disastrous effects upon human life and comfort where remedy is possible. The occurrence of storms, e.g., leads to greater care and science in shipbuilding; the occurrence of pestilence, to better sanitary regulations, and so forth. "Der Kampf mit der Natur," says Dr. Gass, "umfasst von Anbeginn einen beträchtlichen Theil der Menschenbildung, und er hat, so unzählbar auch die Opfer sein mögen, der Menschheit weit mehr verliehen als geraubt." Many facts will show us that pain is often subservient to good, and conducive to a higher stage of happiness. And if we once desert the low ground of "egoistic Hedonism" as a standard of human happiness, we come to discern the fact that to give up our own pleasure and to encounter pain is often a higher form of what is, in effect, pleasant, because it is in a mental or moral sense good.

15. Sorrow and mental suffering are not evils in an absolute sense. They temporarily interfere with individual happiness, but they often have, and seem intended to have, a disciplinary and awakening effect both upon the intellect and the conscience. The longing for a more complete and higher life is a spiritual motive within men, which-even apart from definite revelation of a life to come-elevates the soul, and so makes men in reality happier than they were before the suffering came. Moreover, both the experience and the observation of suffering tends to evoke sympathetic capabilities which widen men's outlook, and cultivate a humane and philanthropic spirit. Nor will it be denied that "endurance" is often nobler than enjoyment," and intimates truths of self-control and selfsacrifice which point to a higher goal than individual selfcomplacency, and develop possibilities of a social harmony yet to be attained where every part, in mutual adjustment, shall contribute to the happiness of the whole body.

16. Sin, or moral evil, is the only form of evil of which we have to acknowledge that it seems absolutely antagonistic to good, to happiness, to hope, to harmony; and "sin is universal." Here is the greatest mystery and perplexity for the optimist philosopher. Violation of moral order is mischievous. because it is the opposition of the will of intelligent beings to a Supreme Law, and an absolutely Righteous Will; yet where is there not such violation? and why is this violation of moral law permitted? "It is sometimes asked," says M. Naville, in his lectures on The Problem of Evil, "why did not God make the creature incapable of sin--that is to say, necessarily good? It is forgotten that necessity excludes liberty; that where there is no liberty there is neither good nor evil; so that the idea of a creature necessarily good really implies a

contradiction." The possibility of sin is "the condition of
created liberty,'
"" "but the cause of the actual realisation of
evil exists nowhere else than in the will which rebels against
law." The exercise of this rebellious self-will introduces
disaster and discord into human history. And the worst kinds
of suffering and sorrow are the results of sin. The fact, how-
ever, that suffering follows sin-dogs it, we may say—is surely
a hopeful feature in the survey of this strange, disturbing
influence in the world of humanity. Whether such suffering
be viewed as penal, or as remedial, it speaks of a tendency in
the whole order of things which is contrary to sin. The
solution, however, of the mystery of moral evil, and the cure
of the mischief, must be confessed to be beyond the grasp of
our finite philosophy. But though in this matter philosophy
can help us little, the Revelation from God which Christians
allege to have been made in Jesus Christ helps us much, at
any rate in a practical way, and allows us to hope that
sin and all its sad results in the world may be regarded
as "the conditions of a grander order" of things yet to be
revealed.

17. I have said nothing yet of death, as an evil. To the Pessimist, privation of life ought to be, by his very theory, rather good than evil. To the bare Materialist, death is but a cessation of molecular movements of matter. To the spiritualist philosopher, death must appear to be an emancipation. To the Christian believer it is the gate into a higher realm of life. That death is so generally dreaded and viewed as an evil, even by those whose circumstances of earthly life seem most miserable, is a strong argument against the truth of a pessimistic philosophy, and a strong argument in favour of the theory which regards life and the faculties of living as designed for happiness.

To those who believe in the spiritual capacity of man, and yet have doubt as to any future existence, death must present itself as a burden and a sadness, because it quenches aspiration and stops progress. Such a view can only be cured by the hope of a life to come.

Death, in its relation to sin, is a theological topic, and cannot be dealt with in this paper.

18. Sufficient has been now said by way of protest against taking up with the philosophy of despair. The positive considerations in favour of an optimistic philosophy are partly derived from a comprehensive logical inference, and partly from an intense moral conviction. When we look at the world as a whole, we perceive a preponderance of phenomena that make for general happiness, and a wonderful adjustment

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of a compensatory kind which keeps the cosmic mechanism in

order.

And when we fairly face the problems of human life in the light of the facts of human history, we find a perpetual tendency that makes for righteousness rather than for unrighteousness. To this the Christian believer adds a faith in the special revelation made in Jesus, the Christ, and the whole horizon of speculation becomes lit up with radiance of a better day coming. 19. The right view as to the value of the world depends upon a patient consideration of the way in which all the phenomena within reach of our knowledge work together. What is the impression produced upon our minds when we estimate by the total resultant, and not by our opinion of individual details? Is there not a universitatis pulchritudo, notwithstanding any long catalogue that may be made of what may seem to us defective or repellant phenomena? Modern researches in science have added marvellous testimony to the existence of pervading design, and adaptation to environment in nature around us. And this thought is of itself at once awe-inspiring and consoling.

