commons and one for the House of Lords; but probably the better arrangement would be to form a joint Committee selected from the two Houses. The Committee should be a small one, say twenty members, of whom twelve might be chosen from the Lower Chamber and eight from the Upper. It would include, of course, members of both parties, and would be appointed, not for the session, but for the duration of the Parliament. It would not be in any sense an executive body; that is to say, it would not be supposed to take the conduct of foreign affairs out of the hands of the Cabinet. Its functions would be to advise, to discuss, to investigate, and generally to act as the eyes and ears of Parliament where its particular department was concerned. It would have power to call for papers, documents, correspondence, and drafts of conventions and agreements with foreign States before these were laid upon the table of the House; and it would be entitled to request the Secretary of State, or his immediate subordinate, to explain the details of the policy which the Ministry proposed to pursue.

The Cabinet would be under no compulsion to adopt the views of the Foreign Affairs Committee; its functions would be merely advisory, and its advice might be rejected. But when Ministers differed from the Committee they would do so under a grave

sense of responsibility, for they would have the full knowledge that this weighty little council, composed of the most competent and influential private members of both Chambers, was against them. And Parliament and the country would have more confidence in the conduct of the most critical department of State if they knew that its intricate and mysterious recesses (necessarily mysterious so far as the mass of the public is concerned) had been explored by a comparatively impartial and reasonably well-informed body of investigators.

We may go further and suggest that no treaty or convention with a foreign Government should take effect until it has been ratified by Parliament. We do not want to conduct delicate negotiations with the blinds up and the windows open; but before the nation is irretrievably committed it ought to know what has been done and how far it is pledged. The processes of diplomacy must usually be conducted in private, but the results should be made public. Our Ministers could not be expected to negotiate on equal terms with the representatives of foreign Governments if their transactions had to be revealed at every stage to Parliament and the newspapers. No reasonable person wants our Foreign Office to play with all the cards on the table for the inspection of rivals and adversaries as well as friends. But all the same, we are far too much under the eighteenth-century tradition of mystification and intrigue in the domain of foreign affairs, and we still keep too close to the methods which prevailed when wars and alliances were made in the closets of sovereigns, by royal favourites and potent Ministers dependent on the throne. Popular government has never really acquired control of this region, and it is perhaps time it did. No doubt our diplomatists would sometimes find themselves at a disadvantage if they could never enter into secret understandings; but that is a disadvantage which must be accepted. Speaking broadly, one is inclined to say that a treaty which cannot be disclosed is a treaty which ought not to be made; and that a nation at our present stage of political development has no right to conclude agreements which it cannot avow even to itself.

SIDNEY LOW.

ITALY'S POLICY AND HER POSITION IN EUROPE.

WHENEVER one of the Powers belonging to the Triple Alliance takes some decisive action without consulting its partners, statesmen and politicians begin to speculate whether the Triple Alliance is still valid. Soon their speculations are reflected in the public Press, and in due course semi-official and official statements appear assuring us that the Triple Alliance is more necessary than ever for the peace of the world, that its binding power continues unimpaired, and that the tie between the three allied monarchs and nations is stronger than ever. Therefore many people have come to believe that the Triple Alliance is as strong and as permanent a factor in international politics as is the German Empire or the Swiss Confederation.

Italy's recent attack upon Turkey has been strongly disapproved of in Germany, and especially in Austria-Hungary. Austria's reproaches have met with very vigorous Italian replies. However, acts are more important than words. It was noticed that practically the whole of the Italian expeditionary force sent to Tripoli was drawn from the 8th, 9th, 10th, and 12th Army corps, that is, from the west of Italy and Sicily. Whilst Italy has thus to some extent denuded of troops her western frontier facing France, she has not only maintained unimpaired, but has actually strengthened, her garrisons facing the territory of her ally, Austria-Hungary, and her garrisons on the shore of the Adriatic where an Austrian landing might possibly take place. The military correspondent of The Times wrote: "The Italian Staff retains as much as possible the power to act against Austria should the necessity arise." Commenting on this curious fact, and various other facts of similar portent, we have again been told that the Triple Alliance is breaking up, but once more the official sources of information have assured us that nothing has occurred to weaken the tie between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy.

Many British people are insufficiently acquainted with the binding force of international agreements in general, and very few people are aware of the serious differences which exist, and which have existed for a long time, within the Triple Alliance, and especially between Austria-Hungary and Italy. These differences are so great, and they have lately become so acute, that they may, and probably will, lead at an early date to an important change in the grouping of the Powers. Therefore we should ask ourselves: What is the binding force of international

treaties and alliances, and what is Italy's position in the Triple Alliance?

Agreements between States are frequently compared with. agreements between persons because of the similarity of the quasilegal wording used in both. However, notwithstanding the analogy of the language used, and the apparent similarity of the transaction, such comparison is not justified. A civil agreement is absolutely binding upon its signatories and can be enforced by a court of law. A merchant who has agreed to sell certain goods at a certain price cannot successfully avoid performance by advancing the plea that fulfilment of the contract would be unprofitable or disastrous to him. The binding force of a civil contract is absolute. On the other hand, an agreement between nations possesses neither unconditional validity nor unlimited binding force. By signing a contract a merchant binds only himself, and he must fulfil the contract even if he has signed away his property. His misfortune affects only himself. Hence it is right that the law courts enforce the unconditional fulfilment of private contracts. But an agreement between States bears a totally different character. Such an agreement is concluded, not by the principals, that is, by the nations themselves, acting in full knowledge of the case and of their responsibility, but only by their temporary agents who are acting on the nation's behalf, by statesmen who have been appointed to promote the interests of the nation and to increase the prosperity of the people. They are the trustees of the nation, and they are neither entitled to sign away the happiness and prosperity of the nation on behalf of which they are acting, nor to fulfil treaty obligations if they are convinced that their performance would be ruinous to the people. Hence a statesman is in certain circumstances bound to deny the validity and binding force of an international agreement, even if it has been signed, not by a predecessor in office, but by himself. Treaties of Alliance resemble laws in their conditional validity. Laws lapse automatically when they are no longer in accordance with the spirit of the time. On the British statute book there are many laws which can no longer be enforced, although they have not been formally repealed. Similarly treaties of alliance, having been concluded between nations with the object of promoting their common interests, lapse automatically when the treaty Powers cease to possess those common interests and aims in furtherance of which the treaties were originally concluded. Bismarck, the father of modern statesmanship, explained repeatedly with his usual directness and lucidity that treaties of alliance possess neither unconditional validity nor unlimited binding force, that both were affected by changing

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