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further cause of disquiet was the fact that after this arrangement
the Premier on the one side, and Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Lloyd
George on the other, had spoken strongly in public on the subject
of women's suffrage. The prospect of members of the Cabinet
going up and down the country speaking against each other was
viewed with grave concern. It was felt that even though the
subject was non-party this could not fail to spell disruption.

In these circumstances a proposal was put forward from a
certain influential quarter in favour of the submission of the whole
subject of women's suffrage to a referendum. The proposal was
taken up fervently. The spectacle of a section of the Liberal
Press-while the echoes of their denunciations of Mr. Balfour's
referendum proposals as un-English, impossible, and destructive
of representative government were still in the air-suddenly
plunging into an enthusiastic defence of the referendum as a
sound and desirable expedient in an emergency, furnished an
interesting sidelight on the versatility of modern politics. It was
otherwise of little interest. It is not merely that the difficulties
in the way-a Bill would have to be passed and machinery set up
as a preliminary-are well-nigh insuperable; but that the adoption
of the referendum, in such circumstances, would be a flagrant
and not very reputable attempt to dodge the issue in Parliament,
in order to get it snowed under in the country. Mr. Asquith is not
likely to lend himself to such a subterfuge. Nor ought there to
be any danger to the Government in a straightforward fulfilment
of Mr. Asquith's pledge on the subject. It will put to the test
the reality of the House of Commons' sentiment on the subject.
If the sentiment is sincere the vote for women will be won.
it is in a large measure a pious opinion not intended for a work-a-
day world, it will be defeated. In either case the Cabinet's
prestige is unaffected.

If

There is some fear that in so heavily mortgaged a session the Manhood Suffrage Bill may not get through, owing to lack of time, and a proposal, strongly supported, has been made for the treatment of the plural voting question in a separate Bill early in the session. This Bill-a simple measure providing penalties for recording more than one vote in any general election-would be brief, and would, it is claimed, not interfere with the prospects of the larger measure; would, indeed, help its chances by relieving it of its most objectionable aspect from the Conservative point of view. Probably the women suffragists would take alarm. They are full of suspicion, and would see in the expedient an intention on the part of the Government to secure the reform they are most anxious for without being compelled to rely on the passing of a Bill on which women's suffrage had been engrafted.

In the circumstances they would be compelled to centre their hopes again on the Conciliation Bill. The probability is that Mr. Asquith will carry out the programme he has laid down without variation. No one in politics has ever shown greater loyalty than he has done to the strict letter of a bargain, or a stronger disinclination to anything that bears even the suspicion of evasion.

In this survey of the Government's programme there seems no ground to anticipate disaster. Nor are the rumours of Cabinet dissensions anything more than exercises in journalistic invention. There are differences, of course. Twenty men cannot think alike on all points of policy and strategy. But there is agreement on all essentials, and the Cabinet is absolutely one in its loyalty to a leader who combines unrivalled Parliamentary capacity with a singularly generous and tolerant attitude to his colleagues. So far as the party is concerned it has the strongest motive for cohesion. Each section is dependent on the support of the others for the attainment of its purposes. And one effect of the Parliament Act is to make the motive operative, not for the immediate session only, but for the successive sessions required to carry a measure against the resistance of the Lords. Liberal Governments no longer think in sessions, but in parliaments. This fact will have an important consolidating influence upon the party. It will strengthen the "will to live." It will remove the sense of defeat and depression which used to overtake the party when at the end of a toilsome session the fruit of its labours was thrown on to the rubbish heap by the House of Lords. Henceforth

What though the field be lost?

All is not lost.

The Bill remains. It remains vital and unscathed, and time is the only condition required for its triumph. In that fact the party has a new and powerful motive to live.

A. G. GARDINER.

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LORD KITCHENER IN EGYPT.

IN the last September number of this journal an article was published which dealt with the situation in Egypt at the death of Sir Eldon Gorst. The writer of that article, who seems to have been well-informed, predicted that Sir Eldon's successor, Lord Kitchener, would not find the task before him a difficult one; for the opposition to British rule had been largely dissipated by the clever policy of Lord Cromer's much-abused successor, and the road to administrative reforms had been cleared and made ready. It was pointed out, very truly, that Lord Kitchener, by reason of his great reputation, would not be subjected to that 1 "heckling" which so distracted his predecessor, and would be free to impose his will upon the native ministers without being encumbered by the fluent comments of a united party of Nationalists. It was further suggested that the new British Agent would have time to devote some of his attention to international affairs, and would raise British prestige throughout the whole Mediterranean littoral.

Six months have now passed, and it is already possible to observe the trend of events in Egypt. The predictions made in the above-mentioned article have proved correct; but, owing to the momentous occurrences which have lately taken place in the countries neighbouring to Egypt, an importance is to be attached to affairs on the banks of the Nile which makes it desirable to supplement, in the light of these recent complications, the remarks made, during the quiet days of last summer, by one who was evidently somewhat biassed in favour of Sir Eldon Gorst and his policy.

