once.

plans were well under way for the reorganization of the government under the auspices of well-known moderados. Before it had been accomplished Trist again asked the Mexican commissioners to meet him. A month elapsed before he had an answer, and he asked Buchanan for permission to return home, as the weakness of the new government might keep him "hanging here for an indefinite period without accomplishing anything. Buchanan's letter of recall reached Trist November 16. Trist acknowledged it, waived for the moment any defense of his actions, and stated that he would start home at Following hard upon the receipt of his recall Trist received word, again through Thornton, that the new Mexican administration had appointed commissioners. He replied, November 24, that, as he was about to return to the United States, whatever overtures Mexico desired to make would be forwarded through Scott to Washington. Despite this statement and notwithstanding his orders to return, he began immediately to negotiate with the Mexican commissioners upon the basis of his original instructions. The reasons for this change in plans are set forth in a letter of sixty pages written December 6.4 This letter was certainly of a character to arouse the President's indignation. The diary describes it as "impudent, arrogant, very insulting to the government and personally offensive to the President ". The writer of it was "destitute of honor or principle and contemptibly base". "It is manifest to me ", wrote Polk, "that he has become the tool of General Scott and his menial instrument and that the paper was written at Scott's instance and direction. I directed the Secretary of War to write to Major General Butler [who had superseded Scott], directing him, if Mr. Trist was still with the headquarters of the army, to order him off and to inform the authorities of Mexico that he had no authority to treat." Scott, writing at the same time, said: "No proposition has been made to me, looking to a peace, by the federal government of this republic, or its commissioners; the latter understood to be still in this city. I have not seen them.” 6

This long despatch of Trist's doubtless justified Polk's suspicion that Scott instigated it. While Trist said that the government would be left at liberty to disavow his act, he set forth his reasons for 1 Trist to Buchanan, October 31, 1847, S. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Congress, I Session, 213.

2 Thornton to Trist, November 22, 1847, and to Peña y Peña, November 24, 1847, ibid., 231.

3 Trist to Peña y Peña, November 24, 1847, ibid.

Trist to Buchanan, December 6, 1847, received January 15, 1848, ibid., 231-266 5 Polk's diary, January 15, 1848.

6 Scott to Marcy, December 4, 1847, H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Congress, I Session, 1033-1035.

reopening negotiations as: 1, that peace was still the desire of the President; 2, that unless he seized the opportunity offered, no other chance for peace would remain; 3, that the boundaries stipulated in his instructions were as much as Mexico would ever yield; and 4, that his recall was based upon a supposed state of facts the reverse of the truth. Underlying all of his arguments in support of these reasons is the thinly-disguised innuendo that the President had changed his plans and now favored the annexation of all Mexico. In other words, Trist proceeded to make a treaty embodying Polk's original idea of territorial indemnity with the express intention of throwing upon the President the unpleasant alternative of either accepting the treaty or rejecting it. If Polk rejected it, he must bear the odium of seeking to annihilate Mexico as a nation and of renewing a war which was now unpopular. If he accepted it, he would then, according to Trist's belief, sacrifice his cherished wish, the conquest of the whole of Mexico. Such is the import of this unique despatch. Trist's assumption that Polk desired the absorption of all Mexico has been proved to be baseless.1 Reasonably enough, the President felt that the amount of money to be paid Mexico for the cession should be less than would have been the case had the war ceased seven months before. Pillow was in favor of greater territorial indemnity and claimed while in Mexico to be the President's mouthpiece. Trist shared Scott's hatred of that officer, and the parts of the despatch not directly or by inference attacking Polk are filled with venom against Pillow.

Before Butler had an opportunity to carry out Polk's order, Trist had signed the treaty and sent it on its way to Washington. There are no detailed accounts of the conferences of which the treaty was the result. We know that for two months Trist met the commissioners daily, that the original projet was taken as a basis for the negotiation, and that there was apparently little difficulty in agreeing upon boundaries. The question of claims and of the condition of the inhabitants of the ceded territory occupied most of the meetings. The result was in hand February 2, 1848, when Trist met the Mexican commissioners to sign the treaty at Guadalupe-Hidalgo, "a spot", said Trist, "which, agreeably to the creed of this country, is the most sacred on earth, as being the scene of the miraculous appearance of the Virgin, for the purpose of declaring that Mexico was taken under her special protection ".2

Seventeen days later Polk had in his hands the grant of territory 1The United States and Mexico, 1847-1848", by Professor E. G. Bourne, in AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW, V, 491-502, April, 1900.

2 Trist to Buchanan, February 2, 1848, S. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Congress, I Session, 102.

which he had hoped to obtain through the peaceful negotiations of Slidell. The Rio Grande was acknowledged as the boundary of Texas; New Mexico and Upper California were ours; and the sum to be paid was that named in Trist's instructions: the treaty included all of Polk's sine qua non. That the right of transit over Tehuantepec was not included was a small matter, for the recent treaty with New Granada afforded a better route to the Pacific. Benton's comment upon the treaty was that it was a fortunate event for the United States and especially for Polk's administration. "The Congress elections were going against the administration, and the aspirants for the presidency in the cabinet were struck with terror at the view of the great military reputations which were growing up."1

