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into conceptions which do not correspond to realities as they are in themselves, but into ideas of the sublime, the beautiful, the grotesque, the grand, etc.

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EXPERIMENT III.-Concentrate your mind for a moment on yourself and you find that you are conscious of " I myself” apart even from the body.

Thus I know that there is a co-ordinating presiding power somewhere within me. I am I. I am one!

When I was a student at the University of Edinburgh we of the Natural History class had the freedom of the magnificent Museum of Science and Art adjoining.

I remember standing before the case where the material constituents of a man were graphically displayed. A flask of water and a handful of dirt, with the intimation that (roughly speaking) 75 per cent. is water, and 25 per cent. are solids. Or, to take a human weighing 12 stone, the water weighs 9 stone, and the solids weigh 3. And that, the materialist says, is all!

That reminds me of the tale of the one-legged stork, or what the fool answered Hamlet when he asked, "Who is to be buried here?'

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"One that was a woman!

But, rest her soul, she is dead."

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Socrates, the wisest of the Greeks, knew better. Plato relates his saying on the eve of his death: "You may bury me if you can catch me ; and "Do not call this poor body Socrates. I would not have you sorrow at my hard lot, or say at the interment 'Thus we lay out Socrates'; or 'Thus we follow him to the grave and bury him.' Be of good cheer say you are burying my body only."

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Let us turn to the contemplation of our bodies for a moment. The morphological unit is the cell; and seeing the amount of water we may well call the cells of our bodies aquatic cells!

Cienkowski made some interesting observations on the Vampyrella Spirogyræ.

This is a minute red tinged aquatic cell without any apparent limiting membrane, and quite structureless. This minute blob of protoplasm will take only one kind of food, a particular variety of algae, the Spirogyræ. He describes how this minute cell creeps along the Confervæ until it meets with its prey. He never saw it attack any other kind of algæ, in fact, it rejected Vaucherie and Edogoniæ put in its way. From his observations Cienkowski writes: The behaviour of these monads in their

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search after food and in their method of absorbing it is so remarkable, that one can hardly avoid the conclusion that the acts are those of conscious beings."

From his remarkable observations on the Arcella Engelmann writes: "It cannot be denied that these facts point to psychical processes in the protoplasm." Any of you who have worked out the opsonic index in a consumptive patient will agree with me that the actions of the white corpuscles of the blood lead us to the same conclusion. Take also the cells of the body that have specialized. Some will select the nitrogenous waste products in the blood and remove them. Others will select the materials that are needed to make up the fluid that is required for the nutrition of the young of the species. Think also of the newly discovered secretions, hormones, which, secreted by one set of cells, are required for the stimulus that will enable other sets of cells to secrete their substances in right proportions and due quantities.

The more one studies these cell actions the less one finds the mechanical hypothesis adequate and the more one is led to declare that psychical powers and phenomena are required to explain life and its processes even when these seem most material.

The functions and powers of the body may be divided into two classes, the vegetative and the organic. The former functions are those of assimilation, reproduction, growth, etc. The governing principle here is adaptation-adaptation to the body's environment and to the various relationships that arise.

The latter, that is, the organic, are the faculties or instruments (Gr. organon, an implement) by which that environment becomes known; or, in other words, the mediating powers between the world of matter and the world of mind. The energizing principle here is Motion.

As my kind friend, Sir David Ferrier, writes: "That the brain. is the organ of the mind, and that mental operations are possible only in and through the brain, is now so thoroughly well-established and recognized, that we may, without further question, start from this as an ultimate fact. But how is it that molecular changes in the brain-cells coincide with modifications of consciousness; how, for instance, the vibrations of light falling on the retina excite the modification of consciousness termed a visual sensation, is a problem that cannot be solved. We may succeed in determining the exact nature of the molecular changes which occur in the brain-cells when a sensation is experienced; but

this will not bring us one whit nearer the explanation of the ultimate nature of that which constitutes the sensation. The one is objective, and the other subjective; and neither can be explained in terms of the other. We cannot say that they are identical, or even that one passes into the other, but only, as Laycock expresses it, that the two are correlated." (Functions of the Brain, pp. 255, 256.)

EXPERIMENT IV.-If you like to try it-Press the point of a pin into your finger. You feel a pain.

What causes that pain? The point stimulates the little bulbous bodies in which the sensory nerve fibres end and sets up changes, movements, waves, vibrations, what you like, in the nerve substance. This molecular movement runs up at the rate of 100 feet per second the sensory nerve; the posterior part of the spinal cord; and so on until it reaches the Rolandic area of the brain. It ends there-in cells.

Now we can prevent that pain by (1) poisoning the sensory nerve endings by certain drugs known as local anesthetics; (2) by dividing the sensory nerve or injuring the spine; (3) by poisoning the brain-cells by drugs known as general anæsthetics. But we can go further, for (4) by hypnotism we can prevent the pain being felt without interfering with the braincells; that is to say, without interfering with the sufferer's consciousness. Permit me to suppose that this interference takes place just where mind and matter meet.

