Second. In the complex character of many of his moral actions. Although there is in moral actions themselves that which constitutes them right or wrong, yet in many actions the real character is not always apparent upon the surface. Some actions are of so doubtful a character as to perplex the moral faculty. We often find it necessary to look backward to the motive from which an action springs and forward to the results likely to be produced before we can determine its moral worth; and when this process occasionally fails, the motives and the results are frequently such a mixture of good and evil as to leave us in doubt respecting the moral character of the act. Part of the difficulty which we are considering is to be sought for in us, rather than in the complexity of the action itself. Our ignorance, our prejudice, our education, and religious training, and the stand-point from which we view an action, may give to it a complexity which does not really belong to it. Thus, two men differently trained, educated, and circumstanced, will often be found pronouncing diametrically opposite verdicts respecting the same moral action. As an illustration :-theft, simply considered as theft, we are inclined to think will be condemned by the moral faculty without exception. Yet in Sparta, such were the ignorance, prejudice, and education of the people, and such the military virtues that were supposed to be acquired by its successful practice, that theft was permitted by their national laws; and when successfully practiced, without detection, was applauded as a virtue. But strip theft of these supposed advantages, and even the conscience of a Spartan would condemn it. There may be elements entering into the moral character of an action that we do not observe, and whose presence we do not even suspect, but which, if known, would often lead to very different conclusions. Let evil be presented simply as evil, and good simply as good, and the moral faculty will instantly and uniformly condemn the one and approve the other; but a mixture of these two elements in the same action cannot fail to perplex it.

Third. In the influence of the principle of association over man's moral decisions. Dr. Brown's analytical mind clearly perceived the difficulties arising from this source, and set it down as one of his limitations: "The influence of association, indeed, does not destroy the moral capacity, but it gives it new objects, or at least varies the objects in which it is to exercise itself, by suggesting, with peculiar vividness, certain accessory circumstances, which may variously modify the general sentiment that results from the contemplation of particular actions."* We leave this point by simply intimating, that if any of our readers wish to push the inquiry further, they may do so by examining the manner in which

"Lectures on Ethics," page 33.

I

one idea tends to modify another; or, what is still less difficult, by carefully observing how their views of the moral quality of the same action are affected by the character and circumstances of the person who performs it.

We now revert back to our former position-that the moral faculty, though possessed of a greater amount of authority than the appetites, passions, and self-love, and designed to preside over all the other faculties, yet being under the influence of sin, it is liable to be imposed upon and perverted, so that we cannot place that confidence in its decisions which is due to an infallible guide.

Hence arises the absolute necessity for a higher, a more authoritative, and reliable guide than conscience. This is furnished in the word of God,- We have a more sure word of prophecy, whereunto we do well that we take heed." It is God's lamp, hung out from heaven to guide mankind on the way to eternal life. It embodies the laws of eternal right; and in every syllable of its divine teaching an enlightened conscience will acquiesce.

We now enter our protest against what we deem a dangerous error, which has been maintained by many of our moral philosophers, namely, that divine revelation is simply a republication of the law of nature, meaning by this the law written on the heart of man in his state of innocency. This is true so far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. The scriptures contain the scheme of redemption by Jesus Christ. Hence they are addressed to man as a sinner, not merely to make known to him the way of obedience, which he has forsaken, but to make known to him the means of restoration to a new and holy obedience, by the pardon of all his sins, the renewal of his heart, and a restoration of the lost image of God. This is the primary object of divine revelation. This secured, and we are prepared to say with Dr. Wardlaw, who has exhibited the whole of this part of the subject in the light of divine revelation— "But since there cannot be two laws, two different rules of duty, the moral law of revelation is the same as the moral law in the heart of the first man; and so far this department of revelation may be allowed to be a republication of the law of nature." "In the great principles of moral rectitude revelation makes no change."*

The word of God is of the highest authority. From its decisions there is no appeal. Let us but certify ourselves of the fact that God hath spoken, and there remains but one thing for us, and that is to acquiesce and obey. It is in vain to plead the authority of conscience for any course of conduct contrary to the word of God. The scriptures being infinitely higher in authority and trustworthyness, must be obeyed; so that, although conscience is of higher

"Christian Ethics," page 123.

authority than our other impulsive and restraining faculties, it must bow to the still higher authority of the written revelation.

Thirdly. In contrast with the authority of ecclesiastical systems and claims. We are not a little surprised to find that many of the best writers on ethical science have either entirely overlooked this point, or passed it slightly over. To us it seems a subject of growing importance in connection with the authority of conscience, as in our country this is an age of increasing ecclesiastical pretension. There are in existence systems of church polity whose pretensions, if yielded to, rob man of his dearest rights, and bind his noblest faculties in stronger than iron chains. Take the Papacy as an illustration. This system of iniquity holds the personal conscience in its grasp, and makes one presiding official the dictator of the entire body. Or take the Puseyites, connected with the Anglican church, and there is but a very slight improvement in their claims to authority over the conscience of their votaries, upon that of Popery. Basing their authority upon priestly ordination and apostolical succession, they claim the sole right to expound the scriptures, administer the ordinances, and guide the people in religious matters, It is easily perceived to what their pretensions lead. As they are the only divinely appointed teachers of the people, every man is bound to place himself, with unquestioning docility, under their direction. It is in vain to talk about free and independent thought, or to plead the authority of reason and conscience for dissenting from them, for they acknowledge no such authority, but pretend to a supremacy over both.