Haste in acting upon the treaty was of the utmost importance for two reasons: first, that the treaty might be returned to Mexico for ratification before the Mexican government should be overthrown; and second, that the growing sentiment for "all of Mexico", both in the cabinet and out of it, a sentiment to which the President was opposed, might be effectually stifled.2 Polk made up his mind at once not to reject the treaty because of Trist's conduct. His desire for peace was so great that he did not permit himself to be influenced by his indignation at Trist's insulting letters. He decided, after stating his views to the cabinet, to send the document to the Senate, suggesting certain amendments and by so doing show a "magnanimous forbearance toward Mexico". Every member of the Senate committee on foreign relations, with the exception of the chairman, Sevier, was at first opposed to ratification. The reason for their attitude, as reported by the chairman to Polk, was not the terms of the treaty, but Trist's lack of authority to negotiate. "I told Sevier”, the diary records, " that the treaty was the subject for consideration, not Trist's conduct and that if the provisions of the treaty were such as would be accepted, it would be worse than an idle ceremony to send out a grand commission to re-negotiate the same treaty."3 The Senate committee reported the treaty without amendment on the same day, and after two weeks' discussion the Senate first amended and then ratified it by a vote of thirty-eight to fourteen. The most important of the amendments was made at the suggestion of the

Benton's Thirty Years' View, II, 710.

2 Professor Bourne's article as cited. The treaty arrived in Washington February 19; Polk decided to send it to the Senate for ratification February 21. Polk's diary, February 21, 1848. Calhoun wrote to Clemson, March 7, 1848: “The greatest danger is, that the [Mexican] Government may not hold together until the treaty is exchanged. Nothing but the countenance of our Government, and the support of capitalists interested in preserving it, can continue it in existence. It is, indeed, but the shadow of a Government." Report of American Historical Association, 1899, II, 746.

3 Polk's diary, February 28, 1848.

Sevier and

President, and by it the tenth article, relating to the disposition of the public lands in Texas, was stricken out. An additional secret article, delaying for eight months the time of Mexico's ratification, was for obvious reasons omitted by a unanimous vote. Clifford, the latter Polk's attorney-general, were appointed commissioners in accordance with the provision of the treaty permitting the exchange of ratifications at the City of Mexico. As their duties were merely the gaining of Mexico's consent to the Senate's amendments, and the hastening of final ratification, their task was light. As soon as it was known that the Senate was modifying the terms of the agreement as signed, the Mexican government ceased all efforts for ratification until the nature of the amendments was known. A few days after the arrival of Sevier and Clifford at Mexico with the amended treaty, the Mexican congress agreed to ratification by practically a unanimous vote.

There was no glory in all this for Trist. Polk characterized him as an "impudent and unqualified scoundrel ". Upon his arrival at Washington the former chief clerk of the State Department found the doors closed to him. He could get the ear of no one, and after vainly trying for some time to collect his salary after the date of his recall, he left Washington. Insisting on having a hearing, he addressed a long communication to the speaker of the House August 7, 1848, accusing the President of high crimes and misdemeanors, including subornation of perjury, and suggesting that Polk be impeached.1 But there was no need for stirring up the matter in the hope of finding political capital against Polk. The time had gone by for that. The letter was received during the last days of the session and referred to the committee on foreign affairs, and there it slept. The war was over; Polk's term was drawing to a close; and the country was in the midst of a presidential campaign. Trist was soon forgotten. The result of the election of 1848 was the choice of Taylor for President, one of the two great Whig generals who had reaped the political popularity which Polk had coveted. Scott was for the time passed by, and nobody had any consideration for the assertive and talkative commissioner who had made the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo. But the persistent Trist did not despair, and twenty-two years later he secured from Congress the reward for his successful presumption. The feeble old man, who had been one of Jefferson's family and afterward the friend of Jackson, was at last secure in the belief that he had been vindicated by his government. JESSE S. REEVES.

Congressional Globe, 30 Congress, 1 Session, 1057–1058.

2 Senate Report 251, 41 Congress, 2 Session.

MATERIALS IN BRITISH ARCHIVES FOR AMERICAN COLONIAL HISTORY1

NOTWITHSTANDING the fact that for a hundred and fifty years our colonies were a part of the British empire, no systematic attempt has ever been made by British or American historians to discover the extent and value of the material contained in British archives relating to American history. Persistent and long search has frequently been made for documents bearing on a given subject or connected with the history of a given colony, but such investigation has usually been confined to well-known and fairly well-arranged collections, examination of which was comparatively easy and a successful result highly probable. Outlying sources, records relating to other than colonial subjects, and groups containing only occasional and isolated documents have remained largely unexplored; while even such compact and clearly defined collections as the Colonial Office papers have never been thoroughly and critically examined.

The time was therefore opportune for a more thoroughly organized attack upon the British records, and for the discovery, as far as human imperfection would allow, of all documents that directly or indirectly bear upon our history. Tedious though the work promised to be, it seemed to be justified by the possibility of obtaining even an approximate description of each isolated document, important or unimportant, and of each collection, great or small, that might some time be needed by future writers of our history.

The task was a large one, but two conditions proved eminently favorable to a rapid prosecution of the work: first, the concentration of the bulk of the material in a few great centers, like the British Museum and the Public Record Office; and secondly, the unfailing courtesy of the officials in charge as well as of many private individuals, who without exception did all in their power to promote the undertaking. In most cases, though not in all, the facilities for research are adequate for student purposes, and though hours seem. short, notably at the Bodleian Library, the overzealous investigator is forced thereby to take a needed relaxation. Except occasionally in certain cases where the quarters are cramped and special searchrooms cannot be spared, the student will meet with few restrictions,

1 This article is a preliminary report to the Bureau of Historical Research of the Carnegie Institution of Washington.