The antiforeign feeling continued, and in June, 1862, another attack was made on the guards of the British legation. The British chargé d'affaires withdrew from Yeddo to Yokohama, and, with the return of the Dutch consul-general to Nagasaki, Mr. Pruyn was the only minister resident left in Yeddo. The antiforeign agitation continued; all the foreign legations were threatened with attack, and individual foreigners were subjected to personal violence sometimes resulting in their death. On the morning of May 24, 1863, the American legation was burned. Mr. Pruyn stated that he desired to believe that the fire was purely accidental, although for months attempts had been made to induce him to leave Yeddo. On the 31st of June, he retired to Yokohama. Before this incident occurred, Mr. Pruyn was instructed on June 18, 1863, to "cooperate with the representatives of the other treaty powers" in any difficulties that might arise, and was informed that the U. S. S. Wyoming would obey his orders. The situation was fully reviewed by Mr. Seward in instructions to Mr. Pruyn of July 7 and 10, and September 1, 1863. These instructions enjoined the importance of "concert and unity among the treaty powers," in "the common interests of civilization and humanity," "unobstructed by jealousy or suspicion, or unkind debate of any sort." It appeared that the British legation had demanded indemnities before a certain date on pain of hostilities, and that the French naval forces were prepared to act in concert with the English. It was apprehended, however, that, if the government should conclude to grant the indemnities, a civil war was likely to break out under the auspices of the Mikado and a combination of daimios hostile to the foreign policy of the Tycoon. In these circumstances, Mr. Pruyn was directed to exert his "whole moral influence" to preserve peace between the other treaty powers and Japan, on the basis if necessary of a compliance by the latter with the terms prescribed by the powers, since it was not doubted that those terms would be formulated simply with a view to the necessary security of foreigners of all nations. As to the injuries suffered by Americans, if the Japanese should grant adequate indemnities and guarantee the safety of American residents, the Wyoming was not to commit any hostile act against the Japanese government or power. But if, on the contrary, it should seem to Mr. Pruyn to be necessary "for the Wyoming to use her guns, for the safety of the legation or of Americans residing in Japan, then her commander will employ all necessary force for that purpose." The prime objects of the United States were declared to be: "First, to deserve and win the confidence of the Japanese government and people, if possible, with a view to the common interest of all the treaty powers; secondly, to sustain and cooperate with the legations of those powers, in good faith, so as to render their efforts to the same end effective." When news was received at Washington of the burning of the American legation, Mr. Pruyn was instructed to demand of the government of the Tycoon the prompt payment of an indemnity, the exertion of diligence to discover and punish the incendiaries, the permanent reestablishment and guaranteed safety of the legation at Yeddo, and the full observance of the treaties between the two countries. He was to employ the naval forces at his command for the protection of the legation and of American citizens under all circumstances, and to inform the government of the Tycoon that additional forces would be sent, as occasion should arise, to maintain the demands of the United States. Mr. Harris, min. to Japan, to Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, No. 28, July 9, 1861, Dip. Cor. 1861, 421; Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Pruyn, No. 2, Nov. 15, 1861, Dip. Cor. 1862, 817; same to same, No. 42, June 29, 1863, Dip. Cor. 1863, II. 1033; same to same, No. 43, July 7, 1863, id. 1037; same to same, No. 45, July 10, 1863, id. 1039; same to same, No. 46, Sept. 1, 1863, id. 1057; same to same, No. 47, Sept. 9, 1863, id. 1059. See, also, Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Welles, Sec. of Navy, July 14, 1863, 61 MS. Dom. Let. 204. As to the attack on the American merchant ship Pembroke by the Prince of Nagato, see Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Pruyn, No. 50, Oct. 3, 1863, Dip. Cor. 1863, II. 1060, acknowledging the receipt of Mr. Pruyn's despatches Nos. 48 and 49, of July 24, and No. 50, of July 25, 1863, printed in the same volume. In this instruction Mr. Seward said: "You will, in all cases, hold the claims of this government and of citizens of the United States distinct and separate from those of other governments and subjects of other powers. But this separation will not be expected to restrain you from acting with your colleagues, and giving them your moral support; and when there is need, with reference to common defence, or to save a common right, or secure a common object, just and lawful in itself, the naval forces of the United States will be expected to cooperate with those of the other Western powers." See further, as to the case of the Pembroke, supra, § 1093. As to building ships of war for Japan, see S. Ex. Doc. 33, 37 Cong. 3 sess. 5. AFFAIR OF SHIMONOSEKI. $849. As the treaties were made by the Tycoon's government, they were not recognized by the partisans of the Mikado. Chief among these was the Prince of Chosu, ruler of the provinces of Sueoo and Nagato. He had possession of the fortifications commanding the straits of Shimonoseki, and also had with him the person of the Mikado, and, refusing to recognize the validity of the treaties concluded by the Tycoon, he closed the passage to the inland sea. At the request of the Tycoon's government, naval forces of the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands jointly proceeded to open the straits by force. On the 4th to the 8th of September, inclusive, 1864, they destroyed the batteries commanding the straits, blew up the magazines, threw the shot and shell into the sea, carried away seventy cannon, and obtained the unconditional surrender of the prince, with an agreement on his part to pay the expenses of the expedition. The ratification of the treaties by the Mikado and the firm establishment of the foreign policy of the Tycoon speedily followed. The government of the Tycoon, preferring to assume the expenses of the expedition, entered into a convention October 22, 