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sight," or not, we will not argue. The failure to see, or seeing to recognize it, was certainly an oversight of some kind.
Secondly, we observe the reviewer has not quoted the whole, nor the most material part, of the passage to which we applied what he calls our “word-practice." The entire passage, as written by him, reads thus: rightness “means not only conformity to a standard, but, as often, the very standard idea or law to which we ought to conform, or the characteristic element of that to schich we ought to conform, i. e., moral goodness. Thus used, it denotes a simple idea.” The part in italics of his own words, the reviewer did not quote. We submit to all who are sufficiently skilled in “word-practice” to interpret language, whether, when the writer speaks of moral goodness as “the characteristic element” of the standard, and that it has this meaning, and “not only" that of “conformity to the standard," and that when “ thus used it denotes a simple idea,” he did not give us reason to suppose that he intended that in the one sense it denotes a simple idea, and in the other sense it means conformity to a simple idea, and that the two senses differed in other respects than that the one was “concrete," and the other “abstract ?”
But is straightness, whether in the abstract” or “in the concrete," a simple idea ? The critic confidently assumes that it is. We commend to him “the rudimental books” on this point; for example, the Definitions in Playfair's Euclid. We think he will find that it is not a simple idea, in any such sense as he presumes when he contends that rightness is, in his reasonings against Dr. Taylor.
Paley's Æschylus.*_The English scholar, Paley, has made Æschylus his special study, and has given the labor of many years to this, his favorite author. He is well known as an acute and cautious critic; and the publishers of this volume have done well in selecting his text for reproduction in this country. The book is handsomely printed, with the Porson type, and shows, by its correctness, the care which has been used in the proof-reading.
Harper's Greek and Latin Texts. Æschylus ex novissima recensione FredERICI A. PALEY. Accessit verborum quae praecipue notanda sunt et nominum index, New York: Harper & Brothers. 1860. 16mo. pp. 272.
The whole getting up is admirably suited to the purposes of a pocket edition. Judging from this specimen, we venture to predict a wide popularity (so far as Greek and Latin can be popular) for the series of texts, in similar style, by which it is to be followed.
Plato's APOLOGY AND Crito.*—Professor Tyler deserves the thanks of all lovers of Greek, for his neat and convenient edition of the Apology and Crito. The more one reads the works of Plato, the more convinced he becomes that they are the richest mine in Greek literature. It is certainly surprising that those immortal dialogues are so little read and appreciated by the mass of classical students. We must also commend the judgment shown in the selection of these two dialogues, as especially adapted to the purpose of introducing the young student to an acquaintance with Plato. A very important point, we think, is gained, in the work of instruction, when the minds of a class of students are thoroughly awakened and become deeply interested in the subject-matter of what is read. One cannot read far in the Defense of Socrates before his judges, without feeling a strange sympathy with so remarkable a character, and a strong impulse to discover, if possible, the secret of so wonderful a life, soon to be eclipsed by a more wonderful death. In other dialogues, Socrates appears as a keen dialectician, or as a severe moralist, but in these closing scenes of his life, he stands forth the true man of his time, already invested with all the attributes of sainthood, and waiting to accept the crown of martyrdom. Few can rise from the study of these dialogues without experiencing new promptings to pursue what is true and noble, and to shun the false and the base. This edition, as the editor states in his preface, is in the main an exact reprint of Stallbaum's third edition. The notes also are derived chiefly from him, and after comparing them, we can heartily sympathize with the editor in his remark that “the notes of Stallbaum are so felicitous, especially in the illustration of Plato's peculiar idioms and constructions, that any one who has read them, bears the results almost unconsciously with him in all his subsequent reading of the same author.” In regard to contested points the editor is candid and often exhibits a deep appreciation of the text. In particular, we feel convinced that the view given of the daiwn of Socrates is the true one.
* Plato's Apology and Crito, with Notes. By W. S. Tyler, Graves Professor of Greek in Amherst College. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1860.
The Coxd[(T OF LIFE.*_In common with very many of our readers we have read the Conduct of Life. We have laughed over it, admired it, and found fault with it. But what we would say under these and other heads cannot be expressed in a brief notice and must be reserved till our next Number.
