It is proper for me to add, that the foregoing aphorism of Lord Bacon plainly refers, like the note of Mr. Leslie, to the objects of natural philosophy alone, otherwise it would not only imply by inference, but explicitly assert, that we know nothing whatever concerning the existence of the Deity, and his attributes. How perfectly consistent, at the same time, or rather how closely connected with each other, are the fundamental truths of religion and Bacon's general proposition, (when that proposition is understood with the limitations which the nature of the subject suggests obviously to every attentive and candid reader,) will appear sufficiently from the following passages, extracted from authors prior to Mr. Hume, all of whom seem to have had a clear perception of that leading principle in his essay which has chiefly attracted the notice of succeeding philosophers. These passages, (the greater part of which are from English divines, but which, I am sure, will not, on that account, meet with the less respect from any one party connected with the established church of Scotland,) the hurry in which I now write obliges me to transcribe simply, without any comment. "If we except the mutual causality and dependence of the terms of a mathematical demonstration, I do not think that there is any other causality in the nature of things wherein a necessary consequence can be founded. Logicians do indeed boast of I do not know what kind of demonstrations from external causes, either efficient or final, but without being able to show any one genu cause. tween cause and effect, implying the existence of an operating principle in the They inquired, says Xenophon, ΤΙΣΙΝ ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΣ ἕκαστα γίνεται τῶν gaviar. The same excellent writer informs us of the light in which Socrates regarded those by whom such notions were adopted: ΑΛΛΑ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥΣ ΦΡΟΝ. ΤΙΖΟΝΤΑΣ ΤΑ ΤΟΙΑΥΤΑ ΜΩΡΑΙΝΟΝΤΑΣ ΕΠΕΔΕΙΚΝΥΕΝ. Afterwards he adds, Εθαύμαζε δὲ, εἰ μὴ φανερὸν αὐτοῖς ἐστιν, ὅτι ταῦτα οὐ δυνατόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις εὑρεῖν. I had almost forgot to mention, that Ernesti translates ȧvayen, Vis et ordo naturalis quo res fiunt; which paraphrase, when combined with the Greek word to which it refers, cannot be better rendered into our language, than in the words already quoted from the "Representation and Protest.,"-" Such a necessary con nexion between cause and effect as implies an operating principle in the cause.” ine example of any such: nay, I imagine it is impossible for them to do so. For there can be no such connexion of an external efficient cause* with its effect, (at least none such can be understood by us,) through which, strictly speaking, the effect is necessarily supposed by the supposition of the efficient cause, or any determinate cause by the supposition of the effect. Nay, there can be no efficient cause, in the nature of things of a philosophical consideration which is altogether necessary. For every action of an efficient cause (as well as its consequent effect) depends upon the free will and power of Almighty God, who can hinder the influx and efficacy of any cause at his pleasure; neither is there any effect so confined to one cause, but it may be produced by perhaps innumerable others. Hence it is possible that there may be such a cause without a subsequent effect, or such an effect, and no peculiar cause to afford any thing to its existence. There can therefore be no argumentation from an efficient cause to the effect, or contrarily from an effect to the cause, which is lawfully necessary."-Barrow's† Mathematical Lectures read at Cambridge. *Would not Dr. Barrow have conveyed his meaning still more clearly and unequivocally, if, instead of the phrase external efficient cause, he had substituted some such phrase as physical cause, agreeably to the distinction which I have already pointed out in p. 322? †The soundness of Dr. Barrow's religious principles was, I believe, never questioned; and although the notions of church-government in which he had been educated would (according to the present views of the Presbytery of Edinburgh) have opposed an unsurmountable bar to his appointment as mathematical professor in this university, it is an acknowledged fact, that he discharged the duties of that office at Cambridge with no common ability and success. A few biographical particulars with respect to this truly great man, one of the very first names in mathematical science, and one of the chief lights of the English Church, are not altogether foreign to a subject discussed in a former part of this pamphlet; and they may perhaps suggest useful reflections to some persons not likely to enter deeply into his philosophical views. The following are transcribed literally from the succinct account of his life in Dr. Hutton's Mathematical Dictionary. "On Barrow's return from the continent, in 1659, he was episcopally ordained by Bishop Brownrig; and in 1660, he was chosen to the Greek professorship at Cambridge. In July 1662, he was elected Professor of Geometry in Gresham College; in which station he not only discharged his own duty, but supplied likewise the absence of Dr. Pope, the Astronomy Professor. In 1663, the executors of Mr. Lucas having, according to his appointment, founded a mathematical lecture at Cambridge, they selected Mr. Barrow for the first professor; and though his two professorships were not incompatible with each other, he chose to resign that of Gresham College, which he did May the 20th 1664. In 1669, he resigned the mathematical chair to his learned friend Mr. Isaac Newton, being now determined to quit the study of mathematics for that of divinity. On quitting his professorship, he had "All things that are done in the world, are done either immediately by God himself, or by created intelligent beings: matter being evidently not at all capable of any laws or powers whatsoever, any more than it is capable of intelligence; excepting only this one negative power, that every part of it will, of itself, always and necessarily continue in that state, whether of rest or motion, wherein it at present is. So that all those things which we commonly say are the effects of the natural powers of matter, and laws of motion; of gravitation, attraction, or the like; are indeed (if we will speak strictly and properly) the effects of God's acting upon matter continually and every moment, either immediately by himself, or mediately by some created intelligent beings. Consequently there is no such thing, as what men commonly call the course of nature, or the powers of nature. The course of nature, truly and properly speaking, is nothing else but the will of God producing certain effects in a continued, regular, constant, and uniform manner."