1862

Lincoln is very eager to have the Western generals march to the assistance of the people of Eastern Tennessee who are mainly for the Union.

January 1st. (To General D. C. Buell.) General McClellan should not be disturbed with business. I think you better get in concert with General Halleck at once. I write you to-night. I also telegraph and write Halleck.

(To General H. W. Halleck.) General McClellan is not dangerously ill, as I hope, but would better not be disturbed with business. I am very anxious that, in case of General Buell's moving toward Nashville, the enemy shall not be greatly re-inforced, and I think there is danger he will be from Columbus. It seems to me that a real or feigned attack on Columbus from up-river at the same time would either prevent this or compensate for it by throwing Columbus into our hands. I wrote General Buell a letter similar to this, meaning that he and you shall communicate and act in concert, unless it be your judgment and his that there is no necessity for it. You and he will understand much better than I how to do it. do not lose time in this matter.

Please

6th. (To General D. C. Buell.) Your despatch of yesterday has been received and it disappoints and distresses me. My distress is that our friends in East Tennessee are being hanged and driven to despair and even now I fear are taking rebel arms for the sake of personal protection. In this we lose the most valuable state we have in the South. My despatch to which yours is an answer was sent with the knowledge of Senator Johnson and Representative Maynard of East Tennessee

and they will be upon me to know the answer which I can not safely show them. They would despair; possibly resign to go and save their families somehow or die with them.

I do not intend this to be an order in any sense but merely as intimated before to show you the grounds of my anxiety. 7th. (To General D. C. Buell.) Please name as early a day as you safely can on or before which you can be ready to move southward in concert with Major-General Halleck. Delay is ruining us, and it is indispensable for me to have something definite. I send a like despatch to Major-General

Halleck.

10th. (Indorsement.) The within is a copy of a letter just received from General Halleck. It is exceedingly discouraging. As everywhere else, nothing can be done.

All this while bitter intrigues inside the ruling party. Cameron disagrees with his chief and tries to play into the hands of the Abolitionists. His enemies accuse him of peculation. Lincoln forces him to offer his resignation, but at the same time devises a way to save his face for him.

11th. (To Secretary Cameron.) Though I have said nothing hitherto in response to your wish, expressed long since, to resign your seat in the Cabinet, I have not been unmindful of it. I have been only unwilling to consent to a change at a time and under circumstances which might give occasion to misconstruction, and unable till now to see how such misconstruction could be avoided.

But the desire of Mr. Clay to return home and to offer his services to his country in the field enables me now to gratify your wish, and at the same time evince my personal regard for you, and my confidence in your ability, patriotism, and fidelity to public trust.

I therefore tender for your acceptance, if you still desire to resign your present position, the post of minister to Russia.

Should you accept it, you will bear with you the assurance of my undiminished confidence, of my affectionate esteem, and of my sure expectation that, near the great sovereign whose personal and hereditary friendship for the United States so much endears him to Americans, you will be able to render services to your country not less important than those you could render at home.

(To dissatisfied Republican Senators who urge him to appoint a whole new Cabinet.) Gentlemen, your request for a change of the whole Cabinet because I have made one change reminds me of a story I once heard in Illinois, of a farmer who was much troubled with skunks. His wife insisted on his trying to get rid of them.

He loaded his shotgun one moonlight night and awaited developments. After some time the wife heard the shotgun go off, and in a few minutes the farmer entered the house. "What luck have you?" asked she.

"I hid myself behind the wood-pile," said the old man, "with the shotgun pointed toward the hen-roost, and before long there appeared not one skunk, but seven. I took aim, blazed away, killed one, and he raised such a fearful smell that I conIcluded it was best to let the other six go."

Your despatch of yes"I have received your

13th. (To General D. C. Buell.) terday is received, in which you say: letter and General McClellan's, and will at once devote all my efforts to your views and his." In the midst of my many cares, I have not seen nor asked to see General McClellan's letter to you. For my own views, I have not offered and do not now offer them as orders; and while I am glad to have them respectfully considered, I would blame you to follow them contrary to your own clear judgment, unless I should put them in the form of orders. As to General McClellan's views, you understand your duty in regard to them better than I do.

With this preliminary, I state my general idea of this war to be that we have the greater numbers, and the enemy has the greater facility of concentrating forces upon points of collision; that we must fail unless we can find some way of making our advantage an overmatch for his; and that this can only be done by menacing him with superior forces at different points at the same time, so that we can safely attack one or both if he makes no change; and if he weakens one to strengthen the other, forbear to attack the strengthened one, but seize and hold the weakened one, gaining so much.

Not only in the West but in the East as well the slowness of military preparation has become unbearable. Though McClellan has organized a great army he still insists that more time must elapse before he will be ready to advance. At last Lincoln can not restrain his impatience any longer.

27th. (President's General War Order No. 1.)

Ordered, That the 22nd day of February, 1862, be the day for a general movement of all the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces. That especially the army at and about Fortress Monroe, the army of the Potomac; the army of Western Virginia; the army near Munfordville, Kentucky; the army and flotilla at Cairo, and a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready to move on that day.

That all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective commanders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey additional orders when duly given.

That the heads of departments, and especially the Secretaries of War and the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the general-in-chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for prompt execution of this order.

31st. (President's Special War Order No. 1.)

Ordered, That all the disposable force of the army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defense of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad southwestward of what is known as Manassas Junction; all details to be in the discretion of the general-in-chief, and the expedition to move before or on the 22nd day of February next.

The President and the General disagree sharply as to what plan of campaign should be adopted.

February 3rd. (To McClellan.) You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac-yours to be down the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on the York River; mine to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest of Manassas. If you will give me satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours.

Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of time and money than mine?

Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than mine? Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan than mine? In fact, would it not be less valuable in this, that it would break no great line of the enemy's communications, while mine would?

In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by your plan than mine?

(To William H. Herndon.) Yours of January 30th just received. Do just as you say about the money matter. As you well know, I have not time to write a letter of respectable length. God bless you.

4th. To all whom these Presents shall come. Greetings: Whereas it appears that at a term of the Circuit Court of the