of the middle and commercial class, who formed the basis of his political power, small landowners, bankers, merchants, nabobs, army contractors, lawyers, soldiers, and seamen, Pitt revolutionized the Upper House. It became the stronghold, not of blood, but of property, the representative of the great estates and great fortunes which the vast increase of English wealth was building up. For the first time, too, in our history, it became the distinctly conservative element in our constitution. The full import of Pitt's changes has still to be revealed, but in some ways their results have been very different from the end at which he aimed. The larger number of the peerage, though due to the will of the Crown, has practically freed the House from any influence which the Crown can exert by the distribution of honours. This change, since the power of the Crown has been practically wielded by the House of Commons, has rendered it far harder to reconcile the free action of the Lords with the regular working of constitutional government. On the other hand, the larger number of its members has rendered the House more responsive to public opinion, when public opinion is strongly pronounced; and the political tact which is inherent in great aristocratic assemblies has hitherto prevented any collision with the Lower House from being pushed to an irreconcileable quarrel. Perhaps the most direct result of the change is seen in the undoubted popularity of the House of Lords with the mass of the people. The large number of its members, and the constant additions to them from almost every class of the community, has secured it as yet from the suspicion and ill-will which in almost every other constitutional country has hampered the effective working of a second legislative chamber.' sition of The largely increased numbers of the House of Lords, Political poand the more representative character which it has ac- the House quired through the changes in its composition here of Lords. briefly sketched, have enabled it to preserve very much of its ancient authority and political influence. But it Determined the Lords to has nevertheless tended-especially since the Reform Act of 1832-to decline more and more from the position which it still theoretically occupies, of a co-ordinate legislative power, and to become simply a revising and suspending House-altering and modifying bills sent up from the Commons, rejecting thein sometimes when the mind of the nation is not thoroughly made up in their favour, but yielding to the national will whenever unequivocally expressed.1 The Constitutional position of the Lords with regard to opposition of legislation of which they disapprove, but which is supthe Reform ported by the ministers of the Crown, the House of Bills of 1831 Commons, and the people, may be said to have been and 1832 definitely settled by the result of the memorable struggle with the Upper House in 1831 and 1832 on the passing of the Reform Bill. After sixteen peers had been created to assist the progress of the measure, the continued oppoovercome by sition of the House of Lords was at length overcome by a threatened the private persuasions of the King, and the knowledge that he had consented to his ministers' request for power to create a sufficient number of peers to ensure a majority? creation of peers; 1 The late Earl of Derby, in speaking against the second reading of the Corn Importation Bill, in 1846, said: ‘My lords, if I know anything of the constitutional importance of this House, it is to impose a salutary obstacle to rash and inconsiderate legislation; it is to protect the people from the consequences of their own imprudence. It never has been the course of this House to resist a continued and deliberately expressed public opinion. Your lordships always have bowed, and always will bow, to the expression of such an opinion; but it is yours to check hasty legislation leading to irreparable evils.' (Hansard, Deb. lxxxvi. p. 1175). Similarly, the late Lord Lyndhurst, speaking on the second reading of the Oaths Bill, in 1858, said in the House of Lords: It is part of our duty to originate legislation; but it is also a most important part of our duty to check the inconsiderate, rash, hasty, and undigested legislation of the other House ;-to give time for consideration; and for consulting or perhaps modifying the opinions of the constituencies; but I never understood, nor could such a principle be acted upon, that we were to make a firm, determined, persevering stand against the opinion of the other House of Parliament, when that opinion is backed by the opinion of the people; and, least of all, on questions affecting, in a certain degree, the constitution of that House, and popular rights. If we do make such a stand, we ought to take care that we stand on a rock.' (Hansard, Deb. 3rd ser. ii. p. 1768.) 2 The King grants permission to Earl Grey, and to his Chancellor, Lord Brougham, to create such a number of Peers as will be sufficient to ensure the passing of the Reform Bill,-first calling up Peers' eldest sons. WILLIAM, R. Windsor, May 17th, 1832.' Roebuck, Hist. of the Whig Ministry, ii. 331 nounced as vindication tion. The threatened creation of peers was denounced at the which is detime by the Duke of Wellington and the Tory party unconstitu generally as an unconstitutional exercise of the pre- tional. rogative; but it was admirably answered by Earl Grey: Earl Grey's 'I ask what would be the consequences if we were to of the prosuppose that such a prerogative did not exist, or could not posed creabe constitutionally exercised? The Commons have a control over the power of the Crown, by the privilege, in extreme cases, of refusing the supplies; and the Crown has, by means of its power to dissolve the House of Commons, a control upon any violent and rash proceedings on the part of the Commons; but if a majority of this House is to have the power, whenever they please, of opposing the declared and decided wishes both of the Crown and the people, without any means of