tenance to an insurrectionary movement in derogation of the sovereign to which he is accredited. Doubtlessly there are revolutions which deserve the sympathies and favor of all civilized states, but even in such cases the representatives of foreign governments should act by their direction and make their protests direct and explicit, taking the responsibilities of the termination of diplomatic intercourse. No such circumstances are known to us as existing in regard to the revolution in New Granada." (Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Burton, July 18, 1861, MS. Inst. Colombia, XVI. 7.)

"This government has not now, it seldom has had, any special transaction, either commercial or political, to engage the attention of a minister at Rome. Indeed, until a very late period the United States were without any representation at that ancient and interesting capital. The first colonists in this country were chiefly Protestants, who not merely recognized no ecclesiastical authority of the Pope, but were very jealous lest he might exert some ecclesiastical influence here which would be followed by an assumption of political power unfavorable to freedom and self-government on this continent. It was not seen that the political power of the Catholic Church was purely a foreign affair, constituting an important part of the political system of the European continent. It is believed that ever since the tide of emigration set in upon this continent the head of the Roman Church and states has freely recognized and favored the development of this principle of political freedom on the part of the Catholics in this country, while he has never lost an opportunity to express his satisfaction with the growth, prosperity and progress of the American people. It was under these circumstances that this government, in 1848, wisely determined that while it maintained representatives in the capitals of every other civilized state, and even at the capitals of many semicivilized states which reject the whole Christian religion, it was neither wise nor necessary to exclude Rome from the circle of our diplomatic intercourse. Thus far the new relation then established has proved pleasant and benificent.

"Just now Rome is the seat of profound ecclesiastical and political anxieties, which, more or less, affect all the nations of Europe. The Holy Father claims immunity for the temporal power he exercises, as a right incident to an ecclesiastical authority which is generally respected by the European states.

"On the other hand, some of those states, with large masses in other states, assert that this temporal power is without any religious sanction, is unnecessary and pernicious. I have stated the question merely for the purpose of enabling myself to give you the President's views of what will be your duty with regard to it. That duty is to forbear altogether from taking any part in the controversy. The reasons for this forbearance are three: First, that so far as spiritual

or ecclesiastical matters enter into the question they are beyond your province, for you are a political representative only. Second, so far as it is a question affecting the Roman States, it is a domestic one, and we are a foreign nation. Third, so far as it is a political question merely, it is at the same time purely an European one, and you are an American minister, bound to avoid all entangling connection with the politics of that continent.

"This line of conduct will nevertheless allow you to express, and you are therefore instructed to express, to His Holiness the assurances of the best wishes of the government and of the people of the United States for his health and happiness, and for the safety and prosperity and happiness of the Roman people."

Mr. Seward. Sec. of State, to Mr. Blatchford, Sept. 25, 1862, Dip. Cor. 1862, 851.

With reference to an invitation from France to cooperate with the governments of Paris, London, and Vienna in the exercise of a moral influence with the Emperor of Russia with reference to affairs in Poland, Mr. Seward said:

"This government is profoundly and agreeably impressed with the consideration which the Emperor has manifested towards the United States by inviting their concurrence in a proceeding having for its object the double interests of public order and humanity. Nor is it less favorably impressed with the sentiments and the prudential considerations which the Emperor has in so becoming a manner expressed to the court of St. Petersburg.

"Notwithstanding, however, the favor with which we thus regard the suggestion of the Emperor of the French, this government finds an insurmountable difficulty in the way of any active cooperation with the governments of France, Austria, and Great Britain, to which it is thus invited.

"Founding our institutions upon the basis of the rights of man, the builders of our Republic came all at once to be regarded as political reformers, and it soon became manifest that revolutionists in every country hailed them in that character, and looked to the United States for effective sympathy, if not for active support and patronage. Our invaluable Constitution had hardly been established when it became necessary for the government of the United States to consider to what extent we could, with propriety, safety, and beneficence, intervene, either by alliance or concerted action with friendly powers or otherwise, in the political affairs of foreign states. An urgent appeal for such aid and sympathy was made in behalf of France, and the appeal was sanctioned and enforced by the treaty then existing of mutual alliance and defense, a treaty without which it may even now be confessed, to the honor of France, our own sovereignty and independence

could not have been so early secured. So deeply did this appeal touch the heart of the American people that only the deference they cherished to the counsels of the Father of our Country, who then was at the fullness of his unapproachable moral greatness, reconciled them to the stern decision that, in view of the location of this republic, the characters, habits, and sentiments of its constituent parts, and especially its complex yet unique and very popular Constitution, the American people must be content to recommend the cause of human progress by the wisdom with which they should exercise the powers of self-government, forbearing at all times, and in every way, from foreign alliances, intervention, and interference.

"It is true that Washington thought a time might come when, our institution being firmly consolidated and working with complete success, we might safely and perhaps beneficially take part in the consultations held by foreign states for the common advantage of the nations. Since that period occasions have frequently happened which presented seductions to a departure from what, superficially viewed, seemed a course of isolation and indifference. It is scarcely necessary to recur to them. One was an invitation to a congress of newly emancipated Spanish-American states; another, an urgent appeal to aid Hungary in a revolution aiming at the restoration of her ancient and illustrious independence; another, the project of a joint. guarantee of Cuba to Spain in concurrence with France and Great Britain; and more recently, an invitation to a cooperative demonstration with Spain, France, and Great Britain in Mexico; and, later still, suggestions by some of the Spanish-American states for a common council of the republican states situated upon the American continent. These suggestions were successively disallowed by the government, and its decision was approved in each case by the deliberate judgment of the American people. Our policy of nonintervention, straight, absolute, and peculiar as it may seem to other nations, has thus become a traditional one, which could not be abandoned without the most urgent occasion, amounting to a manifest necessity. Certainly it could not be wisely departed from at this moment, when the existence of a local, although as we trust only a transient disturbance, deprives the government of the counsel of a portion of the American people, to whom so wide a departure from the settled policy of the country must in any case be deeply interesting.

