the nebular hypothesis is not equally exposed. Yet the nebular hypothesis finds general scientific acceptance, and is adopted as the basis of an extended and recondite illustration in Mr. Agassiz's great work.*

How the author of this book harmonizes his scientific theory with his philosophy and theology, he has not informed us. Paley, in his celebrated analogy with the watch, insists that if the time-piece were so constructed as to produce other similar watches, after the manner of generation in animals, the argument from design would be all the stronger. What is to hinder Mr. Darwin from giving Paley's argument a further a-fortiori extension to the supposed case of a watch which sometimes produces better watches, and contrivances adapted to successive conditions, and so at length turns out a chronometer, a townclock, or a series of organisms of the same type? From certain incidental expressions at the close of the volume, taken in connection with the motto adopted from Whewell, we judge it probable that our author regards the whole system of nature as one which had received at its first formation the impress of the will of its Author, foreseeing the varied yet necessary laws of its action throughout the whole of its existence, ordaining when and how each particular of the stupendous plan should be realized in effect, and-with Him to whom to will is to do-in ordaining doing it. Whether profoundly philosophical or not, a view maintained by eminent philosophical physicists and theologians, such as Babbage on the one hand and Jowett on the other, will hardly be denounced as atheism. Perhaps Mr. Darwin would prefer to express his idea in a more general way, by adopting the thoughtful words of one of the most eminent naturalists of this or any age, substituting the word action for 'thought,' since it is the former (from which alone the latter can be inferred) that he has been considering. "Taking nature as exhibiting thought for my guide, it appears to me that while human thought is consecutive, Divine thought is simultaneous, embracing at the same time and forever, in the past, the present and the future, the most diversified relations among hundreds of thousands of organized beings, each of which may present complications again, which, to study and understand even imperfectly, as for instance man himself-mankind has already spent thousands of years."+ In thus conceiving of the Divine Power in act as coetaneous with Divine Thought, and of both as far as may be apart from the human element of time, our author may regard the intervention of the Creator either as, humanly speaking, done from all time, or else as doing through all time. In the ultimate analysis we suppose that every philosophical theist must adopt one or the other conception.

Contrib. Nat. Hist. Amer., i, p. 127-131.

Op. cit., p. 130.

A perversion of the first view leads towards atheism, the notion of an eternal sequence of cause and effect, for which there is no first cause,-a view which few sane persons can long rest in. The danger which may threaten the second view is pantheism. We feel safe from either error, in our profound conviction that there is order in the universe; that order presupposes mind; design, will; and mind or will, personality. Thus guarded, we much prefer the second of the two conceptions of causation, as the more philosophical as well as Christian view, a view which leaves us with the same difficulties and the same mysteries in Nature as in Providence, and no other. Natural law, upon this view, is the human conception of continued and orderly Divine action.

We do not suppose that less power, or other power, is required to sustain the universe and carry on its operations, than to bring it into being. So, while conceiving no improbability of "interventions of Creative mind in nature," if by such is meant the bringing to pass of new and fitting events at fitting times, we leave it for profounder minds to establish, if they can, a rational distinction in kind between His working in nature carrying on operations, and in initiating those operations.

We wished under the light of such views, to examine more critically the doctrine of this book, especially of some questionable parts;-for instance, its explanation of the natural develop ment of organs, and its implication of a "necessary acquirement of mental power" in the ascending scale of gradation. But there is room only for the general declaration that we cannot think the Cosmos a series which began with chaos and ends with mind, or of which mind is a result: that if by the successive origination of species and organs through natural agencies, the author means a series of events which succeed each other irrespective of a continued directing intelligence,-events which mind does not order and shape to destined ends, then he has not established that doctrine, nor advanced towards its establishment, but has accumulated improbabilities beyond all belief. Take the formation and the origination of the successive degrees of complexity of eyes as a specimen. The treatment of this subject (pp. 188, 189), upon one interpretation is open to all the objections referred to; but if, on the other hand, we may rightly compare the eye "to a telescope, perfected by the long continued efforts of the highest human intellects," we could carry out the analogy, and draw satisfactory illustrations and inferences from it. The essential, the directly intellectual thing is the making of the improvements in the telescope or the steam-engine. Whether the successive improvements, being small at each step, and consistent with the general type of the instrument, are applied to some of the individual machines, or entire new ma

chines are constructed for each, is a minor matter. Though if machines could engender, the adaptive method would be most economical; and economy is said to be a paramount law in nature. The origination of the improvements, and the successive adaptations to meet new conditions or subserve other ends, are what answer to the supernatural, and therefore remain inexplicable. As to bringing them into use, though wisdom foresees the result, the circumstances and the natural competition will take care of that, in the long run. The old ones will go out of use fast enough, except where an old and simple machine remains still best adapted to a particular purpose or condition,-as, for instance, the old Newcomen engine for pumping out coal-pits. If there's a Divinity that shapes these ends, the whole is intelligible and reasonable; otherwise, not.

We regret that the necessity of discussing philosophical questions has prevented a fuller examination of the theory itself, and of the interesting scientific points which are brought to bear in its favor. One of its neatest points, certainly a very strong one for the local origination of species, and their gradual diffusion under natural agencies, we must reserve for some other convenient opportunity.

