Can Anglo-German relations be improved, and what should be done to improve them?

Unfortunately, deep distrust exists between Great Britain and Germany. That distrust is unwarranted on the part of Germany, and it has been artificially created among them by a campaign of misrepresentation. The German masses have so persistently been told that Great Britain is envious of Germany's prosperity, and that she plots to bring about her downfall, that they have at last come to believe it, and are clamouring for a powerful fleet for their defence against Great Britain. British distrust of Germany, on the other hand, is due to this artificial German agitation, to the attitude of Germany's diplomacy, to the antiBritish pronouncements of Germany's leaders and the German Press, and especially to the most palpable evidence of Germany's intentions, the great German fleet, which, as many Germans have admitted, can only be meant for use against Great Britain. The continued enlargement of the German fleet will not increase Germany's security, for under no conceivable circumstances will Great Britain and her colonies allow the unchallengeable supremacy of the British Navy to be in the least reduced by Germany. On the other hand, the continued enlargement of the German fleet is bound to increase the tension between the two countries. Therefore the first step towards an improvement of Anglo-German relations must be taken by Germany, and it must take the shape of a limitation of naval armaments. The Navy Bill of 1900, with its subsequent enlargements of 1905 and 1908, fixed Germany's output of warships till 1917, and provided for two large ships in every year between 1912 and 1917, or twelve altogether. However, the German Navy League and the German Nationalist Press are now demanding that the Navy Bill of 1900 should again be increased, and that in every year from 1912 to 1917 three Super-Dreadnoughts should be con structed. If the German Government construct between 1912 and 1917 eighteen Super-Dreadnoughts, Great Britain will have to produce thirty-six Super-Dreadnoughts. If the German Government has really the wish to improve Anglo-German relations, it can now show that it is in earnest by keeping her shipbuilding programme within the limits laid down by the Navy Bill of 1900 and the amendments of 1905 and 1908, and it will be wise to do so, especially as Germany's naval position will be no better whether she produces twelve Super-Dreadnoughts or eighteen Super-Dreadnoughts during 1912-17. In a few weeks' time we shall know the mind of the German Government. If it should not demand additional credit for the construction of six additional Super-Dreadnoughts, an atmosphere conducive to an Anglo-German rapprochement will be created; but until the

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German Government has shown that it is in earnest with its intention to arrive at an understanding with Great Britain, it is quite useless for Germans and Englishmen to talk of AngloGerman friendship and co-operation and of the natural union of the countries of Goethe and Shakespeare.

As soon as Germany has shown by deeds that she wishes to live on good terms with Great Britain, as soon as she has shown * that she desires no longer to create for herself "a fleet of such strength that a war with the mightiest naval Power would involve risks threatening the supremacy of that Power," Great Britain will reciprocate. Great Britain can give valuable assistance to Germany in all parts of the world. As soon as Great Britain feels convinced that Germany's intentions are peaceful, the Anglo-German differences regarding the greatest transmaritime undertaking of Germany, the Baghdad Railway, which at present is considered in Great Britain to be rather a German strategical railway than a Turkish business undertaking, will no doubt be adjusted. In course of time colonies may come into the market, and with British support Germany will easily obtain the outlets which she requires. If, on the other hand, Germany ✰ again enlarges her naval programme, and continues antagonising and demonstratively threatening Great Britain, Anglo-German relations will steadily become worse and we shall have every reason to take a pessimistic view of the future.

I have lately spent six weeks in Germany, where I have met many of the leading people, and I have unfortunately received the impression that the German Government apparently does not wish for an improvement in Anglo-German relations. Apparently its policy is to keep alive the artificially created national animosity against Great Britain by encouraging the unceasing misrepresentations and attacks upon Great Britain in the semi-official Press. Its principal aim seems to be the creation of an extremely powerful navy. Ever since 1900 it has appealed to popular passion for support, and has called upon the people to provide the necessary sums "to protect Germany against England's hostility." As long as the possession of a powerful navy is Germany's principal aim, does not suit the German Government to be on good terms with Great Britain, all advances on the part of Great Britain will be useless, and Lord Haldane may have wasted his time.

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The German Press is still repeating the fable that during the Morocco crisis Sir Edward Grey had threatened Germany, who had never intended to occupy a part of Morocco. Unfortunately a portion of the British Press has echoed the German story, and has violently attacked Sir Edward for his "unwarranted interference." It is true that the German Chancellor and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs have publicly declared that Germany had never

intended to occupy Moroccan territory, but since then revelations have been made which belie their assertions. Before a court of law, in a political libel suit brought by the editor of the RheinischWestfälische Zeitung against the Grenzboten, the editor of the former paper stated on January 19th, 1912 :

"Mr. Class, the President of the Pan-Germanic League, is prepared to state upon oath before this Court that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Herr von Kiderlen Wächter, writing to him from Kissingen, requested Mr. Class to meet him at the Hotel Pfälzer Hof in Mannheim. During the interview, which occupied several hours, Herr von Kiderlen Wächter stated: 'the Pan-Germanic demand for the possession of Morocco is absolutely justified. You can absolutely rely upon it that the Government will stick to Morocco. Monsieur Cambon is wriggling before me like a worm. The German Government is in a splendid position. You can rely upon me and you will be very pleased with our Morocco policy. I am as good a PanGerman as you are.' On the 1st July Mr. Class called at the German Foreign Office and, failing to find Herr von Kiderlen Wächter, was received by Herr Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary. Mr. Zimmermann told him : 'You come at an historic hour. To-day the Panther appears before Agadir and at this moment (12 o'clock mid-day) the Foreign Cabinets are being informed of its mission. The German Government has sent two agents provocateurs to Agadir and these have done their duty very well. German firms have been induced to make complaints and to call upon the Government in Berlin for protection. It is the Government's intention to seize the district and it will not give it up again. The German people require absolutely a settlement Colony. Please prevent, wherever in the Press you have influence, the raising of claims for compensation elsewhere. Possibly France will offer us the Congo. However the German Government does not want compensation elsewhere, but a part of Morocco.'"

