NOTICES OF BOOKS.

BRITISH WAR ADMINISTRATION.

A VOLUME of the series of Preliminary Economic Studies of the War, published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in the Division of Economics and History, aims at presenting a systematic and somewhat comprehensive account of the manifold changes in the machinery of governmental administration in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, which have been made during and as a result of the war." But, though comprehensive, it contains "only a preliminary survey, and by no means gives an exhaustive account of the subject." The arrangement of the contents is well planned. The historical matter included, for instance, the "War Measures in Former Times," and the accounts of Naval and Army Administration before the Great War have their interest, but might have been omitted, as not being essential to the main purpose of the work. This survey gives a good idea of the enormous labours entailed on the Government and the country by the war. An Appendix contains a list of the 405 Official Commissions and Committees set up in the United Kingdom to deal with public questions arising out of the war, besides lists of the Defence of the Realm Regulations, and of the subdivisions of departmental organisation, which appear to have been carefully prepared. The work claims to cover "the ground with a fair degree of completeness to the end of 1917," but not beyond. For this period it will be a valuable work of reference, should similar circumstances unfortunately recur. The writer does not limit himself to statements of fact. At p. 52 he suggests the necessity for a still more radical reorganisation. of the British administrative system, chiefly by the reduction of the number of main Departments of State. "For example, it might be well to combine the ministries of foreign and colonial affairs." It is hardly conceivable that such a change could ever be contemplated. C. E. BUCKLAND.

1 British War Administration. By John A. Fairlie, Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois. London: Oxford University Press, 1919. 55.

AGRICULTURAL LEGISLATION.1

THE Annuaire is a stout quarto volume of 1,260 pages, containing between 600,000 and 700,000 words. No pains are spared to make the record complete and handy for reference. Prefaced by an introduction in English, it gives in French the text of the principal enactments, together with the titles of the less important provisions, on the subject of Agriculture. Two indices are supplied. One is a chronological index by countries; the other, an alphabetical index of subjects. The legislation is grouped under eleven heads. If, for example, the reader desires to study the legislation of foreign countries during the year 1913 on the subject either of the formation of small-holdings or of forestry and the products of forestry, he will find it grouped in part ix., chap. 2, and part iv., chap. 5, respectively.

It is significant that there is no allusion to agricultural legislation other than that of the Allied and neutral countries. No laws, orders, or decrees of the Governments of Germany, Austria, Turkey, Bulgaria, or Russia, appear in the collection. The omission may mean much or nothing. It means nothing if those countries were excluded from want of space or from difficulty in obtaining material. It would mean much for the future if the omission is due to the entire absence of legislative activity on agricultural subjects in those countries.

From the period covered in the present issue of the Annuaire, the general character of the contents may be inferred. The war was still raging the date of its conclusion was entirely uncertain. Two main problems confronted the Governments of the world. One was to feed the people on a restricted scale of consumption at as reasonable a price as possible. The other was to make such provision as was possible for the transition from war to peace when hostilities ceased.

So far as Great Britain was concerned, there was comparatively little legislation. Very numerous Orders were issued under the Defence of the Realm Act, such as those for the regulation of prices for the sale of agricultural produce, or for the distribution of fertilisers and feedingstuffs. The powers necessary for the increase of production had been obtained and put in force in the preceding year, and it is interesting to note the use made by other Allied and neutral nations of the experience which Great Britain had already obtained. There were, however, five Acts of Parliament passed during the year. Two were in the nature of 1 Annuaire International de Législation Agricole; VIIIème Année, 1918. Rome,

1919.

Effects of the Great War upon Agriculture (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Division of Economics and History). By Professor Benjamin H. Hibbard. (London: Oxford University Press, 1919. 5s.)

amendments to the legislation of 1916-17. These were the Act to amend s. II, subs. 3 of the Corn Production Act (August 8, 1918), and the Act to authorise an increase in the amount of land which may be acquired for the purposes of the Small Holdings Colonies Act, 1916 (July 30, 1918). The other three Acts were new. One was the Horse Breeding Act (June 27, 1918), which regulated the use of stallions for breeding purposes. The second was the Land Drainage Act (July 30, 1918), which gave important facilities for the drainage of agricultural land. The third dealt with tithes, and established a quindecennial instead of a septennial average (Tithe Act, 1918, Nov. 21, 1918).

The legislation passed by Allied and neutral nations, with the object of provisioning the people, contained many important measures. Every nation recognised that, in dealing with food-supplies in time of war, the national necessities were paramount. To the urgent need for increased production the proprietary rights of individuals must yield. But the principle of compensation was universally recognised.

In providing for adequate food-supplies, the first step was to ascertain existing stocks and the resources available for their increase. One result of the war will be that every nation is more fully equipped with statistical information as to its means of agricultural production. Where no machinery existed for the purpose, it was set up. In Canada, Portugal, and China, for instance, a statistical service is elaborately organised by the legislation of 1918. Nearly every Government made provision, also, for censuses of stocks in hand, declarations as to the acreage and character of landed properties, returns of livestock of various kinds and of agricultural machinery, and estimates and results of the different harvests of the year.