"The President will not allow himself to think for a single moment that the Emperor of the French will see anything but respect and friendship for himself and the people of France, with good wishes for the preservation of peace and order, and the progress of humanity in Europe, in the adherence of the United States on this occasion to

the policy which they have thus far pursued with safety, and not without advantage, as they think, to the interests of mankind."

Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Dayton, min. to France, No. 342, May
11, 1863, Dip. Cor. 1863, I. 667.

See, further, Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Motley, min to Austria,
Nos. 34 and 37, June 20, July 14, 1863, Dip. Cor. 1863, II. 926.

"Within the last three years it has seen an attempt at revolution in the ancient kingdom of Poland, a successful revolution in what was New Granada, but now is Colombia, a war between France and Mexico, a civil war in Venezuela, a war between three allied SpanishAmerican republics and Salvador, and a war between Colombia and Ecuador. It now sees a probability of a war between Denmark and Germany. In regard to such of these conflicts as have actually occurred, the United States have pursued the same policy, attended by the same measure of reserve, that they have thus far followed, in regard to the civil war in Santo Domingo. It is by this policy that the United States equally avoid throwing themselves across the way of human progress, or lending encouragement to factious revolutions. Pursuing this course, the United States leave to the government and people of every foreign state the exclusive settlement of their own affairs and the exclusive enjoyment of their own institutions. Whatever may be thought by other nations of this policy, it seems to the undersigned to be in strict conformity with those prudential principles of international law-that nations are equal in their independence and sovereignty, and that each individual state is bound to do unto all other states just what it reasonably expects those states to do unto itself."

Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Tassara, Feb. 3, 1864, MS. Notes to
Spain, VII. 451.

As to keeping aloof from foreign interests, see 9 John Adams's Works,
108, 109, 118, 129, 136, 202, 277, 579.

As to nonintervention generally, see 3 John Adams's Works, 316; 7 id. 151; 8 id. 9, 178; (and see also discussions in 103 N. Am. Rev. 476, October, 1866).

As to special mission in reference to claims of Costa Rica on Nicaragua, see Mr. Cass, Sec. of State, to Mr. Jones, July 30, 1857, MS. Inst. Special Missions, III. 96.

It is not deemed unreasonable on the part of the government of Hayti that it should ask leading maritime states to guarantee their sovereignty over Samana. The government of Hayti very properly consults the United States government with reference to such a guarantee. The President is gratified, also, that the Haytian government has submitted its views in a proper spirit to Great Britain. Nevertheless, the question unavoidably calls up that ancient and settled policy of the United States which disinclines them to the

constituting of political alliances with foreign states, and especially disinclines them to engagements with foreign states in regard to subjects which do not fall within the range of necessary and immediate domestic legislation. This policy would oblige the United States to refrain from making such a guarantee as Hayti desires, but disclaiming for themselves all purpose or desire to disturb the peace and security of Hayti, the United States would be gratified if Great Britain and other maritime states should see fit to regard the wish of the government of Hayti in the same spirit of justice and magnanimity."

Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Sir F. Bruce, British min., Aug. 15, 1865,
Dip. Cor. 1865, II. 191.

This note of Mr. Seward's was written in reply to a note from Sir F.
Bruce, stating that the chargé d'affaires of Hayti had requested the
British government to concur in guaranteeing the neutrality of the
peninsula of Samana.

"In the opinion of the President, the most beneficent policy which this government can practice with reference to foreign states is to abstain from all authoritative or dictatorial proceedings in regard to their own peculiar affairs, while it employs at all times whatever just influence it enjoys to promote peace, and to recommend to them, by its own fidelity to justice and freedom, the institutions of free popular government. In this respect you have proceeded in harmony with the policy of the United States."

Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Kilpatrick, min. to Chile, No. 6, May 5, 1866, Dip. Cor. 1866, II. 411.

This instruction referred to the action of Mr. Kilpatrick in endeavoring to avert the bombardment of Valparaiso. In the course of the instruction, Mr. Seward said: "The conclusion at which you arrived upon an examination of the circumstances, that it was not your duty to advise or instruct Commodore Rodgers to resist the bombardment by force, is accepted and approved." (Id. 412.)

The instruction above quoted is recorded in MS. Inst. Chile, XV. 327.

The American commissioner and consul-general at Port au Prince having reported that there existed between Hayti and Santo Domingo jealousies which derived support from some imaginary political designs on the part of the United States, Mr. Seward said:

"The United States sincerely desire and hope that Hayti and St. Domingo may become cordial friends, and may dwell together in peaceful neighborhood, each maintaining its own sovereignty, integrity and independence. The forbearing and friendly policy of this government towards all the free states of the American continent and islands has been so often exposed and illustrated during the last five years, that it is deemed unnecessary now to make a distinct utterance on that subject, when no event has occurred which could bring