among them? Let proposed truth be tested whether it can stand the storm of time. Let the new proposition be investigated calmly and coolly, and if genuine it can be preserved, for it will survive even if men try to crush it. are a later But truth Taking for granted that the different denominations exist for the sole purpose of defending and advancing the truth, the saving truth, the question still remains why a particular phase of doctrine is still binding when it is demonstrated that there is reason to doubt it. Certainly there is a voluntary subscription to the creed, but what does this mean? Is the creed the final authority in all cases even where it is antiquated? Has it superseded the Bible on which it is supposed to base its own existence? What sort of reasoning is this that deduces a creed from the Bible and then declares it so rigid an article and so inflexible a guide that its authority is greater than its own foundation? But if the appeal is to be made to the Bible why may not a man appeal to it in support of his belief that the Lord's Supper was not originally instituted as a memorial of the death of Christ when it is shown that probably the words "do this in remembrance of me' insertion? The majority may not agree with the few. is not always with the majority. These words may not be an insertion. They may be. There is evidence for both positions. Now it matters little whether they were originally there or were put there later as far as the practical life of the Christian is concerned. This question is to be decided on literary and not on theological grounds, even if it does effect a doctrine. The Sacrament is as dear to me whether I believe He said these words or whether Jesus merely instituted the Supper and left the church to develop its full meaning later when it would be in a position to grasp the idea more fully. So much is true that the apostles did not enter into hairsplitting differences in regard to the Supper. They merely celebrated it. And in doing so they could not help reflecting on the death of Christ, and hence it must become in a sense commemorative. Must such things be an occasion for enforcing rigidity in creeds? By what authority? An assumed one or is it real? It is admitted on all hands that some liberty of interpretation must be allowed. How much? Either the creed is binding on all alike, or all have liberty of expression. This raises the question of devotion to the denomination and creed. Is that the only sort of loyalty permissible when one is to be confronted on all sides by the existence of the creed? We contend not. We believe there is a loyalty that begets life because it sees in the creed a guide to future generations and a help for further study rather than a limitation within which thought is to remain. (See this REVIEW, Vol. IV., No. 2, pp. 153-163.) But the concession of the necessity of liberty is the basis for the demand for the free exercise of that liberty. For the question may be put in this way: Have I not the same right for private interpretation that you claim for yourself? We are supposing that arbitrariness is out of the question. These generally are matters of conviction. For instance: A class of writers in the Reformed Church hold to the Christocentric position in theology. The Heidelberg Catechism is clearly Theocentric. What right have these men to say that a theology not Christocentric is fundamentally wrong? What right have we to forbid them? What about the catechism? That will take care of itself. It may be that some of us, after further study, will fall in line with them. What of the catechism then? Is not the catechism more honored by exercising liberty than by trying to force thought into a narrow, human-made channel, and then lauding the divinity of the procedure? Would not that exhibit more gall than grace? The foundation for the inch of my brother may be just just as good as mine, or that of one man as good as that of a whole denomination, but because we differ is no reason why we should quarrel. Why cannot a Calvinist and an Arminian live in the same community and live at peace? They do in the Moravian Church, where are found both the Lutheran and Reformed types of doctrine concerning the Lord's Supper. The bones of contention are philosophical rather than theological, at any rate. Cannot a man tell whether he is out of harmony with his denomination as soon as others? Do others need to tell him what he thinks? We see that much of the ecclesiastical authority is assumed rather than a real fact. VII. CONCLUSION. It seems to be frequently supposed that the cause of the heresy and kindred troubles lay mainly with the conservatives. The fault then would seem to be that they refuse to keep time with the advancing column. No doubt this is true to a great extent. Some are entirely too fast, so that many of us cannot keep up. Man is also prone to hold fast to that which he considers sacred with a tenacity that borders on superstition and stubbornness. But when he gets the notion that he can fly there seems to be no power to hold him back. Thus there is a reason for conservatism, as well as for liberalism. The fact is that we find narrowness in the literature of both sides. The man who denies the authenticity of the Pentateuch and divides it up into an almost innumerable number of fragments, so that one might almost as well begin to count the stars as these, is not necessarily more liberal than the man who defends the Mosaic authorship. the contrary, he may be the narrowest of the two. Liberality is not to be judged by what one asserts or denies, but from his relation to others. On Questions of philosophy, philology, literature, criticism must be investigated in their own realm and decided regardless of the theological position held. Their theological bearing is to be duly considered. Neither can science settle questions of theology. But just so must theologians learn to bear with one another that they may be of mutual service in the interests of truth even amid disagreements. There is need of more charity among the different denominations, and more leniency towards men of different opinions in the same denomination. In this way can truth make more progress and righteousness be furthered. VI. THE INFLUENCE OF THE NATURAL SCIENCES ON (FIRST PAPER.) BY RICHARD C. SCHIEDT, PH.D. The new science building on the historic campus of old Franklin and Marshall is gradually approaching completion. Its erection has been watched with mingled feelings. Those who are strongly wedded to the old order of things look upon it as an anomaly not befitting such sacred classic ground; others consider it a necessary concession to competition, and few, very few indeed, greet it with intelligent enthusiasm. These conditions undoubtedly furnish some of the reasons for the of contributions. Unquestionably this new building, when once very slow influx thoroughly equipped, will mean a new epoch in our educational history, it will help to inaugurate a greatly modified curriculum, but it will under no circumstances destroy the essential features of the old one. The sentiment expressed by the President of the Board of Trustees at the laying of the cornerstone contains a sufficient guarantee against any such fearful apprehension. On the contrary, the new features, which already have found entrance into our curriculum, will greatly enrich and stimulate the forces which have shaped our educational policy during the past century. The men who created that policy were predominantly philosophical in their thinking and teaching, they stood for sound principles governing the development of the whole man. present tendencies in no wise deviate from those principles. We are not unmindful of our precious heritage. One of the chief characteristics of our great leaders, however, was the peculiar ability to discern with keen foresight the new factors moulding and transforming the thought of an age and pointing to a higher 88 Our development. Their prophetic utterances with regard to the great historical and religious movements sufficiently testify to the truth of this statement. In a modest way we are following their footsteps in our claims for the natural sciences. They too must be philosophically discerned, in order to be appreciated in their importance for the intellectual life of the age as it predominates in our educational institutions. The following discussion is to show this in some measure at least. Philosophy, in the metaphysical sense, deals primarily with theories of knowledge. More than a century ago Kant discussed the question: "How is pure mathematics possible," and thereby aroused intense interest, because every philosopher knew at least something of the fundamental principles of geometry. But, when he later on introduced the question: "How is pure nature science possible," he waited in vain for replies, because but few were thoroughly trained in that department. And yet the second problem is by far more fruitful for metaphysical research. Mathematics start with the laws of logic within us, natural science with the laws of nature without us. The former has primarily no relation to the visible world, it is essentially a formal science, and lacks the wealth of contents which belong to the science of nature. The latter is not only under the constant and watchful supervision of the laws of logic but must also comply with the conclusions of experience. Pure thinking essentially lacks the criterion of value which in such a high degree belongs to external realities. Ordinarily, law is equivalent to commandment; it regulates our actions towards our fellow men. But the freedom of our will does not necessarily include harmony between our actions and the commandments, a conflict may arise for which we are responsible. A law of nature, in the specific sense, however, is the natural limitation of our will. He who desires to act freely in the widest and highest sense of the word must be familiar with the immutability of natural law, in order to arrange his decisions and actions in accordance with the unchangeable order of things. A knowledge of law in this sense leads philosophically to highly important concepts and ideas, and with them to an enlargement of |