And may I not do so since McDougall in his explanation of Hypnotism in the Encyclopædia Britannica, 11th Ed., writes thus of the theory of mental dissociation which he thinks is the best explanation of hypnotism: "Suppose now that all the nervous connexions between the multitudinous dispositions of the cerebrum are by some means rendered less effective, that the associationpaths are partially blocked or functionally depressed; the result will be that, while the most intimate connexions, those between dispositions of any one system remain functional or permeable, the weaker less intimate connexions, those between dispositions belonging to different systems, will be practically abolished for the time being; each system of dispositions will then function more or less as an isolated system, and its activity will no longer be subject to the depressing or inhibiting influence of other systems; therefore each system, on being excited in any way, will tend to its end with more than normal force, being freed from all interferences; that is to say, each idea or system of

ideas will tend to work itself out and to realize itself in action immediately, without suffering the opposition of antagonistic ideas which, in the normal state of the brain, might altogether prevent its realization in action.”

Is that so? Well, if it is so I judge I may suppose that by mental dissociation is meant what I said, interference where spirit and matter, mind and brain-cell, meet.

Again, being in the quotation vein, I quote from Bain in his book Mind and Body: "Extension is but the first of a long series of properties all present in matter, all absent in mind. Inertia cannot belong to a pleasure, a pain, an idea, as experienced in the consciousness. Inertia is accompanied with Gravity, a peculiarly material quality. So colour is a truly material property; it cannot attach to a feeling, properly so called, a pleasure or a pain. These three properties are the basis of matter; to them are superadded Form, Motion, Position, and a host of other properties expressed in terms of these, Attractions and Repulsions, Hardness and Elasticity, Cohesion and Crystallization. Mental states and bodily states cannot be compared."

And Professor Tyndall: "Molecular groupings and molecular motions explain nothing; the passage from the physics of the brain to the corresponding facts of consciousness is unthinkable : and if love were known to be associated with a right-handed spiral motion of the molecules of the brain, and hate with a lefthanded, we should remain as ignorant as before as to the cause of the motion."

Here we are left then with your pain. We have traced it from its source in the finger to its destination in the Rolandic area of the brain, and we are left there with its being still a motion amidst molecules. But what you feel is not a motion but actual pain. It may be merely a pin-prick, still, as Tyndall says, the passage from motion in the molecules to pain in the mind is unthinkable. On the one hand there is something that moves; on the other there is something that feels. These are, they must be, different substances. True, Bain combines the two by saying that the phenomena of matter and the attributes of mind are but the two sides of one substance. That is to say, two irreconcilably antagonistic sets of phenomena and attributes belong to one substance.

There is, then, no truth in what we saw to be a principle, necessary and universal, to wit, phenomena imply substance! and, consequently, different phenomena imply different substances.

But we agreed that it is true, so Professor Bain is wrong. As Professor Tyndall truly says, "It is no explanation to say that the objective and subjective effects are two sides of one and the same phenomenon. Why should the phenomenon have two sides? This is the very core of the difficulty. There are plenty of molecular motions which do not exhibit this two-sidedness. Does water think or feel when it forms into frost-ferns on a windowpane? If not, why should the molecular motion of the brain be yoked to this mysterious companion-consciousness?"

The doctrine of materialism, namely automatism, claims for "the growing province of matter and causation" that it will carry "the concomitant gradual banishment from all the regions of human thought of what we call spirit and spontaneity." Leibnitz taught that the chain of physical causation is not influenced by the human mind; that the chain of mental causation is equally unaffected by matter: and that the two chains are mutually independent although in correspondence—the two parallel series are like two unconnected clocks so constructed that when one points to the hour the other strikes it—but that this harmony is one pre-established by the Creator. Thus Malebranche, with his "We see all things in God," says: "It is He who retains together the objective and subjective worlds, which, in themselves, are separate and apart." The materialist agrees in their separation but holds that whilst the material series is independent the mental is dependent, and drops the notion of a pre-established harmony. Man is a conscious automaton.

Not so the Realist, at least so I venture to think. Brought face to face with the hieroglyphical inscriptions of Egypt and the cuneiform ones of Assyria the mind of man was long baffled in its attempts to read their meaning, but succeeded. Matter spoke to Mind. Here we have two substances face to face, matter and spirit. The phenomena presented by the former are molecular motions caused by the pressure of that pin, or by the etheric vibrations caused by these lights, or the waves in the air caused by my voice. The attributes of the latter are feeling, willing, knowing.

Consequently because of its nature it feels the vibrations and knows the pain as it wills to do. Interference with the willing (as by hypnotism) breaks the chain between feeling and knowing : to put facts immaterial into language belonging to the material. Granted that mind is of an independent substance possessing these attributes, then to me the phenomenon known as telepathy is simple to understand. For instance, my son and I on a winter's

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