20. But the problem which most intimately concerns men is the worth of human life. Here, again, it would be a mistake to judge of the value of life by individual experience, or by exceptional cases of sorrow, poverty, or pain. The materials for judgment are not simple, but complex. And the whole inquiry is a question of tendency, not of phenomena isolated from the general current and order of things-of dominant law, not of what appears to be specific pains or evils, when viewed individually.

Hence the importance of a historical survey of humanity, and of a wide comparison of the different varieties of possible enjoyment for different classes of men and types of human energy.

History will teach us that human progress is, on the whole, stronger than degeneration; and that, in proportion to the elevation of ethical standard, man's capabilities of happiness and hope increase. The degeneration itself is good so far as it leads, not only to "a survival of that which is fittest," but to a prevalence of higher ideas and better conditions of life. And the comparison of the many ways in which life can be used and enjoyed will enable us to perceive that the sum total of even actual present happiness is apt to be disregarded by those who either in expression of pessimistic sentiment or in construction of an indictment against optimism-look only at the dark side of things. The verdict of a careful historical survey of humanity is that there is a constant

evolution of good out of evil which tends in the direction of general progress; and that there is much general enjoyment of life.

It must too be specially borne in mind that the inquiry is predominantly an ethical one. Buddhism and Epicureanism, or Hedonism, may be regarded as representing the opposite poles of the search into the true object of life; and it is only by some practical approximation to an ideal summum bonum that we can estimate the full meaning or value of life. Both these methods of viewing life lead to pessimismone directly, the other in an indirect way. The former, by a universal negation of the happiness of conscious life, is blankly pessimist; the latter, by a mistaken affirmation that pleasurable sensation is the sole standard of human happiness, leaves the soul starved and helpless when it comes into contact with pain and death. Yet it should not be forgotten that the existence and wide acceptance of Hedonistic standards, especially when pleasures like the pleasures of culture, of the pursuit of knowledge, and of intellectual activity are taken into consideration, point in an opposite direction to that of pessimistic philosophy. The inquiry into the worth of life, being an ethical one, is concerned with personal, subjective, mental conditions, rather than with external circumstances. Subjective joys, pleasures, aspirations, hopes, may outweigh all that seem, to an outside observer, to be pains and penalties of life.

21. But without religion no firm standing-ground for the optimist can be reached. An infinite region of mystery lies beyond our reach which cannot be fathomed by finite science or philosophical speculation.

The facts that we can reach show that, while pessimistic sentiment has a locus standi in the circumstances of human life and the things which condition it, pessimism as philosophy is irrational. On the other hand, the facts show that, while optimistic sentiment may sometimes lead to a flimsy and superficial estimate of life, optimism, as philosophy, is more rational than its opposite. It needs, however, to be complemented by religious sentiment and religious truth. For that there is a disturbing element which affects human nature and human society in a most painful manner is indisputable; and for this moral disturbance neither science nor philosophy can be the cure.

21. The Christian religion recognises what lies at the basis. of pessimistic sentiment, and yet enables us to gain a position in which practical optimism is perceived to be a true philosophy of life. Such optimism is the result of persistent

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faith in an Ideal, i.e., a Divine, order and constitution of things, and to this Divine order the best and most instructive testimony which can be found anywhere is given to men in the Bible. Faith in God is brought into highest intensity and reality by the outcome of the progressive teaching of the Hebrew Scriptures, which culminates in the religion of Christ. When Hartmann asserts that in an age which is being increasingly secularised, Christianity will become" what it exclusively was at its origin, the best consolation of the poor and wretched," yet confesses that "only slowly and gradually can the power of an idea so great as the Christian be broken," he is really bearing testimony to the fact that Christianity meets the deepest needs of the human race, and prevents men from entertaining a philosophy of despair. And the following words from Amiel's Journal Intime may be well contrasted with this contemptuous reference of Hartmann to the Christian religion :-"This orgie of philosophic thought" (says Amiel, so he describes pessimism), "identifying error with existence itself, and developing the axiom of Prudhon, 'Evil is God,' will bring back the mass of mankind to the Christian theodicy, which is neither pessimist nor optimist, but simply declares that the felicity which Christianity calls eternal life is accessible to man.'

22. Faith in a future life—or the hope of a future existence, i.e. of a timeless, ideal progress for the individual and for society is an essential factor of consideration when we ask the question, Is life worth living? And in the Christian religion this fact of "immortality" becomes (though still girt about with much necessary mystery for finite minds) a stimulus and hope of great motive power and consolatory influence. Mr. Sully seems to me to make a misleading statement when he says that "the thought of a more than counterbalancing good in a future state may, no doubt, if we are capable of a persistent imagination of the remote, help us to bear our present misery, but it does not make this misery one whit less real." When we are "helped to bear" a present uncomfortable condition of things, it surely makes the discomfort, and the perplexity attendant on it, less. And the idea of a future life" need not be estimated as chronologically remote, for it is connected with a spiritual world which encompasses us, into which we may be at any moment transferred. The modern watchwords of Progress" and "Evolution” are of very attenuated moral worth as motive, if Death ends all, and if there is not really in store an Ideal Good to which the world-process is being conducted. In the Christian Scriptures a personal hope of