ward sign is the laying on of hands; the essential accompaniment is the invocation of the HOLY GHOST; the minister is the Bishop; and the grace vouchsafed is such a gift of the Spirit as strengthens and aids us in the performance of every good work, and arms us against temptation and sin."-Pp. 161, 162.

In the sermon which next ensues, we regret to note that the author continually uses the term "LORD's Supper" to denote the Holy Eucharist.

Precisely the same may be said of No. 12, in Mr. J. H. Parker's Parochial Papers. The right view of Confirmation (this is the subject of the tract) as arrived at after a rather prolix exordium. And this is a fact for which we are truly thankful. We cannot say, however, that the Paper, in other respects, at all comes up to the tone of Catholic theology.

Two Manuals of Prayer have reached us; 1, "for a Christian Servant," (Masters); 2, for more educated persons, compiled by Mr. CHARLES MARRIOTT, (J. H. Parker,) which may be commended, as being taken from or formed upon the model of ancient sources. In other words, they are compiled upon the same principle as was the Book of Common Prayer, not simply made up from it.

The Scriptural Doctrine of the Holy Communion (Masters,) is a decided step in advance. The true Catholic doctrine on this most vital subject may be said to have been now thoroughly vindicated and established, as far as persons of learning and leisure are concerned. Here we have the same doctrine, for the first time, placed within the reach of the unlearned and within the compass of thirty-two small pages. That is, the author, the Rev. W. NEVINS, Successfully vindicates the Real Presence, and the Inward Part of the Sacrament. Upon the sacrificial and liturgical part he scarcely touches. In a new edition, this might well be introduced in connection with our LORD's continuing priesthood in heaven.

LORD LYTTLETON has published some Thoughts on National Education (Murray), which, so far as they go, coincide with the view that we ventured to put forth two months since, namely, that what we must come to, is compulsory education. It is not Lord Lyttleton's immediate object to advocate this step; but foreseeing that it is what we must come to, he endeavours to remove some of the objections which will at first sight assuredly be entertained to the system. Thus he shows that it is already partially adopted with success, both in workhouses and in the case of children employed in factories.

Mr. Bagster has been at the trouble of publishing, and one Mr. JOHN TAYLOR of editing the (so-called) Revised Liturgy of 1689, which he recommends persons to take to Church with them, so that they "may pray in the Spirit according to the revised form, while the services are being read in the ancient way." The Revisionists however, it appears, look to the comfort of the flesh as well as of "the Spirit ;" for we note that one of the recommendations, is the giving a shorter Lesson in the Burial Service, which may be used "in colder or later seasons.

389

MOZLEY'S TREATISE ON PREDESTINATION.

A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination. By J. B. MOZLEY, B.D., Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford. (J. Murray, 1855.)

VERY few perhaps, of those many who will read this remarkable book, will get very far in their studies, without being driven almost to inquire into the circumstances which could have induced Mr. Mozley to undertake such a very deep and laborious investigation. It is so uncommon, especially in the present day, for any one to sit down and devote, we may safely say years, to the subject embraced in this learned treatise, that the more careful readers of it will not fail to speculate on the cause that led to such an inquiry being made at all. Nor is this altogether a vain question arising from mere curiosity rather than an anxiety after truth. In legal documents the main clue to their correct interpretation is the preamble or description, giving an account of the motives and facts that led to the drawing up of the deed; and when these are no where expressed, doubt and confusion are generally the result. The want of a description of the reasons which induced Mr. Mozley to apply his mind to the question of Predestinarianism is very much felt, chiefly because a greater degree of certainty on this point would assist the reader materially in setting a due value upon the conclusions, which he draws from his investigations, and in tracing the various bends and turnings of his abstruse arguments with greater accuracy and precision. They, who having been brought up in the traditional knowledge of their religious faith, launch out into the sea of controversy, fare very differently when they set out in calm weather, from what they will if the waters have just been disturbed by an angry and violent theological storm. In the one case they usually regain in safety the peaceful haven from which they sailed forth, in the other the vessel is so driven and tossed to and fro, that unless there is a very steady pilot at the helm, she rarely will return to the same port.