The work is a scientific one, rigidly restricted to its direct object; and by its science it must stand or fall. Its aim is, probably not to deny creative intervention in nature,-for the admission of the independent origination of certain types does away with all antecedent improbability of as much intervention as may be required,-but to maintain that Natural Selection in explaining the facts, explains also many classes of facts which thousand-fold repeated independent acts of creation do not explain, but leave more mysterious than ever. How far the author has succeeded, the scientific world will in due time be able to pronounce.

As these sheets are passing through the press a copy of the second edition has reached us. We notice with pleasure the insertion of an additional motto on the reverse of the title-page, directly claiming the theistic view which we have vindicated for the doctrine. Indeed these pertinent words of the eminently wise Bishop Butler, comprise, in their simplest expression, the whole substance of our latter pages:

"The only distinct meaning of the word 'natural' is stated, fixed, or settled; since what is natural as much requires and presupposes an intelligent mind to render it so, i. e., to effect it continually or at stated times, as what is supernatural or miracu lous does to effect it for once."

A. G.

ART. XVI.-Forces; by THEODORE LYMAN.

THE first article in this Journal for November last brings to mind the singular part which "force" now plays in science. The theory set forth in that article may be stated as follows: the world, and everything on it, may be considered as matter; this matter is not the same throughout, but consists of a certain number of ultimate species called elements; these elements are not always isolated, but are found joined to form, 1st, simple compounds, known sometimes as minerals; 2d, compounds of a nature higher, more complicated, and differently characterized, known as vegetables; 3d, compounds still higher and more complicated, and again differently characterized, known as animals. As the elements do not remain isolated, so also their compounds continually change their mutual relations; and the result of these changes is that continual falling down and building up which may be seen in the material world. To move these elements and their compounds there is a fund of force, constant in quantity and in quality; if ever it seems to be less in quantity, some of it is latent; if ever it seems different in quality, it is but changed in appearance, from being connected with some peculiar compound. Here is Cosmos at a glance!-there is the force, the mover, a; and these are the elements, the things moved, b, c, d, e, &c.-a may be a' (mechanical force), or a". (chemical force), or a"" (vegetable force), &c., but still it remains a. a may act on b, c, d, e, and there may result such compounds as be, ceb, dec, &c. When a joins b to c, a part of a becomes latent, and the result may be called be+a; but, when this compound is decomposed by a different form of a (c. g. a""" or light) then a latent is set free, and immediately takes b and joins it to d, e, making the higher compound bde, while c is set free as an element. To give an instance, if b is carbon, c hydrogen, and d oxygen, and a"" is vegetable force, then b, c, and d, joined by the action of a"", would be the compound bed, and might be a turnip. This theory looks simple, but its very roundness is suspicious.

The human mind, craving something more than mere fact, has tried to get at the reason. The fact is the law, the reason is the cause. It is in the search for the latter that scientific men have fallen on that unfortunate word, that shadow of a shadow, that last resort of ignorance-Force! It is safe to say that no

The instructive and ingenious essay, by Prof. Joseph LeConte, is quoted in no invidious spirit, but simply as a fair sample of a philosophy now very common. Prof. LeConte may contend that he uses the word "force" only as a convenient supposition, on which to build a theory; if this be the case, it should be remembered that a form of expression which is sure to mislead ninety-nine readers in every hundred, should not be used in scientific writing.

SECOND SERIES, VOL. XXIX, No. 86.-MARCH, 1860.

word in the English language has created so much ambiguity, so much meaningless discussion, and so much wrong-headed philosophy, as this ill begotten monosyllable. It is a gag for inquisitive people. What keeps the world from flying off in space? The force of attraction. What keeps it from rushing towards the sun? The centrifugal force. What makes oxyd of lead join acetic acid? The chemical force. What makes oxyd of lead leave acetic acid and go to sulphuric acid? The chemical force again. What makes a fish with a ventral fin? The vital force. What makes a fish without a ventral fin? The vital force again. Mark this! These forces are blind and they are the same always, yet they make different things, on the one hand, while on the other, they repeat the same thing over and over again. How is this? Can a round auger bore a square hole? Or, can it bore any hole at all without intellect to guide it? If several forces are not enough to account for the phenomena of the world, what can we expect of one force? Yet to this Prof. LeConte would reduce us. His "correlation of forces" is one force; and his "conservation of forces" is the amount of this force. The amount of force, acting on the sum of the material elements, produces all motion and all being. The force is spoken of as "latent," "set free," "liberated," and "developed," and as being "furnished" and "supplied," by decomposition.

Force is either something or nothing, if it be nothing, it is not worthy a place in science; if it be something it may be considered like any other fact of philosophy. What, then, is force and whence comes our idea of it? To answer these questions it is necessary to define, 1st, true causation; 2d, variable sequences; 3d, invariable sequences. The operations of my own. will are the only instances of true causation of which I am conscious. The will, itself immaterial, works either on the material body, or on the immaterial mind. When the body is free and healthy the will has direct control over the voluntary muscles, but none over the involuntary. On the other hand, when the mind is free and healthy, the will has direct control over the whole of it. Whenever I will to do an act, mental or physical, I am conscious of using power. Causation, then, is the act of x, using power to produce y.

We may, in the outer world, see one thing happen immediately after another; yet, in a little while, we may see the first thing again, but this time not followed by the second. In such a case we say that the fact, that one thing followed another, was an accident. For instance, twelve mines of powder may explode, one after another, but probably this will not happen so again. A variable sequence, then, is the fact that y has followed x, but will not, of necessity, do so again.

We may, in the outer world, see a particular thing, which, as far as our experience goes, is always followed by another par