XXVII

VOLITION AND MORAL EDUCATION

Meaning of Will.-Will is ordinarily spoken of as if it were an entity, a something which compels us to follow some line of action rather than another. It is said, for example: "He kept up by sheer force of his strong will," "His iron will carried him onward," or "His will weakened," "He failed because he lacked will," etc. One person is said to have a firm will and another one that is vacillating. Will is thus regarded as a sort of psychological ghost which continually pursues us compelling or prohibiting whatever we undertake to do. It is regarded as a transcendental something outside of the self and apparently not subject to the usual laws governing mental life. Every one is supposed to have a will of inherent and unmodifiable quantity and quality. Each is supposed to be ushered into the world with a particular species of will to be his life-long dictator.

A little reflection ought to convince us, however, that the will is not a separate and transcendental entity, but that all volition conforms to universal laws of psychic action. From previous discussions we have seen that one of the most fundamental conceptions of mental life is that of its unity. The mind is not a sum of separate faculties each of which functions independently of the others. There is no intellectual activity without some feeling-tone; there is no feeling without some accompanying knowledge. Likewise there is no such thing as pure volition without some feeling and some intellection. Why do we will? Because we desire something. Why do we desire it? Because we have knowledge of it, and it seems to possess some worth for us; because we have had experiences which have left tendencies

toward the particular action. We give it our attention which is the same thing as choosing or selecting it. I have emphasized this view-point because it is so important in considering will training to bear in mind the interrelation between these psychic activities. The will can no more be isolated for the purpose of training than we can isolate mind or body from each other. The will is the dynamic or active phase of any mental state. It always exists in concomitance with states of knowing and states of feeling. Cognitive experiences come to possess certain values for a given mind and it is said to have feelings or emotions. Because of the values attached (feelings, emotions), it strives to accomplish certain ends-actions, inhibitions, etc. (wills).

In this connection Royce writes that our minds are full of "passing impulses, of tendencies to action, of passions, and of concerns for what we take to be our welfare. All these impulses and concerns get woven, by the laws of habit, into systems of ruling motives which express themselves without in our regular fashions of conduct. The whole of our inner life, viewed in this aspect, appears as the purposive side of our consciousness, or as the will in the wider sense." 1

Genesis of a Voluntary Action.-In order to understand fully developed volitional acts let us examine the genesis of a voluntary act, for example, throwing at a mark. We throw at the mark and do not succeed. But in so doing we have gained certain experiences-muscular, auditory, etc. Each of these experiences leaves a memory. It may be a visual memory of the appearance of the mark and of the distance, or it may be the kinæsthetic memory of the position of the arm as it was raised, as the missile was hurled, of the position of the hand and the fingers as the missile was released, etc. All of these memories are taken account of in gauging the next trial. We know, for example, how wide of the mark we came and how much muscular tension was exerted, at what height the object was released. These memories we compare with our ideas of the amount of force that ought to be exerted, the modified positions to be taken

1 Royce, Outlines of Psychology, p. 367.

by the arm and hand, and other conditions which we think ought to bring about the desired end. We try again and possibly err in the opposite direction. The memories of this experience are now compared with the former ones and also with the imagined necessary ones and we repeat the trial, trying to correct all the former errors. If perchance we have accidentally hit the mark the first time the case is fundamentally the same. In either case we try to remember the sensations and perceptions gained under these conditions and then endeavor to repeat them. It takes many trials before we can perform the action purposively, because our memories of the movement are so fleeting and imperfect, and our ideas of what is necessary are so indefinite. At first we can not know just what to do because we can have no accurate idea of the end until we have actually accomplished the end.