In default then of any avowal of the motives which led to the choice of the subject of this book, we shall be presumptuous enough to declare our conviction that it took its origin in some one of the various stages of the Gorham dispute. If it did, it conveys a proof if any were wanting, that when once old traditional prepossessions are broken up, subtle and logical minds will find it very difficult to secure a resting place for their faith, all the more difficult on account of this subtlety and power of abstraction; and moreover that it is far more easy to raise and VOL. XVII.-SEPTEMBER, 1855. 3 E

rehearse doubts, than to quiet and allay them. Mr. Mozley must not for a moment suppose that we accuse him of searching out arguments and extenuations for Mr. Gorham's views, or for the unhappy decision that was given upon them,—all that we conjecture is, that he was thereby induced to take up the study of the Predestinarian question, and of the works of S. Augustine its great originator, and that having done so at a period of excitement, his judgment in some way received a bias which throughout his treatise is continually leading him towards a more favourable view of S. Augustine's distinctive tenets, than his arguments and the facts of the case will warrant.

One benefit no doubt arises from Mr. Mozley's patient and laborious investigation, viz., that we have brought forward in language which few can imitate, none can excel, and in his own most lucid style, the whole bearings of the Augustinian theology, and these as far as our space will admit, we will endeavour to collect together for the benefit of our readers.

Mr. Mozley readily admits that S. Augustine's views were a departure from those simple statements of doctrine which satisfied the faith of the Primitive Church; his view is that the unguarded character of these formulæ led to the rise of Pelagianism, and that in combating this heresy, S. Augustine was drawn on to the opinions which have ever been associated with his name:—

"It may at first sight seem unnecessary to inquire into the mode in which the Pelagian controversy arose; because it appears enough to say, that one side maintained and another denied, the fall of man. But the doctrine of the fall though substantially, did not expressly or by name form the original subject of dispute, but was led up to by a previous question.

"It has been disputed whether the Augustinian system was a reaction from the Pelagian, or the Pelagian from the Augustinian. Historical evidence favours the latter assertion. But the dispute, whichever way decided, is not an important one. The controversy between these two was contained in an elementary statement of Christian doctrine, which as soon as it came to be examined intellectually, was certain to disclose it. The language by which the Christian Church has always expressed the truths of man's free will and Divine grace, has been that the one could do no good thing without the aid of the other, nihil bonum sine gratiâ. This formula satisfied the simplicity of the Primitive Church, as it has satisfied the uncontroversial faith of all ages; and no desire was felt for further expression and a more exact truth. But it is evident that this state of theology on this subject could not last longer than the reign of a simpler faith. When minds began to reason upon this formula, and analyse it logically, it lost its finality, and the combination of grace and free will divided itself into two great doctrines of an absolute power of free will, and an absolute power of grace."—-Pp. 50, 51.

The Pelagian then erred in following out to its logical conclu

sion the idea of man's freedom of action, quite irrespective of the counterbalancing influence of Divine grace :—

"Thus apparently sound and forced upon reason by the necessity of the case, this position of an ultimate unassisted strength in the natural will was nevertheless, the root of all the errors, the extravagances, and the impieties of Pelagianism. It was a position logically true, indeed, and such as could not be denied without admitting the alternative of irresistible grace or necessitarianism. Nor had it been maintained with due modesty and reserve, as being one side of the whole mysterious truth relating to human action, would it have been otherwise than orthodox. But to maintain absolutely and definitely an ultimate power in the human will to move aright independently of GOD, was a position untrue and shocking to natural piety; a separation of the creature from the Creator, which was opposed to the very foundation of religion. And to proceed to argue upon such a truth and develop it, as if it were a complete and ascertained premiss, upon which a system could be erected, was to mistake its nature and run at once into obliquity and error. But this was what the Pelagians did. For from this position the conclusion was immediately drawn that every man had the power of fulfilling the whole law."-Pp. 57, 58.

