which may be urged in behalf of the presence and agency of a Personal God in Nature.

In order to accomplish this, let it be remembered that the Evolutionist holds that there has been a period in the history of being, when whatever existed phenomenally was homogeneous, that is, all alike. What that was which then existed as matter, that is, as capable of affecting us as what we call matter now does, the Evolutionist will not undertake to determine. It may have been of inconceivable tenuity, or it may have been, though having all the attributes of what we call matter, only co-existent, immeasurably diffused force-centres. Some such condition the Evolutionist must believe to have at one time existed.

There is no difficulty whatever for the Theist in this view. Indeed, he most readily represents to himself, in this way, the phenomenal result of the original creative act. We have then here a common ground upon which both can stand. It is the critical point too in the whole controversy. The waves of this boundless ether, pulsating with its allpervading forces, are perfectly representable in thought. Let us see if we, Theists or Evolutionists, can venture back together into the mysterious depths which preceded the phenomenal condition, in the presence of which we are now supposed to

stand; and then, turning our faces to the future, follow on together, in thought, through the vast cycles of time, the stupendous developments of the Uni

verse.

If the Evolutionist should say here that it is true that such a condition of things must have existed, but that it is impossible to conceive of any preceding period when the phenomenal did not exist, this is true indeed, but it will not prevent our standing on common ground, nor impede the progress of our argument. It is impossible indeed to conceive of a beginning of phenomena, but it is also impossible to conceive of phenomena not having a beginning; and if the Evolutionist urges the one, the Theist can balance it by urging the other. So far then there is nothing gained or lost upon either side. Let the Theist waive the point of what precedes phenomena, and put the inquiry in this form: what is that which underlies phenomena and the forces which in phenomena are disclosed? The Evolutionist cannot stand upon the ground of utter nescience. He is compelled to admit, and he does admit, Absolute Being. He may say that we cannot know Absolute Being, but he is obliged to say that we know that Absolute Being exists. Mr. Herbert Spencer himself says, " By the very conditions says," of thought we are prevented from knowing any

thing but relative being; yet by these very conditions of thought, an indefinite consciousness of Absolute Being is necessitated." "The axiomatic truths of physical science unavoidably postulate Absolute Being as their common basis." "Both Religion and Science are obliged by the demonstrated untenability of their supposed cognitions, to confess that the ultimate reality is incognizable, and yet both are obliged to assert the existence of an Ultimate Reality. Without this, Religion has no subject matter; and without this, Science, subjective and objective, lacks its indispensable datum. cannot construct a theory of internal phenomena without postulating Absolute Being; and unless we postulate Absolute Being, or being which persists, we cannot construct a theory of external phenomena." (First Principles, p. 190.)

We

It is impossible to overestimate the importance, in our argument, of this admission of Mr. Spencer. The Theist and Evolutionist alike have thus transcended phenomena and all the laws of their succession, and recognized an Ultimate Reality and Absolute Being. It matters not now what we know of this Being. We shall have occasion hereafter to consider that. Our point now is that Theists and Evolutionists have together drawn aside the phenomenal veil which hides the arcana of nature, and

recognized the Absolute Being within the sanctuary of the Universe.

But as we stand, Theists and Evolutionists, in imagination, in the presence of this boundless ocean of force-centres or ultimate atoms of matter, and recognize beyond and beneath it an Ultimate Reality and Absolute Being, the inquiry inevitably suggests itself, What is the relation of the Phenomenal Universe to the Absolute Being? It may be said, that it is impossible for us to have any knowledge in regard to any such relation, and that the whole subject is necessarily shrouded in impenetrable obscurity. But it may be replied that if the whole matter is thus beyond the sphere of human knowledge, then it is of course as unwarrantable to deny the relation as to affirm it. The Evolutionist would

It would follow, then,

not hesitate to admit this. upon this admission, that it is at least as reasonable to affirm this relation as to deny it. The Evolutionist might very probably agree that it is more reasonable to suppose that there is some relation 'between Absolute Being and the Phenomenal Universe. It is allowable for us at least to make the supposition, that there is some relation, and still further to make some supposition as to what the relation is. These allowable suppositions we can use as working hypotheses. Without stopping now

to examine the question as to whether we are entirely ignorant of Absolute Being and of its relation to the Phenomenal Universe, we will go only so far as the Evolutionist will permit us to go, without denying the validity of our position. He will not object to our hypotheses, since in regard to a matter of which, as he holds, we are entirely ignorant, any hypothesis is just as likely to be true as false. Postponing then any effort to show the validity of our hypotheses, I would suppose that a relation exists between Absolute Being and the Phenomenal Universe, that Absolute Being is Personal Being with Reason, Affections, and Will, that the Absolute Being is immanent in the Phenomenal Universe, and that the forces and laws of the Phenomenal Universe are merely expressions of the agency and will of the Absolute Being.

It is important to notice here that if the Evolutionist, while he cannot deny but that these hypotheses may be true, does not admit the validity of the evidence in behalf of their truth, it is not in consequence of holding the theory of Evolution. The theory of Evolution does not touch these hypotheses at any conceivable point. A man may hold that theory to its fullest extent, and in its most extreme form, and yet, in entire consistency, affirm every one of these hypotheses to be true. The only question