On the other hand, there is a large body of thinkers in the present day, having many under their pupilage, who on this subject are thoroughly latitudinarian. They are half sceptic, half Christian. Their views on church polity are so lax that they concede no authority whatever to the church. They glory in unshackled freedom, and boast of being untramelled. They place conscience above the authority of the church, and affect indifference to order, discipline, and law. To this class belong many in England, Holland, France, and Germany, at the present day. But there are thousands of church members in all denominations who have not the ability for the intellectual labour characteristic of the leading rationalistic thinkers, who are nevertheless as lax as any rationalist in their views of the authority of the church. Wherever discipline is to be exercised and rule enforced they are sure to call in their conscience as the sole arbitrator in the case. The appeal to their conscience is final-all must bow to that. It never occurs to their minds that the church, or the church authorities, have any conscience. Their imperious demands must be granted, or there will be serious disturbance, which may perhaps end in a division of the church.

This is clearly seen in the history of all protestant

countries and communities. Hence arises the difficulty of assigning to conscience its proper place and amount of authority in ecclesiastical matters.

That there should be a church is clearly revealed in the word of God, and it is imperatively required by the new condition into which man is brought by regeneration. The divine life creates the necessity for church fellowship. These seem to us so closely united that we seriously doubt whether the former can long exist in the heart without the aid of the latter. That the church, which is of divine appointment and essential to the spiritual growth of man, should have authority, is also clear enough. But that authority ought to be such as man can submit to without degrading the nobility of his renewed nature. And here lies the difficulty. Who can strike the line that shall define the true limits of the authority of conscience on the one hand, and the church on the other? Where does the authority of the church end and that of conscience begin? or, the authority of conscience end and that of the church begin? These are questions to which it is desirable definite answers should be given, and in attempting to answer them we desire only to follow the directions of Scripture and sound common sense.

We are settled in our minds, then, that there ought to be a church. This great point settled, we shall feel no difficulty in concluding that its constitution, its discipline, its ordinances, its ceremonies, its ministry, its conditions of membership, and all its minor institutions ought to be in perfect harmony with the word of God. Then, if the church is so constituted, and so governed, the next conclusion is inevitable, that when she speaks, her voice, sustained by the authority of Scripture, is the voice of God. We have before seen that the authority of the Scriptures is greater than the authority of conscience; and we now see wherein the authority of the church is greater than the authority of conscience. When a question arises between conscience and the church, and their respective claims come into collision with eachother, then the grounds of authority must be examined; and if it be found that the church has departed from the scriptures, or demands what is contrary to the scriptures, the authority of an enlightened conscience must be obeyed, and the word of God maintained, if our lives be sacrificed in the attempt. If, on the other hand, it should be found that the church has not departed from the written word of God, its authority must be obeyed. Such we believe to be the true limits of the authority of the church and the authority of conscience.

Thus we have endeavoured to develop what we judge to be correct views of the nature and authority of conscience. We have neither abandoned the teachings of nature nor revealed religion in this inquiry. It is to be deplored that in this age there should be such a general attempt to separate morals and religion, and teach

the one independent of the other; but they cannot be separated with impunity. God has joined them together, and constituted revealed religion the foundation of all true morality. It would be foolish in us to suppose that we have removed all, or even the greater part, of the difficulties that beset the subject, or that what we have written will meet with the approval of all our readers; but we have attempted to assist the inquirer, and we are persuaded that what we have advanced is in harmony with the word of God. R. S.

ART. II.-WILLIAM GADSBY.

The Life and Works of William Gadsby, of Manchester. In Two Volumes.

ALTHOUGH these volumes have been for several years before

the public, we have reason to believe they are known by few of our readers. Till lately we ourselves were only aware of their existence by report; but knowing their author was a man of varied excellencies, a champion of the school of theology to which he belonged, and, withal, uniting ancommon eccentricity of manner with uncommon massiveness of intellect, we added to our stock of books the volumes now before us. A perusal of their contents yielded us instruction and delight, and they are amongst those choice and favourite tomes which we are in the habit of returning to again and again to find themes for thought and thoughts for themes, comfort in hours of trial, and incentives to exertion when the hands hang down. This may be thought high panegyric, when we add that the works are devoid of learning, that they exhibit few of the higher attributes of polite literature, while the "five points" of Calvinism meet us at almost every page. The "memoirs," too, are meagre. When it is remembered that William Gadsby was for half a century a leading minister of the Particular Baptists, that he took a prominent part in the politico-religious questions which agitated the times in which he lived, that he was in "labours more abundant" than any other man belonging to his own section of the church, and that it is known his social and religious history was singularly eventful, we naturally look for more than a mere sketch,