of men. Obliterating all distinctions between vice and virtue, it falsifies human consciousness, and reveals its own flimsiness and unsoundness as a theory explanatory of the origin and phenomena of life.

The theory of multiple creations in its applications to man has occasioned some degree of alarm for the safety of the Scripture record; but needlessly, for zoology places difficulties in the way of this theory which at present appear insuperable, though it has found an advocate in one of the most distinguished of living naturalists. To maintain, as Agassiz has done,* that there is only one species of men, and yet that the several races have originated independently in different parts of the world, contradicts the commonly received doctrine of species. Lineal descent, and the permanent reproduction of certain resemblances are regarded as indispensible characteristics of species. These conditions upon which specific difference is scientifically based, all polygenists and the advocates of modified polygenism repudiate, and substitute for them mere "form," or "unity of composition;" but in doing this they array themselves against almost all leaders in scientific inquiry. Humboldt allows that appearances seem at first to favour the notion of specific differences among men, but he shows that this support is only seeming, for it disappears before a wide induction of facts and a broad philosophical investigation. The intermediate gradations in colour of skin and form of skull revealed by the progress of geographical knowledge the analogies presented by the existence of varieties among many species of wild and domesticated animals, and the more accurate knowledge respecting the limits of fecundity to which recent investigations have ledsupport upon a strong and hitherto unshaken basis the unity of the human race.

That certain forms of organic life are found within given areas is a fact now generally admitted, but in applying it to man, polygenists make centres of creation much more absolute than the facts of science warrant. With them the influence of these centres reaches to all the products of a region, and brings them into direct relation; so that men, plants, birds, mammals, insects, fishes, and crustacea, are all brethren in the sense of being antocthonous. A conclusion like this is not sustained by sound scientific induction, as for instance--the mammalia of Australia are unlike what are found elsewhere, so that in its mammalogy it constitutes a separate and distinct centre; but entomologically it is related to the whole island region, for its insect-life is the same as that found in New

In his contributions to the "Christian Examiner;" his Essay in Nott and Gliddon's "Types of Mankind;" and his "Contributions to the Natural History of the United States."

+ Cosmos, vol. 7, p. 361.

Zealand and New Caledonia. Ornithologically, the coast of the Mediterranean and the Red Sea at the Isthmus of Suez belong to one centre of creation, but the marine faunae upon the opposite coasts are extremely unlike. Edwards, whose work upon the geographical distribution of crustacea Quatrefages styles a "model work," states that there is not found a single crustacea common to both coasts. If then, centres of creation are narrowed or widened according to the form of organic life, which is the subject of investigation, they ought not to be insisted upon too absolutely in determining whether man proceeded from one pair or from many. But the weakness of the polygenistic argument, based upon centres of creation, may be still more fully demonstrated. If this argument be worth anything there will be an exact correspondence in the area of distribution between the faunae of a zoological centre and the men identified with it. Now, North America furnishes many genera and species of animals which are common to Europe and part of Asia; but South America presents totally distinct types of animal life, and contains few genera and still fewer species common to the North and the Old World. But in relation to man the case is very different. Let the red man be, as Agassiz represents him, the human type most characteristic of the New Continent, now he inhabits that region where are found all the principal genera common to Europe and the temperate zone of Asia-that is, he is associated with the same faunae as the European and Asiatic. Now, in South America "are found men of a yellow colour, with projecting cheek bones, with eyes contracted and oblique, so like the Asiatics that they themselves recognise the resemblance. And on the same soil live other nations, which though not so white as an Englishman or a German, have a clearer colour that is commonly seen in Spain or Italy." Thus, as a centre of animal creation, North America is associated with Europe and part of Asia, but as a centre of human creation, it is isolated and distinct from both. On the other hand, South America, as a centre of animal creation, is separate and distinct from North America, Europe, and Asia, while in its human inhabitants it blends with Asia, and even approaches Europe and Africa. The men of the Old World then stand in zoologico-geographical relation to the men of the New, exactly the inverse of that established between the animals of the same region. Variance upon points so fundamental is fatal to the theory.

In this controversy polygenists omit several factors of prime importance, as the intellectual power of man, and his liberty of will. Thus endowed he has modified the laws of zoological geography, and introduced genera and species into regions where they were not indigeneous. And if in relation to animal life he has modified these laws, why may he not have done the same in relation

to himself? No laws of zoological geography can fetter the will and liberty of man, or confine the activity of his adventurous mind. The extensive and frequent migrations of men which have taken place is also another consideration that ought not to be ignored in this controversy. There is nothing so well attested in the past, and nothing so clearly demonstrated in the present as the migratory habit of man, and his capability to accommodate himself to entirely altered circumstances and conditions, subject it may be to considerable change in form and appearance by the force of local circumstances. However much the opponents of monogenism may repudiate considerations of this kind as unscientific, they certainly belong to the question, and there can be no legitimate settlement of it where these are overlooked.