modifying that power, then this country is placed entirely under the influence of an uncontrollable oligarchy. I say that, if a majority of this House should have the power of acting adversely to the Crown and the Commons, and was determined to exercise that power, without being liable to check or control, the constitution is completely altered, and the government of this country is not a limited monarchy: it is no longer, my lords, the Crown, the Lords, and the Commons, but a House of Lords-a separate oligarchygoverning absolutely the others.'1 ordinary creation of peers equi In its practical aspect, an extraordinary creation of An extrapeers is to the House of Lords what a dissolution is to the House of Commons: and although such a creation ought never to be made use of except in the greatest emergency, its use in such an emergency is not only constitutional, but essential to the safety of the Constitution itself. valent to a dissolution. The political weight of the Upper House has been to Political some extent injuriously affected by the indifference to weight of the peers public business displayed (though with many brilliant affected by exceptions) by the great body of its members, and by attendance their small and indifference to business. 1 Hansard, Deb. 3rd ser. xii. 1006 (May 17, 1832). 2 See May, Const. Hist. i. 315. 1868. their scanty attendance, favoured by the rule which requires only three peers to make a quorum, and by the practice of giving proxies. By a resolution of the House, Proxies dis- in 1868, this latter practice has been advantageously continued, discontinued; but the attempts made, in 1855 by the Attempts to Crown, and in the following year by bill founded on the recommendation of a committee of the Lords, to increase the critical power and representative character of the Upper House by calling up men of ability as life-peers, were unfortunately defeated. revive life peerages. (III.) The House of Commons. members. III. The House of Commons. Like the House of Lords, the House of Commons has also undergone very important changes in its numbers, its composition, and its political influence. In the year 1295, the date of the perfect constitution of the national Number of Parliament, under Edward I., the members of the Lower House numbered 274, comprising 74 knights of the shire, and 200 citizens and burgesses. Under Edward III. and his three immediate successors the number of the burgesses was about 180, fluctuating in different Parliaments according to the negligence or partiality of the sheriffs in omitting places which had formerly returned members. New boroughs, however, either on account of their growing importance or to increase the authority of the Crown in the Lower House, were from time to time summoned to return representatives, and at the accession of Henry VIII. we find 111 cities and boroughs (all of which retained their privilege down to the Reform Act of 1832) represented in Parliament by 224 citizens and burgesses. In this reign the number of members was considerably increased by the addition of representatives for Wales, and the Tudor sovereigns systematically pursued the policy of creating insignificant boroughs— many of them mere villages-for the express purpose of corruptly supporting the influence of the Crown in the House of Commons.1 Between the reigns of Henry VIII. and Charles II. no less than 180 members were added to the House by Royal charter alone. The borough of Newark, which received the Parliamentary franchise by Royal charter under Charles II., was the last instance of its kind. The House of Commons took the issue of writs. into its own hands; and no new borough was created in England or Wales until the Reform Act of 1832. At the date of the Union with Scotland the number of members was 513. The Act of Union (6 Anne, c. 7) added 45 representatives of that kingdom; and the Act of Union with Ireland in 1800 (39 & 40 Geo. III. c. 67) made a further addition to the House of 100 Irish members. The proportional representation of the three kingdoms has since been a little varied, Scotland having [1885, 72 members, and Ireland 103]; but the total number of members has remained nearly the same. In 1879, owing to the disfranchisement of certain boroughs for corrupt practices, it stood at the slightly reduced figure of 650.3 1 Supra, p. 371. 2 Glanville's Reports, cii.; May, Const. Hist. i. 329. In the reign of James I. the Commons, out of favour to popular rights, resolved that every town which had at any time returned members to Parliament was entitled to a writ as a matter of course; and by virtue of this resolution fifteen boroughs regained the Parliamentary franchise under James and Charles I. In 1673 the county Palatine and city of Durham were for the first time admitted to the franchise by Act 25 Car. II. c. 9; and about the same time a Royal charter was granted to Newark, enabling it to return two burgesses to Parliament. Hallam, Const. Hist. iii. 39. 3 [At the date of the present edition going to press, considerable changes were impending in the way of Redistribution of Seats, as well as of extension of the Franchise. The principle of the Redistribution of 1884-5 is described in the Edinburgh Review, No. 329, for Jan. 1885, as the subdivision of large constituencies,' and the 'adoption of single representatives, as far as practicable, for each electoral division.' That a considerable change will be wrought in some respects seems to be beyond question. When we are told in the Review cited above, that the line of distinction' is effaced, for Parliamentary purposes, between boroughs and counties, we are surely brought face to face with a substantially new state of affairs in the relation of the House of Commons to the Nation. It is said that subdivision will check organisations of the nature of the 'Caucus.' It remains to be seen whether this view is more than an amiable suggestion, by way of comforting those, on either side, who do not like such organisations It is also said that no disfranchisement of |