Having ascertained the quantities of food in sight, and the material available for adding to the supply, Governments addressed themselves to the task of increasing and directing production. Belgium, for instance, regulated minutely the cropping of arable land. Every holding of 2 acres and upwards is to have three-eighths of the land under cultivation for wheat; one-eighth under potatoes; three-eighths under various fodder crops. On the remaining eighth, crops may be grown for industrial purposes, such as malting barley, sugar-beet, chicory for coffee, or tobacco. Denmark provides that the land-tax may be paid in grain-in wheat or rye, and, when these grains are exhausted, in barley or oats. In France provision is made for the cultivation of derelict or uncultivated land. If the agricultural committee finds land in a derelict condition, it communicates with the departmental committee which control the supply of agricultural labour, fertilisers, etc., and, acting through the mayor of the commune, can enter into occupation of the land and cultivate it for a crop. principle is applied to other classes of land. Powers are taken to make advances either to existing or substituted occupiers for the purchase of

The

livestock, seeds, manures, and other necessities of working capital, up to a total limit of 100 million francs. Provision is also made for State assistance in the reclamation of land up to 100 francs per hectare. In Italy the Minister of Agriculture was given wide powers to increase production, including those of distributing labour, tractors and other machinery, implements and fertilisers. He was also authorised to enter into occupation, for a period not exceeding six years, of any land which was improperly or inadequately cultivated. The Swiss law for the intensification of farming is also drastic. Each canton and each commune were instructed to set up a cantonal or communal office, charged with the duty of inspecting the land, directing its cultivation, entering upon and cultivating private and public parks, and, in all cases where their orders are disobeyed or imperfectly executed, replacing the defaulting occupier with a farmer or association of farmers selected by themselves.

The effort to increase production was almost universal. But among the belligerent nations it was obvious that any large advance would be impeded, if not prevented, by the scarcity of male labour. They could, at the best, hope to arrest the decline in food-production and effect some slight increase. But France and Italy laboured under one special disadvantage. They were not only stripped of labour, and unable to supply themselves with fertilisers and machinery. They were also deprived by the invaders of large and productive areas of land. It was inevitable that they should become increasingly dependent on foreign food. At the same time the world's pool of surplus exportable produce was diminished by the cessation of exports from Russia and the interruption of communications with India and Australia. It was this combination of circumstances which gave the United States a position of supreme importance. From her alone could Europe look for such an increased supply as would meet the larger demand, and reinforce the dwindling surplus of the world which was accessible for export.

Professor Hibbard discusses "the effects of the Great War upon agriculture in the United States and Great Britain." It may be pointed out that, so far as the effort of Great Britain is concerned, the history is scarcely carried beyond the end of 1917. It is therefore of comparatively little value. The measures taken by Mr. Lloyd George's Government could not be expected to affect, and as a fact did not very materially affect, the grain harvest of 1917. Entering office, as they did, in December 1916, and faced by a winter of unusual length and severity, they could effect but little improvement in the conditions. The best that could be expected was achieved. The decline in production, which threatened to be serious, was arrested and turned into a slight advance. Scarcely any addition could be made to the area of wheat which, for climatic reasons, is almost entirely sown in the autumn or early winter. But the large addition of nearly a million

acres was made to the spring-sown acreage of oats and potatoes. The huge potato crop of 1917 was the great result in that year of the British effort. But it is mainly by the magnitude of the grain harvest of 1918, and by the immense increase in the production of vegetable products owing to the extension of allotments, that the success of the impulse given to British agriculture can be gauged. For the purpose of forming a judgment on this point, the material was not available for Professor Hibbard at the time of writing.

Whatever efforts belligerent nations might make to stimulate home production, they could not hope to be able to feed themselves. The American continent alone stood between them and acute privations, if not famine. It is this outstanding fact which gives special interest to the effort of the United States. The Editor, Professor Kinley, of the University of Illinois, pays Professor Hibbard a well-merited compliment when he says that the experience of the United States, as narrated in the present volume, may be "helpful in the discussion and solution of such a problem as "the possibility of a national policy in agricultural production." The facts are marshalled with admirable clearness. If we lay stress on one point only, it is because the debt which Europe at war owed to the American people should be held in everlasting remembrance.

The people of the United States were remote from the scene of war. They commanded adequate supplies of food. Half of the population is rural, and a third is actually on farms. They had, therefore, ready access to agricultural food-products. Yet the American people voluntarily abstained from utilising their own supplies, in order that larger quantities of food might be available for export to the Allies. To eat "within your tether" is common prudence. But voluntarily to restrict your tether in order to feed someone else is a fine act of self-denial. Wheatless "days on Mondays and Wednesdays were almost universally accepted. Other means were adopted. The general result was that, in 1918, the consumption per head of wheat, in the form of flour, dropped from 5.3 bushels to 3.93 bushels. This voluntary act of self-denial on the part of the American people enabled the Government to send 110,000,000 bushels of wheat to feed the European Allies out of their harvest of 1917a quantity, be it observed, which is double the ordinary output of the whole of the British Isles.