20. But if there is really something which feels, one of its relations to the organised aggregate of molecules with which, wheresover discovered, it is found in close association, must needs be that of tenant. Whether it comes into existence before there is even a single room to receive it, and, if so, whether it has unconsciously a hand in building the house it is destined to occupy-these are questions which it might be interesting to ventilate, but which, so far as my purpose is concerned, may be left unanswered. Thus far, moreover, it is immaterial whether or not we can determine the grade of life at which the sort of susceptibility to outward changes that is evinced by appropriate movements becomes associated with actual sensation-in other words, with the most fundamental kind of psychical affection of which we have experience; and we may allow it to remain an open question whether the cases in which, in organisms supposed to be animal, apparent individuality, instead of being destroyed, is multiplied by mechanical division, exhibit the production of new individuals really sentient, or whether the kind of sensibility of which they furnish evidence may be ranked with that of the socalled sensitive plant, and may be regarded as having, in the functional susceptibility of the efferent portion of a developed nervous system, its analogue in the higher types of life. I still hold myself at liberty to distinguish from the organs or instruments of sensation the things which feel, and to contemplate the latter, relatively to non-sentient matter, as an evolution of something previously latent in the resources of Originative Power, as an advance in the revelation of the Eternal Idea.

21. The next step in advance is the commencement of psychical differentiation. In view of the possibility that variations of type may have arisen in the way of progressive development, it will here occur to us to ask whether limits determined by the capacity of its soul have been assigned to the developments which a sentient organism may undergo in correspondence with modifications of its environment, or whether the soul is, so to speak, illimitably elastic and indefinitely expansible in all directions. If (to illustrate my meaning by a further use of metaphors I employed just now) some considerable improvement of the house should so change its character as to necessitate on the part of the tenant a superior style of living, must he make way for another tenant? or will he, if he does not possess already, be supplied with, as a matter of course, the means of adapting his ménage and his scale of expenditure to the situation in which he will find himself, on the supposition that he is allowed to remain? One

thing I venture to assert without the slightest hesitation: I am at a loss even to conceive of a transition from the psychical condition of a lower animal to that of man having been effected otherwise than by what might be called a new birth or a new creation. He has certain distinctive mental characteristics which are surely traceable to the seed of some intellect of a peculiarly God-like order such as shows him to be of nobler lineage than the creatures over which he exercises sway. It is no mere difference of degree that we observe in comparing the brute soul, even in those specimens which exhibit exquisitely-developed sensibilities and perceptive powers, with the soul which manifests a capacity for thinking of an Author of all things finite and temporal, and of a life independent of all changes and chances. Yearnings and anxieties unutterable, in thoughts directed towards One who is perceived to have had no beginning, and to be the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever, are assuredly conceived through no faculty which owes its origin to nothing more than growing complexity in the inter-relations of appetency with a physical environment. An ellipse may be imagined to have its major axis lengthened out continuously ad infinitum, while the minor axis remains unchanged; but can imagination ever by this process expunge it from thought and fill its place with a parabola? Is there a possibility of blending the conception of the one with that of the other-in other words, of conceiving curves which are intermediate between the ellipse and the parabola, and do not admit of being sharply defined by either term? When this can be done, when the former can be represented as having by continuous modification of its axial relations evolved the latter, then may we allow it to be possible that the human soul has grown imperceptibly out of that which once belonged to some inferior animal.

22. To those whose psychological philosophy is but the interior projection and indispensable complement of their physiological scheme, I am quite prepared to concede that a fallacy must be lurking somewhere in my reasonings, if ever the brain, in any of the abnormal states to which it is liable, gives evidence of a break-up of personality. But is such evidence forthcoming? A lunatic, it may be, is under the impression that he is two individuals. Let us suppose them to be historical celebrities, whose characters present points of contrast. If his mental aberration involves corresponding alternations of character, there may be reason to suspect that the two hemispheres of his brain are in different states, and that they have been rendered by disease incapable of normal concerted action. For character, as manifested in the flesh,

cannot simply be the stamp which the soul bears: it must be in a considerable degree dependent upon the state of its instrument and medium of manifestation. Assume, however, the impression of a duplex, or of a multiplex, personality, and let it induce the bewildered man to hunt at times after some imaginary illusive self. We must needs postulate a subject to which it may be ascribed. What, then, should the subject of this impression be but a conscious self, a soul whose individuality cerebral confusion has left intact? If, from a conscious subject, some portion, not recognised while there as constituting a wedded, but distinct consciousness, were detached, how should its severance leave the impression of a divided consciousness? We may see plainly that what is really missed is some desirable habit of mind, faintly remembered, and the comparatively pleasing experiences associated with it; a multiplex personality, if the attempt be made to attach a meaning to the phrase, is absolutely unthinkable.