GUESSES AT Truth.f—This volume is the first American reprint of two volumes of which the first series was published in 1827. They consist of contributions on a great variety of subjects, from the late lamented Julius Charles IIare and his brother, who died much earlier than he, and a few of their friends. They vary in length from a brief apothegm of a single line to a labored though not a formal dissertation occupying twenty pages. The topics are as various as can easily be imagined. Men of all sorts, the follies and errors of the day, books, language, single works, in short, erery subject which would be likely to attract the attention and excite the interest of a knot of literary men of high culture, of manifold tastes, of large observation and abundant reading when in their freest moods for conversation or meditation, are treated of with a word, a single train of unpremeditated suggestions, or the garnered results of some special effort of research. The charm of the book is derived from its unstudied freedom, the singular variety of its contents and the eminently elevated and Christian tone of its reflections. It is a delightful exemplification of that “moral thoughtfulness” which Dr. Arnold notices as distinguishing only here and there one of his acquaintances, and for this reason attracting and winning his sympathy. Every subject is viewed from its relation to Christian truth and is worthy a refined and elevated Christian scholar. Every utterance is fitted to confirm faith
* The Conduct of Life. By R. W. Emerson, Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1860. 16mo. Pp. 288. [For sale in New Haven by T. H. Pease. Price 75 cts.)
Guesses at Truth : by two Brothers. From the fifth London Edition. Boston : Ticknor & Fields. 12mo. pp. 355. (For sale in New Haven by T. II. Pease. Price $1.50.] VOL. XIX.
in truth, and goodness, and God. And yet the whole tone of the book is liberal in its conceptions of what should be the spirit and aims of a scholar. There is not a sentiment in it which is narrow either in the religious or scholarly acceptation of the term. The entire impression of the book upon a young student would be to render him thoughtful, enterprising, studious, catholic, humane, believing, and Christian. The authors were of that select school of thinkers, who were more or less formed by the conversation and the writings of Coleridge, and their “Guesses at Truth” are of the kind and in the direction which we should expect from the disciples of such a master. They have sympathies and antipathies of their own, in all which we do not share. Some of their surmisings are fanciful, others are hasty and superficial, others still are prejudiced. Many of them perhaps are superseded by discussions that are more mature and profound, or by the advances in thought and speculation which have been made since the beginnings of the present generation, but the book has still an uncommon charm and value for the high minded and aspiring Christian scholar. The influence of a work gentle, docile, and believing, like this, is just the reverse of the hard, scornful positiveness of the “Autocrat of the Breakfast Table,” or the still more objectionable “Conduct of Life," and other books like them, which go much too far in forming the tastes of our scholars and reading public.
HERBERT SPENCER'S INTELLECTUAL, MORAL, AND PHYSICAL EDUCATION.*—Mr. Herbert Spencer belongs to the school of thinkers of whom Mr. J. Stuart Mill, the distinguished author of “a System of Logic,” &c., &c., may be said to be at once the type and the leader. He is a thinker and writer of no mean ability, and, we venture to add, of no little pretension. Many principles which he propounds as original are no novelties at all, and the narrowness which leads so well-read a gentleman, not to advert to the fact that the same practical principles in education, which he hails as the last result of improved views in Psychology, have long been recognized and acted upon by the best teachers and writers on education, is to us very surprising. The peculiarly affected and abstract phraseology of his school do not make these
Education : Intellectual, Moral, and Physical. By HERBERT SPENCER, author of “Social Statics,” “Principles of Psychology," &c. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1861. 12mo. pp. 283.
familiar principles to be any the more original, as certainly they do not invest them with any new charms. Aside from this, however, he has the merit of presenting important views with great clearness, and of illustrating them with much force and interest.
The volume consists of Four Essays, all of which have been previously published, on the following topics: “What Knowledge is of most worth? Intellectual Education. Moral Education. Physical Education.” The first of these is an able and certainly a very fascinating paper, contributed originally to the Westminster Review, in which the writer urges very strongly the claims of Scientific or Objective studies, as furnishing that knowledge to man which will prepare him best for usefulness in the family and in society. The study of the Languages, of History, and of Literature, &c., &c., he argues very earnestly and very plausibly, must, from the nature of the case, be far inferior in useful tendency. He expatiates on the fascinations of science, on its capacity to sharpen the wits, to exercise the senses, to bring discrimination into exercise, with so great enthusiasm that we are almost convinced, in spite of our better judgment, that he is right. He dwells upon its poetical aspects, upon those attributes and relations which excite the imagination and kindle enthusiasm till we catch a portion of his zeal. But we remember that we have heard the same arguments repeatedly before, and that all do not avail against the stubborn energy of facts and the incontrovertible testimony of experience. The nature of the case, also, we bethink ourselves, requires such a training of the powers of reflection and analysis as may impart the capacity to understand one's own mental processes and to express them to others; and no disci. pline is so well adapted to this end, as the discipline which the study of “ Latin and the Humanities" gives. All these considera
. tions are placed out of view in the plausible and eloquent harangue of the writer, and we cannot but pronounce it partial, one-sided, and unfair.
The Essay on Intellectual Education presents an interesting and valuable train of thought, which is designed to enforce the importance of following the order of the development of the powers in the arrangement of the order of studies, and in the way in which knowledge is imparted. There is much justice in the problem proposed, and in the general principles which underly these rules. The defect which we observe, is that too much is