The foregoing most important and most interesting statement throws a vivid light upon the Morocco crisis, and explains its genesis. This statement appeared, as far as I am aware, only in the Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung and in the Tägliche Rundschau, but it was suppressed by the German semi-official Press, which preserved a judicious and significant silence. However, as it was not repudiated by Herr Class, by Herr von Kiderlen Wächter, or by Herr Zimmermann, we must assume that it was correct in substance and in detail. The statement shows clearly that it was Germany's deliberate intention to occupy Morocco, notwithstanding the protestations to the contrary of the Imperial Chancellor and the Foreign Secretary. It has made it clear that, but for Great Britain's energetic intervention, war would most probably have broken out between Germany and France over Morocco. We may, therefore, conclude that, through the British Government's timely and vigorous action, peace was preserved, and that the German complaints about Sir Edward Grey's "unwarranted interference" were baseless.

LONDON, February 15th, 1912.

J. ELLIS BARKER.

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AMERICAN PROBLEMS.

I.

Canadian Reciprocity and the Arbitration Treaty. DURING the short visit to what you call "The States," from which I am returning, I have seen a certain number of men in close touch with great affairs, of whose views, mixed with some of my own, I will offer you an impression. If it should not in all respects correspond with the impression prevailing in England, I can only ask you to take it for what it is worth. I shall try to set forth what I believe to be the truth about the President, his policies, and his prospects, and to deal, first of all, with the subjects in which I suppose Englishmen are chiefly concerned, namely, Canadian Reciprocity, the Arbitration Treaty, Trusts, the Tariff, and Mr. Taft's chances of re-election to the Presidency-a matter which really affects English interests.

Canadian Reciprocity, it is true, is no longer a live subject, but there is still a word to be said if only in the nature of a funeral oration. The President who conceived this great scheme -for whether you like it or not you will admit that it was a great scheme and the American people, of whom a vast majority supported it, have accepted their defeat loyally. So far as I can see, there is no resentment, no bitterness; only a genuine disappointment. We are disappointed, not because we thought we had the best of the bargain-that is still a disputed point—but because a great opportunity for drawing closer the friendly relations between Canada and the United States has passed, and passed forever. We must, and Canada must, revert to the old commercial hostilities we hoped to soften, if not wholly to end. We thought Sir Wilfrid Laurier a wiser statesman, with a truer view of Canadian interests, than his victorious rival. But since Canada thought otherwise we have no more to say.

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One misconception, however, it is important to dispel. President's "parting of the ways" speech was believed in England to have a political meaning, or even purpose. I know on authority which cannot be questioned, and on which I shall rely largely in all I say, that it had not. In that speech, as throughout the whole discussion, the President's mind was wholly occupied with commercial, not political, aims. He never dreamed of a closer political connection between Canada and the United States. He thought Reciprocity a policy large enough to stand by itself; as н н 2

it surely was. If he had not, he would have let it alone. Nor did he imagine that commercial union, complete or incomplete, would necessarily or probably, in the near or in the distant future, lead to political union. His view was the American view. There is no party, no important body of public opinion, in the United States in favour of annexing or absorbing Canada. There is, to be sure, Mr. Champ Clark, who holds, by some inexplicable caprice of the Democratic majority, the Speakership of the House of Representatives. But when Mr. Champ Clark talked loosely about annexation, he spoke neither for his party nor-still less and far less-for the American people. He spoke as the emotional and irresponsible politician he is. When the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, answering a question in the House of Commons, said that he did not suppose Mr. Clark's declaration need be taken seriously, he expressed the American as well as the English estimate of this outburst. It made no impression, elicited no response, hardly even provoked comment at home till it had been cabled to England and the English comment on it had been cabled back. The cable in such a case, and in many other cases, is by no means an unmixed blessing.

As for the British Ambassador and his share in these Reciprocity proceedings, it was well understood in Washington that Mr. Bryce was acting on instructions, special or general, from Downing Street. These instructions were supposed to spring from the wish of the Government to obstruct Imperial Preference and Tariff Reform, even if Imperialism suffered at the same time. With such considerations the President, of course, had nothing to do. He was glad of any help he could get from Mr. Bryce. I do not think it once occurred to him that the Imperial tie between Great Britain and Canada could be loosened by the success of Reciprocity. He certainly had no wish that it should be. Mr. Bryce, moreover, has always been the active and efficient representative at Washington of Canadian interests. He has been Canadian Minister as well as British Ambassador. If I may be permitted an opinion on such a question, I think it desirable alike for Great Britain, for Canada, and for the United States that a British Ambassador in Washington should have the confidence of Canada, and be recognised informally by the American Government as the agent of Canada. I do not think there is any ground for the suggestion that Mr. Bryce had been indiscreet or over zealous in his support of Reciprocity. Nor, for that matter, in any other respect. I heard him criticised in England for speechmaking, and people asked why a British Ambassador should be delivering addresses in Oklahoma or other remote or near regions of this great continent. Well, why should he not? It pleases