23. Nothing, therefore, now remains that might seem to forbid the conclusion towards which my argument has been tending. Evolution is more than the mere complication of molecular relations it brought into view being of a kind which shows itself distinct from the material in which those relations find place; and, still differentiating and distinguishing, it opened up those superior attributes of which we find ourselves possessed, and by the aid of which we are enabled to conceive the existence of, and to ascribe a character to, an Eternal Author of the whole, an original and all-compelling energy.* Evolution has been raising that curtain of night and emptiness without beginning, which before all worlds had veiled His glory; and, in a type of creature exhibited on this planet at a comparatively recent date, it has disclosed what may be called an image of the invisible God. But Man, considered simply as an individual, fails to disclose fully what he is, and comes very far short of revealing, as he appears to have been destined to reveal, his Author. His social attributes have need to be duly developed, and to be brought into action in a social state, which shall afford adequate scope for their exercise. As regards the ultimate prospects of the human race, if any physiological progress can be now detected, the bounds which seem to have been established in the fixity of natural laws, render it of comparatively little moment. But the sort of facts which, about eighteen centuries ago, first made it evident to a chosen few that the

manifold wisdom of God was being made known by the Church to the principalities and the powers in the heavenly places (Eph. iii. 10), are still observable and conducive to the expectation of a state of existence in which the Eternal Idea will have its outcome in the absence of sin, decay, and death, and the invisible God thus revealed will be all in all.

THE PRESIDENT.-After a communication from one of the members has been read, we shall be happy to hear any remarks upon this paper, which displays a great amount of thoughtful treatment, and seems to require an equally. careful consideration.

CAPTAIN F. PETRIE then read the following communication from Surgeon-General C. A. Gordon, M.D., C.B. :

"... With regard to sections 21, 22, and 23 of Mr. Clarke's paper, it seems to me that so far is man from, being 'evolved' towards a higher condition than that occupied by him in his early history-he is mentally and physically now in process of retrogression or devolution. I think, also, that this theory accords with analogy as presented to us in the process of decay which we see pervades all things, whether animate or inanimate.

“I further think that as with the early Aryan poet-philosophers mentioned in my essay 'On Medicine in Ancient India,' so with the early Semitic and other 'prophets,' there existed in them a more intimate relation between the corporeal and psychic elements in their nature, than is now to be found in humanity as it at present exists.

Mr. W. GRIFFITH.-I rise with a certain amount of diffidence to offer a few remarks on a paper which exhibits a great amount of intellectual power and considerable skill in the use made by the author of philosophical terms, together with a knowledge of antique philosophy which we do not often meet with. If by "Evolution a Revelation" is meant that Evolution adopted as a truth would explain many facts, this, no doubt, may be the case; but the word "Revelation" does appear to me to be too transcendental for application to a system of natural and physical philosophy. Passing from the proposition which has thus been laid down, I would venture to make a few remarks on the reasons that have been adduced in support of it. The first argument is that, "the beginning of the Cosmos, having been conceived as a state of things in which differentiation had as yet no place, there is but one way in which it can present itself distinctly to the imagination: it must be pictured as a system of homogeneous atoms in perfect equilibrium." Now those who are acquainted with the Greek philosophy know that the Cosmo's is usually taken by the Greek philosophers to signify a uniform order in creation: not as a system of molecules thrown together indiscriminately, but rather that development of system in the universe in which there was order and beauty, and everything was harmonised and consistent. I think, therefore, that the use which is here made of the word "Cosmos" is entirely inappropriate. But, passing from mere criticism of the use made of

the word "Cosmos," I would call attention to the statement made in this
passage, that all things were in a state of homogeneity, and I would ask, “Is
not this assuming a great deal too much?" If we turn to the classics we
find Ovid telling us:

Ante mare, et terras, et, quod tegit omnia, cœlum,
Unus erat toto Naturæ vultus in orbe,

Quem dixêre Chaos; rudis indigestaque moles :
Hanc Deus, et melior litem Natura diremit.

Surely we can imagine a state of chaotic existence before the beautiful and
harmonious Cosmos came into being, and are not compelled to the
conclusion that all the atoms were homogeneous. I think that
such a supposition as this is quite as consistent with fact or reason as
the supposition that all things, at that time, must have consisted of homo-
geneous atoms in perfect equilibrium. It would take too long to follow the
very able development of the author's argument, and trace, step by step,
the superstructure he has erected on, what I conceive to be, a fallacious
foundation, till we come to the point as to Evolution. We are told that, if
we assume all these things, there need be no great difficulty in substituting
the word "Creation" for "Evolution." But this is the very point in
debate. To my mind, it is simpler to take the first chapter of Genesis
as we find it, and say, there may be difficulty in it which is hard to
explain, but that it does explain the existing state of creation in a way
which neither Herbert Spencer nor any of our more extreme modern
philosophers seem to have done. As to the creation of matter, a question
not taken up in this paper. How did matter come into existence? That it
was created by the Almighty and that certain qualities may have been
attached to it which evolved themselves in particular forms of physical
existence, may have been the case; but I do not stand nor lean on that.
We have what is supposed to be really a revelation-inspired-which does
explain the difficulties of creation. These remarks of mine have necessarily
been somewhat fragmentary. The subject is so vast and grand, and the
points brought forward so comprehensive and sublime, that it is difficult
to tie them down to the basis of calm fact and ordinary logic; but still,
I think that what is put before us tends to show that we need something
further to explain what is in existence.

A VISITOR.-May I ask whether the author will explain this passage, which appears in section 23: "Evolution has been raising that curtain of night and emptiness without beginning, which before all worlds had veiled His glory; and in a type of creature exhibited on this planet at a comparatively recent date it has disclosed what may be called an image of the invisible God." Are we to understand by this that the author regards the Saviour as a product of Evolution? I have heard such things before stated by some few men of learning and authority; but I should be very sorry to hear it asserted in this room. Again, may I ask whether I am right in supposing that the author wishes us to regard the term "Creation" as synonymous