— Dr. Clarke's Works, Vol. II. p. 698. Fol. Edit. "It is in general no more than effects that the most knowing are acquainted with; for as to causes, they are as entirely in the dark as the most ignorant. What are the laws by which matter acts on matter, but certain effects, which some having observed to be frequently repeated, have reduced to general rules."-Butler's Sermons. "The laws of attraction and repulsion are to be regarded as laws of motion, and these only as rules or methods observed in the productions of natural effects, the efficient and final causes whereof are not of mechanical consideration. Certainly if the explaining a phenomenon be to assign its proper efficient and final cause, it should seem the mechanical philosophers never explained any thing; their province being only to dis only his fellowship of Trinity College." The happy effects of this wise and disinterested concentration of his powers may be traced in those inestimable and voluminous writings, which, notwithstanding his short life, he bequeathed to posterity. Dr. Barrow died in the 47th year of his age. cover the laws of nature; that is, the general rules and methods of motion; and to account for particular phenomena, by reducing them under, or showing their conformity to such general rules."-Siris, or Philosophical Inquiries concerning the Virtues of Tar Water, by Dr. Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne. "There is a certain analogy, constancy, and uniformity in the phenomena or appearances of nature, which are a foundation for general rules, and these are a grammar for the understanding of nature, or that series. of effects in the visible world, whereby we are enabled to see what will come to pass in the natural course of things. Plotinus observes, in his third Ennead, that the art of presaging is, in some sort, the reading of natural letters denoting order, and that so far forth as analogy obtains in the universe, there may be vaticination. And in reality, he that foretels the motion of the planets, or the effects of medicines, or the result of chemical or mechanical experiments, may be said to do it by natural vaticination." "As the natural connexion of signs with the things signified is regular and constant, it forms a sort of rational discourse, and is therefore the immediate effect of an intelligent cause." Ib. pp. 120, 121. "Here it is worth observing, that all the real true knowledge we have of nature is entirely experimental; insomuch that how strange soever the assertion seems, we may lay this down as the first fundamental unerring rule in physics, that it is not within the compass of human understanding, to assign a purely speculative reason for any one phenomenon in nature; as why grass is green, or snow is white; why fire burns, or cold congeals. By a speculative reason, I mean assigning an immediate efficient cause a priori, together with the manner of its operation, for any effect whatsoever purely natural. We find indeed, by observation and experience, that such and such effects are produced; but when we attempt to think of the reason why and the manner how the causes work those effects, then we are at a stand, and all our reasoning is precarious, or at best but probable conjecture." "If any man is surprised at this, let him instance in some speculative reason he can give for any natural phenomenon; and how plausible soever it appears to him at first, he will, upon weighing it thoroughly, find it at last resolved into nothing more than mere observation and experiment, and will perceive that those expressions generally used to describe the cause or manner of the productions of nature, do really signify nothing more than the effects."-The Procedure, Extent, and Limits of Human Understanding. London, 1737, 3d Edition. In this extract the doctrine in question is stated with such an uncommon clearness and precision, that I confess it was not without some surprise I first read it, after all that I knew had been previously alleged to the same purpose by Barrow, Berkeley, and others. Of the author of the work now referred to, I know nothing; nor was I even acquainted with its title, till I met with the first sentence of the foregoing passage in the preface to the second volume of Dr. Stephen Hale's Statical Essays; where, it may be worth while to add, it is not only quoted, but sanctioned by the approbation of that pious and ingenious writer.* If any one of the foregoing passages were to be judged of merely from the sentences which relate to those established conjunctions about which Natural Philosophy is conversant, it would justify precisely the same interpretation which has been put on Mr Leslie's Note; and yet, it appears how intimately connected * If any person doubts still of the consistency of this doctrine with the most orthodox opinions, I must request him to look into the work last quoted, and into another book by the same author, entitled Divine Analogy.—I have heard them ascribed to Dr. Peter Brown, Bishop of Cork. With respect to the connexion between impulse and motion, which, of all the physical phenomena we know, seems, on a superficial view, to furnish the strongest objection to the general conclusion adopted by these writers, the curious reader will find some very remarkable observations in Locke's Essay, b. 2. chap. 23. § 28, 29. 42 VOL. VII. |