From this analysis we see that in order to perform an act voluntarily we must have (a) an idea (not necessarily a conscious idea) of the end to be accomplished, and (b) a stock of memories of former experiences from which a suitable selection can be used in guiding action toward the ideal end. This idea of the end to be accomplished includes not only an idea of what is to be done, but also the idea of how to do it. On first consideration this may seem a startling statement. The inquiry will at once be raised as to how we can ever perform an act voluntarily if we must first know definitely how to accomplish the act and if that knowledge can only be gained by actual performance of it. Paradoxical as it may seem, however, no act can be performed voluntarily until it has been first performed non-voluntarily. This does not mean that as a whole it must have been performed non-voluntarily, but that the elements which enter into it must have been performed non-voluntarily. In the case of reaching for a book, for example, we do it at once without difficulty although we have never reached for the identical book or in that particular place. But we have moved the arm and the hand in countless directions previously and each of these reachings has been recorded in memory. Now when we wish to reach for a particular

book in a particular place we select from all the past experiences certain elements and combine those elements into a new whole and perform the new action with ease.

James writes that "no creature not endowed with divinatory power can perform an act voluntarily the first time." But as we are not endowed with prophetic power we must wait for the movements to be performed involuntarily before we can frame ideas of what they are. "We learn all our possibilities by the way of experience. When a particular movement, having once occurred in a random, reflex, or involuntary way, has left an image of itself in the memory, then the movement can be desired again, proposed as an end, and deliberately willed. But it is impossible to see how it could be willed before. A supply of ideas of the various movements that are possible left in the memory by experiences of their involuntary performance is thus the first prerequisite of the voluntary life." 1

Professor Royce voices the same idea in the following sentences: "Strange as the statement may seem, we can never consciously and directly will any really novel course of action. We can directly will an act only when we have before done that act, and have so experienced the nature of it. The will is as dependent as the intellect upon our past experience. One can indeed will an act which is sure to involve, in a given environment, absolutely novel consequences; but the act itself, so far as one wills it, is a familiar act. Thus a suicide can will an act which results in his own death, and so far he seems to be willing something which wholly transcends his past experience. But, as a fact, the act itself which he makes the direct object of his will (e. g., pointing a pistol and pulling a trigger, or swallowing a dose) is itself an act with which he is long since decidedly familiar." 2

Fundamental Movements Involved in Volition.-All voluntary actions utilize the conserved effects of previous experiences-the organic motor memories, traces, or impulses. Every movement

1 James, Principles of Psychology, II, pp. 487, 488.

of the body, voluntary or non-voluntary, bequeaths some of these effects which are drawn upon in subsequent volitional activities. Consequently it becomes important to indicate specifically at least the main classes of fundamental muscular activities out of which the more complex stages of volition develop.

1

(1) From our discussion of self-activity we have seen that every organism tends to produce some movement merely through the processes of growth, those which are simply the result of an overflow of nervous energy. These movements are random and indefinite. These spontaneous movements are a direct function of nutrition. Warner says that "movement is the most obvious outcome of nutrition in a subject. A young infant is full of movement while awake if nutrition is good; its arms and fingers are moved apparently spontaneously." (2) Through the various reflexes set up by external stimuli the babe performs many random movements. (3) Through instinctive movement produced by hunger much aimless moving about is carried on. (4) Through other instincts many active processes are set up, such as sucking movements, biting, grasping, winking, crying, smiling, babbling, creeping, etc. (5) Through being carried about, being fed, washed, dressed, etc., thousands of positions are assumed; e. g., gravity causes the hands and feet to fall if unsupported. Thus many movements, accidental so far as the child is concerned, are experienced. (6) In attempting to perform some definite voluntary act we non-voluntarily, i. e., unintentionally execute a multitude of other movements.

All of the foregoing and many others tend to form impulses toward reaction on receiving new stimuli. Thus vast numbers of will-less movements are executed and become a basis for the complex purposive intentional and controlled activities. The learning of any new movement, especially by the lower animals and by children, becomes a process of trial and error, a process of selection of appropriate movements from among the heterogeneous mass of remembered movements. Some writers go so

1

Warner, Physical Expression, p. 59. See the chart showing tracings, p. 245