Pola, situated near the northern end of the Adriatic Sea, consists of a spacious bay. It is surrounded with hills, and it is protecte] from the sea by several well-fortified hilly islands lying in front of it. It is defended by no less than twenty-eight forts. Signor Pellegrini wrote: "A naval balance of power in the Adriatic could be said to exist only if there were on the Italian coast a counterpoise to the Austrian Pola, but there is no such counterpoise. It is merely a phrase devoid of meaning to speak of a balance of power in the Adriatic as long as there exists the naval harbour of Pola." Similar views have been uttered by the highest naval authorities in Italy.

South of Pola, and 125 miles distant from it, lies the magnificent natural harbour of Sebenico. It is surrounded by an amphitheatre of hills. Several large fleets could find shelter in its waters, which are more than a hundred feet deep. South of Sebenico, and 185 miles distant from it, lies the magnificent and strongly-fortified harbour of Cattaro, which dominates Cettinje. Naturally the Italians are asking themselves: "Against which Power is Austria fortifying the Dalmatian coast of the Adriatic? What use will she make of the magnificent natural harbours opposite our own unprotected shore? South of Cattaro, and ninety miles distant from it, in Albanian-Turkish territory, lies the magnificent and naturally-protected harbour of Durazzo, and south of Durazzo, and sixty miles distant from it, lies the magnificent and naturally-protected harbour of Valona, which is also called Ablona. The Adriatic is a long arm of the Mediterranean. It has a narrow opening, the Strait of Otranto. Now the port of Valona lies on the narrowest part of the Strait of Otranto, and is separated by a distance of only forty miles from the Italian shore opposite. By its position at the narrow opening of the Adriatic and its great natural strength, Valona is undoubtedly the most valuable among the many valuable strategical harbours which face the east coast of Italy, and Austria and Italy are equally anxious to secure its control. The question whether Austria or Italy is to control the Adriatic is another point with regard to which Austrian and Italian interests are irreconcilable. Whilst Italy argues that her security compels her to control the Adriatic, and especially its strong eastern shore, Austria argues that her only way to the sea is via the Adriatic, and that she cannot allow another nation to control her only outlet to the sea. Besides, she argues that the trade of Albania is by nature Austria's trade, for the whole of Austria's inward and outward shipping must pass the Albanian coast, whilst the Italian steamers have to go out of their way if they wish to touch Albania. Italy's economic policy in Albania, and Austria's

economic policy in that country, are evidently as conflicting as are the political aims of the two countries in that region.

The modern history of Italy is the history of her wars with Austria. In the Southern Tyrol Austria holds the key to Italy's door. In the Adriatic and in the Balkan Peninsula Austria opposes Italy's political and economic expansion. Besides, she oppresses the Italians living in Austria. Italy was forced against her will to enter the Austro-German Alliance. It is therefore only natural that many patriotic Italians are bitterly opposed to Austria and to the Triple Alliance.

In the year 1906 Signor Pellegrini wrote in his important book, Verso la Guerra?—Il Dissidio fra l'Italia e l'Austria :·

"I believe we cannot live any longer under an illusion which deceives us. We have lived under the impression that the internal difficulties of AustriaHungary are so great as to prevent her from aggressive action towards ourselves and from expansion towards the East. We have believed that Austria-Hungary would fall to pieces after the death of the present Emperor. These views are erroneous. If the political crisis in Austria-Hungary should become more acute, and there is reason for doubting this, Austria-Hungary's need to expand and to acquire new markets in the East will become all the greater. And as long as Italian commerce pursues its triumphant course in the East, the more are the opposing interests of the two nations likely to bring about the final collision.

"We cannot continue a policy of vassalage which will compromise for all time Italy's future in order to preserve the outward form of the Triple Alliance. We must ask ourselves: What are our interests? Are we ready to defend them? What are the conditions of the Italians who dwell on the shore of the Adriatic under foreign domination? What are our interests on the Adriatic compared with those of Austria? What are the wishes of our people, and what is Italy's mission in the Balkan Peninsula? Is it possible to avoid a conflict with Austria? I believe I have shown that Austria-Hungary is at the same time our ally and our open enemy, against whom we must prepare for war."

