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monies, this infinite diversity in unity, are represented by some as the result of forces exhibiting no trace of intelligence, no power of thinking, no faculty of combination, no knowledge of time and space. If there is anything which places man above all other beings in nature, it is precisely the circumstance that he possesses these noble attributes, without which, in their most exalted excellence and perfection, not one of these general traits of relationship, so characteristic of the great types of the animal and vegetable kingdoms, can be understood or even perceived. How, then, could these relations have been devised without similar powers? If all these relations are almost beyond the reach of the mental power of man, and if man himself is part and parcel of the whole system, how could this system have been called into existence, if there does not exist One Supreme Intelligence as the author of all things?"* To put the question in another shape. Man does not invent or create Nature; at the most, with great study, he can but understand Nature, and this only in part. Either then the laws of comparative anatomy, which a Cuvier and an Owen have traced and classified, have a higher intelligence than Cuvier and Owen, or there is a Supreme Intelligence, the author both of the laws and of the minds that study them. And if it requires a mind as capacious as that of Cuvier or Owen to comprehend the animal kingdom, what must be the capacity of the mind that ordained it! Near two thousand years ago Galen pronounced his work on anatomy "a religious hymn in honor of the Creator." And every museum of comparative anatomy adds new strophes to that hymn.
We cannot rest in physical laws as the ultimate powers in nature, because these laws themselves need frequent revision with the progress of scientific discovery. How many laws of physiology and health once laid down so gravely in medical works, have been made ludicrous by the advance of science! Who can read without a smile, much that Lord Bacon and Robert Boyle have put on record as physiological laws? What nonsense has been written concerning electric fluids and
Essay on Classification, p. 35.
magnetic fluids as distinct material agents,-whereas all observation now points to the conclusion that magnetic and electric action are but "different effects of one common cause," as yet unknown? A discoverer proclaims some new law as the first cause of everything, and his successor shows that it was never the cause of anything but his own blunder. The old doctrine of mechanical forces to which physicists traced all action, is now giving way to the doctrine of polar forces as the solution of all the phenomena of material action. But who shall say that this is the final discovery? And is it worthy of the human mind to rest in what the next generation may reject as crudities, as if these were first causes-when it may ever rise toward that Infinite and Eternal Cause, which not all coming generations shall supersede or modify? It is a well-put aphorism of Whewell, that "in contemplating the series of causes which are themselves the effects of other causes, we are necessarily led to assume a Supreme Cause in the order of Causation, as we assume a First Cause in the order of Succession.”*
The harmonious working of apparently conflicting laws and powers in Nature, and the agencies for remedy and restoration, require us to believe in an intelligent Creator and Ruler of all things. The curative processes of nature, the remedial agencies at work to repair waste, loss, and injury, the adaptation of the Materia Medica of the physical world to the diseases of mankind, and the law of conservation in the planetary motions, are striking evidences of the existence of God. If these are not the product of one planning mind, then there are antagonistic laws, which are either in danger of perpetual collision, or which work in harmony by a self-intelligence which must needs be divine. Is there one law of health, and another law of disease, and a third law of remedy, and do these three laws, seemingly adverse, meet in consultation, and agree that each shall have its turn at the patient? Does chance or natural law provide for such a triangular practice to accomplish the desired end?
Is not that very law of conservation in the cosmical mo
* Novum Organon Renovatum, p. 247.
tions, which Baden Powell quotes as proof of the self-evolving powers of Nature, in reality one of the highest proofs of a farseeing, all-controlling intelligence? It is impossible to ascribe such delicate adjustments, compensations, and even counteractions in the system, to anything short of one discerning, planning, directing Cause.
