DOCUMENTS 1. Alexander Hamilton's Notes in the Federal Convention of 1787. IN the Hamilton Papers, now in the Library of Congress, I found some folio sheets containing rough notes in Hamilton's writing, but without date, place, or descriptive heading. A penciled note on one of the sheets, evidently written at a later day, led me to believe that the lines might be some notes of debates in the Convention of 1787 for framing the Constitution, and a little study enabled me to find a corresponding note in the Madison notes. It was then a simple matter to spell out the Hamilton matter by date and speaker, and the result is now published. Fragmentary as the notes are, they add something to the known record of the debates, and possess a general as well as an individual value. The general interest lies in this: that they outline speeches not recorded by Madison, such as Madison's own remarks on June 6; and they add to the notes made by Madison in a number of instances. Further, they offer a test of the accuracy of Madison's pen, and in only one instance do they seem to point to an error. In reporting Gerry's remarks on June 8, Madison made him say the "New States too having separate views from the old States will never come into the Union". The statement would seem to be too strong to express Gerry's meaning, for the legislation on the Northwest Territory and experiences with the western country would modify if not negative the remark. The version given by Hamilton is more correct: "New States will arise which cannot be controuled ". The personal interest is greater. Few men were better equipped than Madison to take notes, for he had long been a careful student of government, and in his closet and his experience in state and Continental legislature had recognized the great evils of the old Confederation and the crying need of a surrender by the states of some of their powers, at least sufficient to create a self-supporting central government. The notes of his researches on federative systems long passed as Washington's, because a copy in Washington's manuscript happened to be found before the Madison original came to light. Yet Madison's studies had produced almost a colorless attitude of mind, in which his learning threatened to neutralize his energy in urging definite reforms for definite evils. His influence in the Convention was small, in spite of the many times he took part in (97) AM. HIST. REV., VOL. X.-7. Madison Randolph the debates; and it was exerted rather through others than through himself. This attitude made him the best possible recorder of the debates, as he was in a receptive frame of mind, not tied fast to one or a small number of propositions, but ready to study what others had to propose. The result is to be seen in his "notes", which could only be surpassed in merit by a full record of the proceedings. Hamilton's experience had been different. His service at headquarters during the most trying years of the Revolution had given him a grasp of the inherent weakness of the Confederation that was improved by his service in the Continental Congress. He approached the question of reform from a more practical side than that of Madison, and this made him the more intent upon a special reform to meet the difficulties he had felt in field and in Congress. Hence his leaning to monarchy, a position that could not be acceptable to the Convention any more than it could be to the people of the United States. His notes were taken on the days when the central government was under discussion, and he has added " notes and " remarks" that clearly indicate his own ideas, something that a really good reporter, like Madison, would not have done. The personal element is therefore stronger in these few notes than in the whole of Madison's record. WORTHINGTON CHAUNCEY FORD. If [Executive Power] large, we shall have the Evils of Elective Monarchies (Charles R. King, The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, I, 588.) 1 With the exception of the first, these excerpts are from The Writings of James Madison, edited by Gaillard Hunt, Volume III. View [or Voice] of America. Safety to liberty the great object Wilson Bedford peculiar talents requisite for executive, therefore ought to be opportunity of ascertaining his talents-therefore frequent change Princ 1 The further men are from the ultimate point of importance the readier they will be [to] concur in a change 2 Civilization approximates the different species of governments 3- Vigour is the result of several principles - Activity wisdom - confidence 4 - Extent of limits will occasion the non attendance of remote members and tend to throw the government into the hands of the Country near the seat of government - a reason for strengthening the upper branch. and multiplying the Inducements to attendance M: Bedford was strongly opposed to so long a term as seven years. He begged the Committee to consider what the situation of the Country would be, in case the first magistrate should be saddled on it for such a period and it should be found on trial that he did not possess the qualifications ascribed to him, or should lose them after his appointment. (Madison, III, 63-64.) Sent: II. NOTES FOR JUNE 6, 7, AND 8, 1787. A free government to be preferred to an absolute monarchy not because of the occasional violations of liberty or property but because of the tendency of the Free Government to interest the passions of the community in its favour beget public spirit and public confidence Re: When public mind is prepared to adopt the present plan they will outgo our propositionThey will never part with Sovereignty of the state till they are tired [?] of the state governments M Pinkney. If Legislatures do not partake in the appointment of they will be more jealous The State Legislatures also he said would be more jealous, and more ready to thwart the National Gov!, if excluded from a participation in it. (P. 107.) He differed from gentlemen who thought that a choice by the people w be a better guard agst bad measures, than by the Legislatures. (Ibid.) The purse and the sword ought never to get into the same hands whether Legislative or Executive. (P. 110.) [June 7, 1787.] II- He would have the state legislatures elect senators, because he would bring into the general government the sense of the state Governments etc II-because the most respectable choices would be made Note Separate states may give stronger organs to their governments and engage more the good will of Ind: - while Genl Gov Consider the Principle of Rivalship by excluding the state Legislatures General government could not know how to make laws for every part such as respect agriculture M: Dickinson had two reasons for his motion. 1, because the sense of the States would be better collected through their Governments; than immediately from the people at large; 2. because he wished the Senate to consist of the most distinguished characters ... and he thought such characters more likely to be selected by the State Legislatures, than in any other mode. (P. 112.) M: Pinkney thought the 2 branch ought to be permanent and independent; and that the members of it we be rendered more so by receiving their appointment from the State Legislatures. This mode w avoid the rivalships and discontents incident to the election by districts. (P. 119.) It is impossible for one power to pervade the extreme parts of the U. S. so as to carry equal justice to them. (P. 120.) The State Legislatures also ought to have some means of defending themselves agt encroachments of the Nat Gov! . . . And what better means can we provide than the giving them some share in, or rather to make them a constituent part of, the Nat Establishment. (Ibid.) [June 8, 1787.] Pinckney - For general Negative He urged that such a universality of the power [to negative all laws which they sh judge to be improper] was indispensably necessary to render it effectual. (P. |