The 29th of September was Lord Kitchener's first day as British Agent in Cairo. On the very next day Italy sent her ultimatum to Turkey, and on October 1st declared war upon the Ottoman Empire, of which Egypt forms an integral part. For many years the Italians had coveted that portion of the North African coast which lies opposite to their native shores; and both in speeches and in books their statesmen had advocated with the greatest vehemence the seizure of Tripoli. Italy's only rival in this proposed game of "grab" was Germany; and when events in Morocco were beginning to point to Germany's failure to obtain any footing in that country, there was some reason to suppose that the Kaiser would turn his attention to Tripoli. The Italians, therefore, felt that if the desired territory was not to slip from

their grasp, they must seize upon it without delay. Preparations for war were hurriedly made, and already in the early summer of last year the plans were formulated.

Now it must be remembered that Italy is a nation with whom we are on the most friendly terms, but with whom Austria and Germany, in spite of the Triple Alliance, have many bones to pick. The events of last July showed the Italian statesmen very clearly that the strong policy of England and France would require all the attention of Austria and Germany for the next few months, and that the moment was thus opportune for an attack upon Tripoli which should not be impeded by European interference. Austria would not interfere, lest in so doing she should fail to be ready to help Germany in her war with England and France, which, at that time, seemed imminent; and, in view of that coming war, neither France nor Germany were likely to worry her. England, however, had to be reckoned with; for, though our attention was fully occupied in Europe, it lay in our power to make the Tripoli expedition a most hazardous affair simply by permitting the Turks to march through Egypt to the seat of hostilities. Before the projected expedition could be launched, therefore, it was necessary for Italy to ascertain the attitude of England, and to obtain her promise to hold Egypt neutral. This promise, however, could not be lightly given, for it might lead to grave complications with the Porte. Egypt is a vassal of Turkey, and is under the obligation to provide the suzerain State with an unlimited number of troops should she require them; and had the British not been the occupying power, the Nile Valley would certainly have formed the Turkish base. England, therefore, had to be consulted with regard to Tripoli, and her attitude to Italy recognised as absolutely friendly, before war could be declared.

No public statement has yet been made which would indicate that the British Government made any agreement with Italy last summer; but there can be very little doubt that some sort of understanding was arrived at. England, it would seem probable, consented to prevent Turkish troops from entering Tripoli viâ Egypt, and so far as possible to put a stop to all gun-running or other belligerent enterprises. She appears to have undertaken to keep Egypt absolutely neutral, and to allow the Porte no assistance from its vassal. The granting of these concessions to Italy are clearly indicated by our present actions in Egypt, which, as will be related below, are of a very deliberate nature; while the despatch of Lord Kitchener to Cairo and the outbreak of hostilities as soon as he had arrived in his new abode, can hardly be attributed to mere coincidence. It seems quite evident that

our attitude to Italy was as follows: "Since it appears to be inevitable," said we, "that some European Power will pounce upon Tripoli, we in Egypt much prefer you as our neighbours to, say, the Germans; and though we do not wish to offend Turkey by actively taking your part, we will show our friendliness to you by holding Egypt neutral. To do this, however, we shall require to send a very strong man to Cairo, and you must promise not to declare war until he has arrived there. In return for our kindness to you we shall expect you to play a friendly part towards us in the event of a European conflagration."

Lord Kitchener, if the above suppositions are correct, found himself, on arriving in Egypt, in a situation which required very delicate handling; and when the expected Italian ultimatum was despatched and the expedition to Tripoli at last became a reality, he was called upon to face a possible crisis of the most violent nature. It is commonly said in Egypt that had he not been in that country during the early stages of the war, the situation would have been most dangerous. Thanks, however, to his great reputation, and to the awe and reverence in which he is held, the situation is, on the whole, tranquil, and, so far as one can see, contains no elements of great danger. The Egyptians were delighted with his politeness and cordiality, and felt that in him they had a friend who would show them how to act in this difficult situation. Their sympathies are entirely with the Turks, their brother Mussulmans, and they believed that Lord Kitchener's prejudices were on the same side.

Early in the war he is said to have been approached by a number of Egyptian officers who asked permission to volunteer for active service in Tripoli. Lord Kitchener replied that he would gladly give them permission to do so, but that their vacant posts would have to be filled by junior officers, and they themselves would probably find on their return that they had been placed on the retired list, not by his wishes, but by reason of the upward pressure due to the congestion in the junior ranks. He advised them, therefore, to curb their heroic ambitions, so natural to Egyptians, and to stay at home: which they did. At another time certain notables proposed that Egypt should send three or four regiments to the aid of the Turks. Lord Kitchener said that he would have no objection, but that, in order to preserve internal quiet, he would be obliged to replace the absent troops by an equal number of British regiments; at which the proposal was hastily withdrawn. A few weeks later a deputation of Bedouin chieftains waited on Lord Kitchener to ask him to permit them to gather their tribes and to travel into Tripoli to fight the Italians. His lordship congratulated them most heartily on their warlike