To sum up all, the higher the plane from which we take our observations of nature, and the wider the range of these observations, the more palpable does it become that there is no possible explanation of the order of nature in all her varying phenomena, save as a thought of the Divine mind put into expression by an act of his will. Agassiz gives it as the result of his study of Natural History, "that the most surprising feature of the animal kingdom seems to rest neither in its diversity, nor in the various degrees of complication of its structure, nor in the close affinity of some of its representatives, while others are so different, nor in the manifold relations of all of them to one another and the surrounding world; but in the circumstance, that beings, endowed with such different and such unequal gifts, should nevertheless constitute an harmonious whole, intelligibly connected in all its parts." And he argues that in our attempts to expound nature, we are only the unconscious interpreters of a divine conception; and when in our pride of philosophy we have thought that we were inventing systems of science, and classifying creation by the force of our own reason, we have only followed and reproduced in our imperfect expressions, the plan whose foundations were laid in the dawn of creation, and the development of which we are laboriously studying." These are not the words of ignorance or of cant. They carry us back to that sublime conception of Plato that there was a pattern of thought in the mind of God, after which the worlds were made; they lead us as students of science to that devout aspiration of Kepler-"I think thy thoughts after thee, O God"—to that ascription of the Psalmist, "I will praise thee, for I am fearfully and wonderfully made. Marvelous are thy works and that my soul knows right well!" It is not merely that design proves the designer, but that the very thoughts of the Divine mind are impressed upon the laws of nature for man to study and interpret. So
that with the profound and eloquent historian of the Inductive Sciences, we can say as the conclusion of the whole argument, "We cannot only hold with Galen, and Harvey, and all the great physiologists, that the organs of animals give evidence of a purpose; not only assert with Cuvier, that this conviction of a purpose can alone enable us to understand every living thing;-not only say with Newton, 'that every true step made in philosophy brings us nearer to the very First Cause, which certainly is not mechanical:'-but we can go much further, and declare still with Newton, that 'this beautiful system could have its origin no other way than by the purpose and command of an intelligent and powerful Being, who governs all things, not as the soul of the world, but as the Lord of the Universe; who is not only God, but Lord and Governor.'
"When we have advanced so far, there yet remains one step. We may recollect the prayer of one, the master in this school of the philosophy of science, "This, also, we humbly and earnestly beg; that human things may not prejudice such as are divine;-neither that from the unlocking of the gates of sense, and the kindling of a greater natural light, anything may arise of incredulity or intellectual night towards divine. mysteries; but rather that by our minds thoroughly purged and cleansed from fancy and vanity, and yet subject and perfectly given up to the divine oracles, there may be given unto faith the things that are faith's.' When we are thus prepared for a higher teaching, we may be ready to listen to a greater than Bacon, when he says to those who have sought their God in the material universe, 'Whom ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you.' And when we recollect how utterly inadequate all human language has been shown to be, to express the nature of that Supreme Cause of the Natural, and Rational, and Moral, and Spiritual world, to which our Philosophy points with trembling finger, and shaded eyes, we may receive, with the less wonder, but with the more reverence, the declaration which has been vouchsafed to us, 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.""
* Whewell, Nov. Org. Renovatum, p. 255.
ARTICLE VI.-LATIN PRONUNCIATION.
Ueber Aussprache, Vocalismus und Betonung der Lateinischen Sprache. Von der königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin gekronte Preisschrift, von W. Corssen. Erster Band [ss. X, 374] Leipzig, Druck und Verlag von B. G. TEUBNER, 1858; Zweiter Band [ss. 493] 1859. Roman Orthoëpy: A Plea for the restoration of the True System of Latin Pronunciation. By JOHN F. RICHARDSON, Professor of the Latin Language and Literature in the University at Rochester. [pp. 114.] New York: Sheldon & Compay, 1859.
THERE is no nation in the world, so far as we know, in which classical scholars claim as a general thing that they pronounce Latin as it was pronounced by the ancient Romans. He therefore, who, from the Roman point of view, undertakes to prove that the modern pronunciation of Latin is erroneous, is engaged in the main in an idle task, for he is laboring to prove that which no one is ignorant enough to deny. It is indeed very easy, not only to point out numerous errors in the various prevalent methods of Latin pronunciation as compared with the ancient, but also to show their incongruities and absurdities. Nor are these errors more obvious than are certain evils which result from them. From what a multitude of questions in etymology, for instance, which every one in the early stages of philological study is called to solve, would a degree of obscurity be lifted, should we ever return to the Roman method of pronouncing the Roman tongue.
Nor let any one suppose that it is American or English scholars alone who need reform in this respect. The pronunciation of the language of Cicero is as manifestly wrong in Paris and Berlin and Padua, and even in Rome itself, as it is in Oxford or in New Haven; and Cicero would to-day find it as difficult to recognize his own name, could he hear it uttered on the banks of the Tiber, as on the banks of the Connecticut or the