1864, and agreed to pay to the governments of the United States, Great Britain. France, and Holland the sum of $3,000,000. It so happened that no vessel in the naval service of the United States then in Japanese waters was in a condition to take part in the expedition, and the steamer Takiang was chartered for the service and was manned with a crew of eighteen persons from the U. S. S. Jamestown, who, with her own crew of forty, made a crew of fifty-eight in all. The mode of dividing the indemnity between the four participating powers was discussed at Paris in 1865, and it was finally decided that, to mark the high estimate placed upon the united action of all the powers then represented in Japan, the indemnity should be divided among the four governments in equal shares, without regard to the actual material force contributed by each to the expedition. The proceedings of the treaty powers in this instance were not intended nor considered as an act of interference in the political affairs of Japan. Their object was the enforcement of treaty rights, with the approval of the government that granted them; and the effect which the expedition may have had on the fortunes of parties in Japan was purely incidental. In the subsequent revolution which led to the fall of the Shogunate and the restoration of the imperial authority under the Mikado, the foreign powers declared their neutrality. The only wish of the United States was for the establishment and maintenance of a strong central government by which the treaties might be enforced and the native autonomy preserved. S. Ex. Doc. 58, 41 Cong. 2 sess.; Dip. Cor. 1864, III. 553, 579, 581, 584. the convention of October 22, 1864, amounted to $785,000. The The following documents relate to the Japanese indemnity: H. Ex. Docs. As to the neutrality of the foreign powers in the war between the Tycoon As to the case of the Pembroke, see Reprisals, infra, § 1093. As to the Monitor claim, and the refusal of the United States further to press it, see For. Rel. 1888, II. 1068, 1069. As to claims against Japan, see S. Mis. Doc. 52, 40 Cong. 2 sess. As to recent events in Japan, 1868, see S. Ex. Doc. 65, 40 Cong. 2 sess. The diplomatic representative of the United States in Japan was instructed to confer with the representatives of the other powers, and, while treating the Japanese government with perfect respect and conciliation, to press upon it, with the concurrence of his colleagues, an application for the abrogation of the law which prohibited Christianity throughout the empire. Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Van Valkenburgh, No. 32, Oct. 7, 1867, See, also, same to same, No. 83, Oct. 5, 1868, Dip. Cor. 1868, I. 827. See, further, For Rel. 1870, 453-486, as to persecution of native 6. CONVENTION OF 1866, AND TREATY REVISION. § 850. On June 25, 1866, the representatives of the United States, France, Great Britain, and Holland signed with the Japanese government a convention for the modification of the tariff of import and export duties contained in the trade regulations annexed to the treaties of 1858. The new convention, which went into operation July 1, 1866, substituted specific for ad valorem duties. The plenipotentiaries acted on the assumption that the treaty, before going into effect, need not be ratified by their respective governments, but it was afterwards laid before the United States Senate, which advised its ratification June 17, 1868. On February 29, 1872, an embassy from Japan arrived in Washington. Arrangements were made for its reception by the President at noon on Monday the 4th of March. The embassy afterwards visited Europe. Its principal object was to secure the revision of existing treaties. In this it was unsuccessful. September 2, 1874, Mr. Fish wrote: "The President is impressed with the importance of continued concert between the treaty powers in Japan, at least until after the revision of the treaties, and until the government of Japan shall have exhibited a degree of power and capacity to adopt and to enforce a system of jurisprudence, and of judicial administration, in harmony with that of the Christian powers, equal to their evident desire to be relieved from the enforced duties of exterritoriality." Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Nicholas Fish, chargé at Berlin, No. 703, A similar instruction was sent to the American minister at St. Peters- As to the reception of the Japanese embassy by the President in 1872, see Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Mori, March 2, 1872, MS. Notes to Japan, I. 13. The efforts of Japan to secure the revision of the treaties continued. According to the despatches of Mr. Bingham, American minister at Tokio, the chief desire of Japan from 1874 to 1878 was to regain control of her revenues. To that end Mr. Bingham always urged independent action on the part of the United States, and in proof of his contention that the United States should not deem itself precluded by the joint agreement of 1866 from so acting, he transmitted to the Department of State, in his No. 276 of October 8, 1875, a copy of a protocol entered into by the British and German governments with that of Japan in 1874 to settle the meaning of the term “iron, manufactured," in the agreement of 1866. Mr. Fish, who was then Secretary of State, took, however, a different view of the matter. In an instruction to Mr. Bingham, of March 9, 1876, he said: "It has been the inviolable policy of the United States to act in all oriental affairs in concert with the European powers. Nothing in the present case appears to call for an abandonment of that policy. On the contrary, in a matter so grave and important as the revision of all existing treaties with Japan, it would seem to be of the utmost importance that there should be earnest and hearty cooperation of all the treaty powers." He also thought that the English-German protocol did not alter the meaning of the agreement of 1866, and consequently was not relevant to the pending question. Mr. Evarts, Mr. Fish's successor, took a somewhat different view, both of the effect of the protocol and of the question of cooperation, and suggested independent negotiations with the Japanese minister at Washington. Subsequently, under instructions of the Department of State, Mr. Bingham signed on July 25, 1878, a commercial convention with Japan. By this convention, the ratifications of which were duly exchanged, the convention of June 25, 1866, was to be annulled |