Signor Pellegrini proposed to meet the danger of a collision with Austria-Hungary by an Alliance between Italy and Russia :

'We have to calculate in the future with the fact that the AustroHungarian Empire, though nominally our ally, is our determined enemy in the Balkan Peninsula. Therefore, it is meet that we should enter into more intimate relations with Russia, the only nation which, in co-operation with Italy, can act as an adequate counterpoise. Only thus we can secure the maintenance of the threatened balance of power in the Balkan Peninsula.”

Already in 1902 Monsieur Delcassé had recommended to Italy, in an interview which was published in the Giornale d'Italia on the 4th January of that year, that she should enter upon intimate relations with France and Russia for the protection of her interests in the Balkan Peninsula.

For some considerable time the Italians have been earnestly

considering the possibility of a war with Austria-Hungary. The Rassegna Contemporanea, perhaps the best Italian monthly, which seems to be quite unknown in this country because it was started only four years ago, began publishing in July, 1911, a series of articles by Colonel Angelo Tragni, entitled "Ai Confini d'Italia," in which the military factors which are important in a war with Austria-Hungary are discussed at length. Italian military and naval men have published many books, pamphlets, and articles on the same subject. However, the Italian soldiers are not alone in considering professionally and publicly the possibility of an Austro-Italian war. One of the leading Austrian military papers, the very important Danzer's Armeezeitung, printed during 1911 a series of articles on a possible AustroItalian war. They were recently reprinted in pamphlet form under the significant title, "Without Victory on Sea no Victory on Land: the Decisive Significance of a Naval Victory in the Conduct of a Land War with Italy." The pamphlet has a preface written by the Austrian Vice-Admiral Chiari, in which we read :-Alliances do not last for ever and the ally of to-day may be the enemy of to-morrow.' One must not under-estimate one's opponents. We should no longer meet the Italian soldiers who were beaten by the Austrians at Novara, and still less the Italian sailors who were beaten by the Austrians at Lissa. I have always admired the splendid naval material of Italy with feelings of envy."

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The most important passages of the pamphlet itself follow, and I would mention that the italicised portions of its preface and of its text are also italicised in the original. All military technicalities have been omitted:

"The crisis during the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has shown that notwithstanding our alliances we must still reckon with the possibility of a war on several fronts. . . In Italy nearly all warlike preparations are directed against Austria, her hereditary enemy, and her standard of armaments is supplied not by Italy's interests, but by our own military power. We must prepare armaments sufficient to meet the whole force of Italy, but not of the Italy of to-day, but of the Italy of to-morrow, when the unavoidable collision will occur. It is certain that we have to reckon with a war on several fronts. Without hesitation one can prophesy that our ally in peace will be our enemy in war, that Italy will rather be found on the side of our enemies than on our side, that we shall have to meet the combined armies of Russia, Italy, Servia, and Montenegro. That was probably in the mind of the Minister of War when he spoke of the possibility of a war on several fronts. . . We should naturally aim our first and our strongest blow at our nearest and most dangerous opponent, at Italy. .

"During 45 years we have been perfecting Austria's armaments in order to arrive at military superiority in general, and, since some time, to be able to defeat Italy in particular. But we must not deceive ourselves. We shall no longer meet the Italians of Novara and Custoza, for Italy has not stood still. Nor shall we meet the Italians who were defeated on the Adowa, for she has made up for past neglect with redoubled energy.

