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sciences both of matter and of mind. Philosophers speak of the law of gravitation, and of the laws of thought; when they only mean to state certain established facts connected with the intellectual and material phenomena. In the proper sense of the word, a law is a rule given to an agent, according to which he is to act; which implies a power of conforming to the particular mode required;-without this agent, and this power, a law is obviously nothing, and can do nothing. There can be no objection, however, to the use of the term, as applied to the order of nature, whether in matter or in mind, provided we always remember that in such an acceptation its meaning can only be, that uniform mode of acting by which it pleases the Deity to govern the world. When we find, wherever our observation extends, that matter invariably gravitates towards a given centre, we are in the possession of a fact, which whether it be produced immediately by the efficiency of the Creator, or by some intervening cause, must be regarded as the result of his appointment, and which must, therefore, be that particular species of arrangement which is most conducive to the harmony of the universe. When we denominate such a fact by the term law, it is understood that we refer it to the appointment of God.

2. The word nature merits our notice, on account of the frequency of its occurrence, and the extreme vagueness and ambiguity of its application. It usually means the constitution and appearance of things: it is sometimes used to denote universal existence, as, when we say that it is not in the compass of nature

In a more restricted sense it is employed to signify the native state or properties of any being or substance; and by philosophers it is frequently used to denote the almighty Being, by whom the universe is governed. The plea which has been urged for its use in this latter acceptation is, that it prevents the frequent repetition of the name of God; and that scientific men may, therefore, allude to his attributes and his efficiency, as displayed in the formation and appearance of the world, without seeming irreverence in the use of those sacred appellations by which, in revealed religion, he has made himself known. How far this plea is valid, I shall not take upon me to determine: the principle upon which it is founded-profound reverence for the name of the Creator,-cannot be too strongly recommended, or too closely adhered to by those who direct their attention to philosophical inquiries. At the same time, the practice which it defends is so liable of abuse, and so capable of being employed in diverting the mind from the great Author of all things, that it should be followed, not only with much caution, but with some limitation.

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3. Induction is a word which is in frequent use in modern science: that operation which it is employed to signify is one of the most essential to the furtherance of knowledge. We have a notion of its nature, sufficiently accurate, in the following words: when from a comparison of a number of facts known from experiment or observation to be true, the existence of a more general fact is inferred, the inference is said to be made by induction. That it is from induction alone that all certain and accurate knowledge

of the laws of nature is derived, is now fully admitted; so much is this the case, that the physical sciences, which have made such rapid progress within the two last centuries, are entirely indebted for their present state of improvement to the established authority of this mode of prosecuting philosophical inquiries. It has, however, been doubted whether the method of induction can be adopted with the same advantage in the philosophy of mind. It has been alleged, that as metaphysical and moral science is conversant with objects that are removed from the observation of the senses, it is, therefore, incapable of being conducted after the mode of experiment and induction;-that though probity, justice, and benevolence are more obtrusive than gravitation and motion, they are more easily obscured by prejudices and sophistry;-and that because the moral aspects of man are ever varying, and mingling into each other with so much rapidity, it has been concluded that they were subjects in which repeated observations or experiments could not be instituted. Supposing natural historians had acted on this hypothesis, and had conducted their inquiries on the principle, that animated or vegetable productions admitted not of experiment, because their subjects were different from mechanical philosophy, would either Harvey or Linnæus have benefited mankind by their important discoveries?

The truth is, there existed the most powerful prejudice against Newton himself when he fearlessly proclaimed himself the scholar of experience, and took her along with him into the field of natural science: he had to combat the prepossessions of

generations, and was, in fact, traduced as an ignoble sectarian, for many years, in the highest school and university of Europe. While this great man was successfully employing his efforts in measuring the heavens, and in ascertaining the laws of other worlds, he was loudly defamed as a presumptuous innovator by those who paid more regard to what Aristotle said, than to what nature revealed. The number of objectors gradually diminished as experimental philosophy advanced; and the successors of Newton, adhering closely to the example of their illustrious master, in pursuing steadily the method of induction, in opposition to human authority and misleading associations, have raised the science of physics to that high eminence from which it now commands the admiration of mankind. To say that they have enlarged indefinitely the extent of our knowledge, and that they have essentially contributed to the happiness and prosperity of the species, is only acknowledging a small portion of their merit; since the example which they have left to others in every department of science, as to the only successful method of augmenting the power of man by the discovery of truth, is of itself the most valuable, as it certainly is calculated to be the most permanently useful, benefit they possibly could communicate.

There can scarcely be a single objection advanced against the application of the method of induction to the philosophy of the human mind, that was not urged against Newton and his immediate successors. After allowing that there is greater difficulty in arresting the trains of our thought, and in reflecting on the subjects of our consciousness, than in observing the facts that

come within the reach of our senses, we may surely maintain that the operations of the human mind, and the laws of their connexion and succession, may be ascertained with as much accuracy as the phenomena of the external world, and the order in which they are conjoined. We cannot, indeed, in one sense, subject the phenomena of mind to the test of experiment, but we can do that which amounts to the same thing, we can carefully examine the operations, not only of our own intellectual and moral faculties, but observe the result of these operations, in the history of man, as delineated in books, and as it is presented to our view in the diversified circumstances of society. If the phenomena which fall within the province of the chemist and natural philosopher are almost infinite in number and variety, they cannot be less so in a science whose object is the ever-varying aspect of human thought, and the aggregated products resulting from it. This great variety, united to the frequency with which the same phenomena, in precisely similar circumstances, may be investigated, affords the same advantage to the moral philosopher which experiment gives to him who confines his attention to physical science.

No science, not even chemistry, is more susceptible of analysis than the philosophy of the human mind. It is not analytic in the same sense as chemistry, which decomposes and reduces substances to their elementary parts. We cannot in the same manner divide the affections of the mind; but we can at all times trace the associated aggregations of which our feelings and passions are composed, to the simple

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