The attack upon the Bible upon scientific grounds is mainly directed against the earlier portion of the record, and we conclude this paper with the words of Herder respecting these earliest chapters of our world's history: "A thing of wonder, to which the men of reason still venture to give no name, is the story of the fall of the first man. Is it allegory, history, fable? And yet there it stands, after the account of the creation, a second pillar of Hercules, beyond which is nothing further! All subsequent history of the human race begins there. And then what a piece-work follows, made up of the murderous hate and wrath of Cain, the little song of Lamech, a row of names of the hundred-years-old cedarlike men, giants, the flood, and an ark! Ah, the philosophical wits must have so much trouble about the swaddling bands of our race, and must be ashamed of them; must wish the waters of the flood had swept them away, or at least left them to appear only in the juggler's commentary. And yet ye are, dear, oldest, and eternal traditions of my race, kernel and germ of its most hidden history! Without you mankind would be what so much else is, a book without title, without first leaves and explanation; with you our family acquires foundation, stem, root, back to God and father Abraham. And they are all taken in so simple, child-like a tone, from the mouth of the first tradition among the trees of the eastern land, and are set forth by Moses, so true and one by one, as if he found them there the echo of eternal times."

A. J.

ART. V.-ELEMENTARY THEOLOGY.

No. VI.

THE CONCEPT OF GOD.

F theology be the science of God, the idea or concept of God must of necessity be the foundation of theology. All men have a concept of God. Those who are said to have no such concept are so few in number, and so degraded below the ordinary standard of manhood, that they need not be taken account of in the present argument. The concept of God is connatural to man, forming part and parcel of his spiritual existence. How the concept originates, whether it is an innate idea, or a necessary intuition, or whether it is derived from external sources by process of observation and reflection, we do not now inquire. Our present business is an analysis of the concept, with the view of finding what are its essential contents.

In all men the concept of God is radically the sane. It indeed assumes different forms according to the different conditions of culture with which it is associated, but when subjected to analysis it is found in all cases to consist of the same essential elements. In thinking of God man invariably projects himself into the concept, imparting to it a predominating human character. Among barbarous and savage tribes, the human element mingling with and colouring the concept, is exceedingly gross and revolting; nevertheless it is in perfect harmony with a barbarous and savage condition. Untrained to protend their thoughts beyond the narrowest range, and having the most grovelling views of their own nature, the concept formed of God is correspondingly narrow and grovelling; but as they advance in culture and their range of thought becomes widened and elevated, their concept of God is purged of its former grossness and reflects the dignity of their advanced condition. While the human element is retained it is refined and elevated, and ennobled. As men obtain grander views of themselves and of the universe, there is of necessity corresponding grandeur in their concept of God.

It may perhaps be said that the mythology of the Egyptians, the most highly civilized people of the ancient world, and that of the Hindoos, the most highly civilized people of the modern heathen world, supply evidence adverse to the notion that the concept of God improves as men advance in general culture. The Egyptians, notwithstanding their high state of civilization, must, it is argued, have retained the grossest conceptions of God, seeing

they rendered divine honours to the meanest and most abominable creatures; and it is well known that the mythology of the Hindoos is an embodyment of cruelty and lust. Of the Egyptians we shall say nothing, not being sufficiently acquainted with their condition of religious thought to form a decided opinion respecting it, but of the Hindoos we may speak confidently. The "gods many" of Hindostan are regarded even by the common people as only a secondary and subordinate kind of deities. It is true they engross the attention of the popular mind, and divine worship is rendered to them unceasingly by all classes; at the same time they are universally understood to be inferior in character and position to the One Supreme; and the more educated of the people, especially the Brahmins, while from a variety of motives encouraging and even outwardly complying with the popular superstitions, are by no means enslaved to those superstitions, but reserve their highest homage for the One who in their assured belief is the only true God. In this respect the Brahmins occupy a position relative to the superstitions of their country, similar to that occupied by the later philosophers of Greece to the gods of Olympus.

It is nevertheless found that though with the progress of intelligence the concept of God is refined from grossness and otherwise improved, the human element remains intact. In his highest condition of culture and in his loftiest flight of thought, man cannot conceive of God otherwise than as having human attributes and human conditions of existence: in other words, a human element necessarily intermingles with and constitutes part of his concept of God. Eliminate the human element, and the concept vanishes; nothing is left which the mind can grasp. This will appear sufficiently evident as we proceed with our analysis.

Personality is ascribed to God. This, properly speaking, is the root, the foundation of the concept. If God is not a distinct personality, having consciousness, intelligence, and will, he is nothing, nothing to justify our regarding Him as God. But man has no idea of personality different from his own. There may be,

there probably are ingredients in the personality of God altogether different from what enter into the constitution of his own personality; but of these he has, and, as it appears to us, can have no conception. In thinking of God as a person, man transfers to Him the conception he has of his own personality.

Spirituality is ascribed to God. Investing God with a material organization corresponding with the human body, indicates a low state of human culture. Man can only do this when so degraded that he regards himself chiefly as a species of animal; when the soul is sunk and lost sight of in the body. In a higher state of culture bodily organs may indeed be attributed to God, but only in a metaphorical sense, and for convenience of speech. When once