'Is, in case of a European conflagration, the superiority of our armies operating in the Italian province of Venetia against the Italian army so striking that we may reckon upon the immediate and sweeping success which is necessary for us in view of the difficult position in which we may find ourselves? Consideration of all factors shows that this question must be answered in the negative. Our superiority is not sufficiently great. The Italian army is, through its numbers, organisation, armament, and training, able to offer the most determined resistance even against the mightiest enemy, and its power of resistance will be greatly increased in a war which the Italian nation will wage with all its heart. 'Whilst the North-east of Austria-Hungary has sufficient room for employing armies of from fifteen to twenty army corps, the territory of Venetia is limited. Its narrowness is a factor of the greatest importance. Owing to its narrowness we can turn the flank of the Italian army only by operating over sea, and herein lies one of our best chances and the absolutely necessary condition of a victory on land. A decisive victory of our fleet enables us to turn the Italian position and leaves undefended the great centres of the country. Preparations must be made on the largest scale for the transport of troops across the sea in very large numbers. A decisive victory on sea! That will be the principal need of the situation in a land war against Italy. The protection of our coasts and harbours, which, according to semi-official statements is the object of our fleet, is, in reality, an unimportant matter." Deeds reveal most clearly a country's aims and intentions. Of late years the Italian and Austrian naval manoeuvres were frequently merely rehearsals of an Austro-Italian war. Both Italy and Austria have greatly strengthened their fortifications and their garrisons on the Austro-Italian frontier, and, following Germany's example, Austria-Hungary has begun building a large fleet. At present she is building or completing four Dreadnoughts of 20,000 tons each. Many English people have surmised that the Austrian and Italian Dreadnoughts were intended to fight on Germany's side against Great Britain. The foregoing pages should make it clear that the Austrian Dreadnoughts are perhaps more likely to be employed against Italy.

The Italians are not idly looking on whilst Austria-Hungary is building Dreadnoughts and creating numerous naval bases opposite the Italian coast. Italy is rapidly increasing her fleet so as to maintain her present lead, and she is transferring its headquarters from the west coast of Italy to the Adriatic. She has considered creating, at the cost of £40,000,000, a war harbour to the south of the Isole delli Tremiti. She has begun converting the port of Taranto, close to Brindisi, into a war harbour, and she has created bases for torpedo-boats on her eastern coast at Ancona, Porto Corsini, Isole delli Tremiti, Manfredonia, Barletta, Bari, Brindisi, Otranto.

mutual trust and Between Italy and

An alliance is an impossibility without without a community of aims and interests. Austria-Hungary there exists evidently, not a community, but an incompatibility, of aims and interests.

By her attack upon Turkey Italy has seriously damaged the Triple Alliance. The support of Turkey in case of an AustroGerman war against Russia would have been far more valuable than the support of Italy in case of a war with France. Italy could only have done a little damage on the strongly-fortified and very mountainous French frontier, but Turkey could have aided Germany and Austria-Hungary against Russia very materially in the Black Sea. Germany and Austria-Hungary have allowed their unreliable partner to knock down their strong and reliable friend. Italy's ultimatum to Turkey ought to have been answered by a German ultimatum to Italy which would have prevented the war. By abstaining from action, Germany and Austria have at the same time lost the friendship of Turkey and not gained the goodwill of Italy. By attacking Turkey, Italy has revenged herself upon Germany and Austria for the Congress of Berlin. For all practical purposes the Triple Alliance is dead. Italy may conceivably remain a member of the Triple Alliance and enter into suitable secret arrangements elsewhere. If she should formally withdraw from the Alliance, she will probably immediately join the Triple Entente, for she is not strong enough to stand alone. In that case Germany's only ally will be AustriaHungary. Except for Austria-Hungary, Germany would be isolated in the world, and then another prophecy of Bismarck might come true. He wrote in his Gedanken und Erinner

ungen:

"In taking account of Austria it is even to-day an error to exclude the possibility of a hostile policy such as was pursued by Thugut, Schwarzenberg, Buol, Bach, and Beust. May not the policy which made ingratitude a duty, the policy on which Schwarzenberg plumed himself in regard to Russia, be again pursued against another Power?

"The field in which Russia can make offers to Austria is a very wide one; there is not only the East at the expense of the Porte, but Germany, at our expense. If Russian policy succeeds in winning Austria, then the coalition of the Seven Years' War against us is complete, for France can always be induced to act against us, her interests on the Rhine being more important than those in the East and on the Bosphorus."

The weakening of the central European group of Powers by the secession of Italy, and the strengthening of the FrancoRussian group by Italy's joining them, would alter completely the balance of power in Europe. It would again make France the predominant Power on the Continent, and then France might feel tempted to seek revenge for Sedan and endeavour to induce Austria to seek revenge for Königgrätz. Germany is in danger of becoming completely isolated. Herein lies the great seriousness of the situation.

J. ELLIS BARKER.