In the course of the controversy, the position of Adam both before and after the fall, became a subject of careful inquiry, and both of the contending parties arrived at very definite conclusions on this point. The following beautiful extract will assist in throwing light upon the way in which S. Augustine argued :—

:

"Adam's trial lay in having to sustain a divinely bestowed defence against sin, rather than engage in direct conflict with it; and a tranquil precaution, not inconsistent with the happiness of paradise against a remote issue on the side of evil, had it been adequately maintained, would have effectually preserved him. He had by his created disposition a pleasure in goodness; and that pleasure naturally preserved him in obedience without the need of express effort. But though thus held to obedience by the persuasive tie of an adequate pleasure and delight, man was not without an indefinite principle of desire in his nature, which tended to pass beyond the bounds of present happiness in quest of more. Thus in common life persons happy after a human measure in their present condition and resources, still carry about with them a general sense of a capacity for greater happiness, which is without much difficulty kept under and controlled by the mind, simply sustaining a proper estimate of the resources in its possession, and applying a just attention to the enjoyment of them; but which may be allowed to expand unduly until it impels the man to a trial of new and dangerous sources of pleasure. Happy within the limits of obedience, Adam was still not out of the reach of a remote class of invitations to advance beyond the precincts of a sacred sufficiency, and make trial of the unknown. But the happiness with which GOD had connected his duty could have easily, with the aid of an unpainful caution of his own, mastered the temptation. Thus in some calm interval, produced by sight or sound, or by some cheering or tranquillising news, or arising in

the mind, he knows not how, a man enjoys, amid the business, anxiety, and turmoil of the world, a brief repose and happiness within; which does not however, while it removes to the distant horizon for the time, the evils and the pains of life, altogether put them out of sight. Behind him are the sorrows and misfortunes of the past, before him those of the future. He is not unconscious of either; but they yield to the reign of the present hour, which disables and unsubstantiates, though it does not suppress them. The fulness of present peace occupies the mind, excluding the power of realizing anything which is not in harmony with it; and evil is only seen as a distant shadow, hovering on the outside of things, a feeble and inert phantom belonging to another world than our own, which cannot come near enough to hurt or pene trate within the sphere of solid things. So from some inland scene is heard the distant roar of the sea, or from some quiet country spot the noise of some neighbouring city; the sounds are heard, but they affect the mind altogether differently than if they were near. They do not overwhelm or distract, but rather mingle with the serenity of the scene before us.

"This implanted rectitude, or good habit it was, which made the first sin of man so heinous, and caused that distinction between it and all the other sins which have been committed in the world. For the first sin was the only sin which was committed against and in spite of a settled bias of nature toward good; all the sins which have been committed since have been committed in accordance with a natural bias toward evil. There was therefore a perversity in the first sin altogether peculiar to it, and such as made it a sin sui generis. S. Augustine is accordingly exact in distinguishing the motive to the first sin as being a depraved will as contrasted with concupiscence or lust; by a depraved will meaning a perverse opposition to the good will established in the first man, a voluntary abandonment of the high ground on which he stood by nature, a violation of his own created inclination to good. A kind of horror attaches to the falls of saints, when those who have maintained a high and consistent course of holiness commit some deep sin. Such sins are like unaccountable convulsions in nature, and our moral instincts immediately draw a distinction between them and common sins. The peculiarity however, of the sin of Adam, exceeded that of any sin of fallen man, in that it was the sin of man unfallen." Pp. 94, 95,

S. Augustine attributes to Adam before the fall a free will1 and power of choice, but argued from the existence of original sin as produced by Adam's disobedience, that this freedom of action could no longer remain in his state of corruption. Looking at the whole question with the eye of a philosopher, and drawing out what he considered undoubted premises to their logical result,

"He explained the corruption of human nature to mean the loss of freewill; and this statement was the fundamental barrier, which divided

"Homo

1 Augustine endows Adam with freewill; "Potuit non peccare primus homo, potuit non mori, potuit bonum non deserere."-De Corr. et Grat. c. 12. male utens libero arbitrio, et se perdidit et ipsum."-Enchir. c. 30, Lomb.