cal reasoning *. But DES CARTES is no fceptic in his moral reafonings: therefore, in his moral reasonings, he must be a 'fophifter. Let us fee whether we can make good this charge againft him by facts.

Taking it for granted that he thinks, he thence infers, that he exifts: Ego cogito, ergo fum. Now there cannot be thought where there is no exiftence; before he take it for granted that he thinks, he muft alfo take it for granted that he exifts. This argument, therefore, proceeds on a fuppofition, that the thing to be proved is true; in other words, it is a fophifm, a petitio principii. Even fuppofing it possible to conceive thinking, without at the fame time conceiving existence, ftill this is no conclufive argument, except it could be shown, that it is more evident to a man that he thinks, than that he exifts; for in every true proof, a lefs evident propofition is inferred from one that is more evident. But, I think, and, I exift, are equally evident. Therefore this is no true proof. To fet an example of fate reafoning in the very foundation of a

*See the Gel part of this Effay.

fyftem,

fyftem, can hardly fail to have bad confequences.

Having in this manner established his own existence, our author next proceeds to prove the veracity of his faculties; that is, to fhow, by reafoning, that what he thinks true is really true, and that what he thinks falfe is really falfe. He would have done better to have taken this alfo for granted: the argument by which he attempts to prove it, does more honour to his heart than to his understanding. It is indeed a fophifin of the fame kind with the former, in which he takes that for granted which he propofes to prove. It runs thus. We are conscious, that we have in our minds the idea of a being infinitely perfect, intelligent, and powerful, neceffarily existent, and eternal. This idea differs from all our other ideas in two refpects it implies the notions of eternal and neceffary exiftence, and of infinite perfection; it neither is, ner can be, a fiction of the imagination; and therefore exhibits no chimera or imaginary being, but a true and immutable nature, which muft of neceffity exist, because necessary existence is comprehended in the idea of it.

Therefore

Therefore there is a God, neceffarily exiftent, infinitely wife, powerful, and true, and poffeffed of all perfection. This Being is the maker of us and of all our faculties; he cannot deceive, because he is infinitely perfect; therefore our faculties are true, and not fallacious*.-The fame argument has been adopted by others, particularly by Dr Barrow. Cartefius, fays that pious and learned author, "hath "well obferved, that, to make us abfo

lutely certain of our having attained the "truth, it is required to be known, whe"ther our faculties of apprehending and judging the truth, be true; which can only be known from the power, goodnefs, and truth of our creator +."

I object not to this argument for the divine existence, drawn from the idea of an all-perfect being, of which the human mind is conscious; though perhaps it is not the most unexceptionable method of evincing that great truth. I allow, that when a man believes a God, he cannot, without abfurdity and impiety, deny or question the veracity of his own faculties;

* Cartefii Princip. Philof. part. 1. § 14. 15. 18,

Lect. Geomet. 7.

and

and that to acknowledge a distinction between truth and falfehood, implies a perfuafion, that certain laws are established in the universe, on which the natures of all created things depend, which (to me at leaft) is incomprehenfible, except on the fuppofition of a fupreme, intelligent, directing caufe. But I acquiefce in these principles, because I take the veracity of my faculties for granted; and this I feel myfelf neceffitated to do, because I feel it to be the law of my nature, which I cannot poffibly counteract. Proceeding then upon this innate and irrefiftible notion, that my faculties are true, I infer, by the jufteft reasoning, that God exifts; and the evidence for this great truth is fo clear and convincing, that I cannot withstand its force, if I believe any thing else whatfoever.

DES CARTES argues in a different manner. Because God exifts, (fays he), and is perfect, therefore my faculties are true. Right. —But how do you know that God exifts? I infer it from the fecond principle of my philofophy, already established, Cogito, ergo fum. -How do you know that your inference is juft? It fatisfics

my

my

reafon. Your argument proceeds on a fuppofition, that what fatisfies your reafon is true? It does. Do you not then take it for granted, that your reafon is not a fallacious, but a true faculty? This must be taken for granted, otherwife the argument is good for nothing.—And if so, your argument proceeds on a fuppofition, that the point to be proved is true. In a word, you pretend to prove the truth of our natural faculties, by an argument which evidently and neceffarily fuppofes their truth. Your philofophy is built on fophifms; how then can it be according to common fenfe?

As this philofopher doubted where he ought to have been confident, fo he is often confident where he ought to doubt. He admits not his own exiftence, till he thinks he has proved it; yet his system is replete with hypothefes taken for granted, without proof, almoft without examination. He fets out with the profeffion of univerfal fcepticism; but many of his theories are founded in the most unphilofophical credulity. Had he taken a little more for granted, he would have proved a great deal more: he takes almost no