After a fortnight of heavy rain, clearing weather makes it possible for Lee to attack McClellan. He and Davis decide upon another ruse for the purpose of further alarming Washington and increasing the nervousness of McClellan, already near the point of exhaustion. It is intended to give the impression that large reinforcements are moving to the Valley of Virginia. McClellan is deceived. He concludes that the Confederates have great reserves of men. But Lincoln is not deceived.

19th.

(To McClellan.) Yours of last night just received and for which I thank you. If large reinforcements are going from Richmond to Jackson it proves one of two things, either that they are very strong at Richmond or do not mean to defend the place desperately.

On reflection, I do not see how reinforcements from Richmond to Jackson could be in Gordonsville, as reported by the Frenchman and your deserters. Have not all been sent to deceive?

(To Fremont.) We have no indefinite power of sending reinforcements; so that we are compelled rather to consider the proper disposal of the forces we have than of those we could wish to have. We may be able to send you some dribs by degrees, but I do not believe we can do more. As you alone beat Jackson last Sunday, I argue that you are stronger than he is to-day, unless he has been reinforced; and that he can not have been materially reinforced, because such reinforcement could only have come from Richmond, and he is much more likely to go to Richmond than Richmond is to come to him. Neither is very likely. I think Jackson's game-his assigned work-now is to magnify the accounts of his numbers and reports of his movements, and thus by constant alarms keep three or four times as many of our troops away from Richmond as his own force amounts to. Thus he helps his friends at Richmond three or four times as much as if he were there. Our game is not to allow this.

20th. (To McClellan.) We have this morning sent you a despatch of General Sigel corroborative of the proposition that Jackson is being reinforced from Richmond. This may be reality, and yet may only be contrivance for deception, and to determine which is perplexing. If we knew it was not true, we could send you some more force; but as the case stands we do not think we safely can. Still, we will watch the signs and do so if possible.

24th. Lincoln, accompanied by General Pope, suddenly makes a flying visit to West Point, where General Scott is living in retirement. Scott advises 1, that the forces under Fremont and Banks are adequate to protect Washington; 2, that forces stationed at Fredericksburg are entirely out of position; 3, that a victory before Richmond would end the war.

26th. Washington. Ordered-1. The forces under Major-Generals Fremont, Banks, and McDowell, including the troops now under Brigadier-General Sturgis at Washington, shall be consolidated and form one army, to be called the Army of Virginia.

2. The command of the Army of Virginia is especially assigned to Major-General John Pope, as commanding general.*

3. The Army of Virginia shall operate in such manner as while protecting western Virginia and the national capital from danger or insult, it shall in the speediest manner attack and overcome the rebel forces under Jackson and Ewell, threaten the enemy in the direction of Charlottesville, and

*Pope had made a popular reputation by his services on the Mississippi. Having been called to Washington on military business he ingratiated himself with the Committee on the Conduct of the War by insinuations against McClellan, Lincoln took him up and, for a time, appears to have believed in him.

At this moment, Jackson, having accomplished his purpose in the Valley, had secretly withdrawn his whole force to the vicinity of Richmond.

render the most effective aid to relieve General McClellan and capture Richmond.

Lee attacks McClellan at Mechanicsville, opening the Seven Days before Richmond.

27th. (To McClellan.) Your three despatches of yesterday in relation to the affair, ending with the statement that you completely succeeded in making your point, are very gratifying.

The later one of 6:15, suggesting the probability of your being overwhelmed by 200,000,* and talking of where the responsibility will belong, pains me very much. I give you all I can, and act on the presumption that you will do the best you can with what you have, while you continue, ungenerously, I think, to assume that I could give you more if I would. I have omitted and shall omit no opportunity to send you reinforcements whenever I possibly can.

P. S. General Pope thinks if you fall back it would be much better toward York River than toward the James. As Pope now has charge of the capital, please confer with him through the telegraph.

28th. (To General H. W. Halleck.) The enemy have concentrated in such force at Richmond as to render it absolutely necessary, in the opinion of the President, for you immediately to detach 25,000 of your force, and forward it by the nearest and quickest route by way of Baltimore and Washington, to Richmond. It is believed that the quickest route, would be by way of Columbus, Kentucky, and up the Ohio River. But in detaching your force the President directs that it be done in such a way as to enable you to hold your ground and not interfere with the movement against Chattanooga and

*Characteristic of McClellan; his force of 109,000 was opposed by 87,000 under Lee.

East Tennessee. This condition being observed, the forces to be detached and the routes they are to be sent are left to your own judgment.

The direction to send these forces immediately is rendered imperative by a serious reverse suffered by General McClellan before Richmond yesterday, the full extent of which is not yet known.

(To Major-General Burnside.) We have intelligence that General McClellan has been attacked in large force and compelled to fall back toward the James River. We are not advised of his exact condition, but the President directs that you shall send him all the reinforcements from your command to the James River that you can safely do without abandoning your own position. Let it be infantry entirely, as he said yesterday that he had cavalry enough.

(To McClellan.) Save your army, at all events. Will send reinforcements as fast as we can. Of course they can not reach you to-day, to-morrow, or next day. I have not said you were ungenerous for saying you needed reinforcements. I thought you were ungenerous in assuming that I did not send them as fast as I could. I feel any misfortune to you and your army quite as keenly as you feel it yourself. If you have had a drawn battle, or a repulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We protected Washington, and the enemy concentrated on you. Had we stripped Washington, he would have been upon us before the troops could have gotten to you. Less than a week ago you notified us that reinforcements were leaving Richmond to come in front of us. It is the nature of the case, and neither you nor the government is to blame. Please tell at once the present condition and aspect of things.

Convinced that McClellan is suffering a terrible defeat and that the Federal fortunes are in desperate plight, Lincoln,

nevertheless, fears to make an open appeal for fresh troops lest a general panic ensue. He sends Seward on a confidential mission to Governors of States arming him with a statement of facts as the President sees them.

My view of the present condition of the war is about as follows:

The evacuation of Corinth and our delay by the flood in Chickahominy have enabled the enemy to concentrate too much force in Richmond for McClellan to successfully attack. In fact there soon will be no substantial rebel force anywhere else. But if we send all the force from here to McClellan, the enemy will, before we can know of it, send a force from Richmond and take Washington. Or if a large part of the western army be brought here to McClellan, they will let us have Richmond, and retake Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, etc. What should be done is to hold what we have in the West, open the Mississippi, and take Chattanooga and East Tennessee without more. A reasonable force should in every event be kept about Washington for its protection. Then let the country give us 100,000 new troops in the shortest possible time, which, added to McClellan, directly or indirectly, will take Richmond without endangering any other place which we now hold, and will substantially end the war. I expect to maintain this contest until successful, or till I die, or am conquered, or my term expires, or Congress or the country forsake me; and I would publicly appeal to the country for this new force were it not that I fear a general panic and stampede would follow, so hard it is to have a thing understood as it really is. I think the new force should be all, or nearly all, infantry, principally because such can be raised most cheaply and quickly.

(To General J. A. Dix.) Communication with McClellan by White House is cut off. Strain every nerve to open communication with him by James River, or any other way you

can.