to intervention or mediation in the affairs of disputing states. It is regretted that you did not recall this salutary rule, and find some discreet way of avoiding even the semblance of concerted action with your British colleague in the sense of advising Guatemala as to its treatment of the questions existing with Mexico. It would be doubly unfortunate if your utterances had left on the mind of the Guatemalan executive an impression that the government of the United States inclined to the Guatemalan view of Mexico's intentions and might even thwart by force a hostile act of Mexico growing out of the present strained situation.

"This government, as the impartial friend of both Guatemala and Mexico, can not but deplore the tension which has arisen between them, and were the way open for our friendly action in a manner equally acceptable to both of them, we would gladly do what we properly might, in the same spirit of impartiality, to induce a friendly composition of their differences. This government conceives that it can only be useful toward such a result by maintaining, for itself and through its agencies, an attitude of unbiased reserve as to the merits of the points at issue. Were it to authorize such declarations as you appear to have made to President Cabrera, the maintenance of that neutral position would be impossible.

"I am therefore constrained to disapprove and disavow your action."

Mr. Day, Sec. of State, to Mr. Hunter, min. to Guatemala, No. 78, Sept. 16, 1898, MS. Inst. Cent. Am. XXI. 364, citing Mr. Adee, Act. Sec. of State, to Mr. Mizner, min. to Guatemala, No. 38, Sept. 19, 1889.

McKinley.

"This government has maintained an attitude of neutrality in the unfortunate contest between Great Britain and the Boer States of Africa. We have remained faithful to the precept of avoiding entangling alliances as to affairs not of our direct concern."

Roosevelt.

President McKinley, annual message, Dec. 5, 1899, For. Rel. 1899, xxii. "In asserting the Monroe doctrine, in taking such steps as we have taken in regard to Cuba, Venezuela, and Panama, and in endeavoring to circumscribe the theater of war in the Far East, and to secure the open door in China, we have acted in our own interest as well as in the interest of humanity at large. There are, however, cases in which, while our own interests are not greatly involved, strong appeal is made to our sympathies. Ordinarily it is very much wiser and more useful for us to concern ourselves with striving for our own moral and material betterment here at home than to concern ourselves with trying to better the condition of things in other nations. We have plenty of sins of our own to

war against, and under ordinary circumstances we can do more for the general uplifting of humanity by striving with heart and soul to put a stop to civic corruption, to brutal lawlessness and violent race. prejudices here at home than by passing resolutions about wrongdoing elsewhere. Nevertheless there are occasional crimes committed on so vast a scale and of such peculiar horror as to make us doubt whether it is not our manifest duty to endeavor at least to show our disapproval of the deed and our sympathy with those who have suffered by it. The cases must be extreme in which such a course is justifiable. There must be no effort made to remove the mote from our brother's eye if we refuse to remove the beam from our own. But in extreme cases action may be justifiable and proper. What form the action shall take must depend upon the circumstances of the case; that is, upon the degree of the atrocity and upon our power to remedy it. The cases in which we could interfere by force of arms as we interfered to put a stop to intolerable conditions in Cuba are necessarily very few. Yet it is not to be expected that a people like ours, which in spite of certain very obvious shortcomings, nevertheless as a whole shows by its consistent practice its belief in the principles of civil and religious liberty and of orderly freedom, a people among whom even the worst crime, like the crime of lynching, is never more than sporadic, so that individuals and not classes are molested in their fundamental rights-it is inevitable that such a nation should desire eagerly to give expression to its horror on an occasion like that of the massacre of the Jews in Kishenef, or when it witnesses such systematic and long-extended cruelty and oppression as the cruelty and oppression of which the Armenians have been the victims, and which have won for them the indignant pity of the civilized world."

President Roosevelt, annual message, Dec. 6, 1904, For. Rel, 1904, xlii.

(2) THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.

$899.

Genet, when he came to the United States in 1793, brought instructions to negotiate "a national agreement, in which two great peoples shall suspend their commercial and political interests, and establish a mutual understanding, to defend the empire of liberty, wherever it can be embraced; to guarantee the sovereignty of the people, and punish those powers who still keep up an exclusive colonial and commercial system, by declaring that their vessels shall not be received in the ports of the contracting parties." In a note of May 23, 1793, Genet proposed that the two peoples should by "a true family compact," establish a "commercial and political system," on a "liberal and fraternal basis." Washington had already, by his proclamation

of April 22, 1793, adopted the policy of nonintervention and neutrality.

Am. State Papers, For. Rel. I. 708-709, 147, 140. See supra, § 821.

(3) SPAIN AND HER COLONIES.

§ 900.

In the contest between Spain and her colonies, in which the latter achieved their independence, the United States adhered to the policy of neutrality and nonintervention. See supra, §§ 28-36; infra,

§ 930-936, 1320.

(4) GREEK INDEPENDENCE.

$ 901.

"The war of the Greeks for independence early attracted attention in this country. Mr. Dwight, of Massachusetts, on the 24th of December, 1822, presented to the House a memorial in their favor. The sentiment of the House was against meddling with the subject, and the memorial was ordered to lie on the table.

“Early in the next session (December 8, 1823), Mr. Webster submitted to the House a resolution that provision ought to be made by law for defraying the expense incident to the appointment of an agent or commissioner to Greece, whenever the President shall deem it expedient to make such appointment. On the 19th of the same month the House requested the President to lay before it any information he might have received, and which he might deem it improper to communicate, respecting the condition and future prospects of the Greeks.

“On the 29th a memorial was presented from citizens of New York, requesting the recognition of the independence of Greece. On the 31st the President transmitted the desired information to Congress. On the 2d of January, 1824, Mr. Poinsett laid before the House a resolution of the general assembly of South Carolina that that State would hail with pleasure the recognition by the American government of the independence of Greece. On the 5th Webster presented a memorial from citizens of Boston. The debate upon Webster's resolution began upon the 19th of January and continued until the 26th. It took a wide range, developed great diversity of sentiment, and produced no result.

"The sympathy for the Greeks continued to manifest itself. On the 2d of January, 1827, Edward Livingston moved to instruct the Committee on Ways and Means to report a bill appropriating $50,000 for provisions for their relief. The bill was negatived on the 27th. Private relief was given, and in his annual message to Congress in the H. Doc. 551-vol 6-3

following December the President transmitted to Congress correspondence respecting it with Capo d'Istrias and with the president and secretary of the Greek national assembly.

"The first and only treaty with Greece was concluded in London in 1837 between the ministers of the respective powers at that court. It was sent to Congress with the President's message of December 4, 1838."

Davis, Notes, Treaty Vol. (1776–1887), 1341; supra, § 41.

For correspondence in relation to the Greeks, in 1823-1824, see Ex. Papers 14, 18 Cong. 1 sess.; Am. State Papers, For Rel. V. 251, 252.

(5) HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION.

$ 902.

As to the efforts made to induce the United States to depart from the policy of nonintervention in the Hungarian revolution of 1848, see supra, § 72; infra, § 905.

(6) CHILE-PERUVIAN WAR.

§ 903.

With reference to an inquiry as to the attitude of the United States in case a proposal should be received from Germany and Great Britain to act with them in a mediation between Chile and Peru in the war in South America, in the interest of the protection of commerce, Mr. Evarts said: "While as keenly alive as the governments of Germany or Great Britain can be to the dangers arising to commerce from the existence of so deplorable a war between kindred peoples, as well as to the greater prospective danger that the Argentine Republic and other South American States may yet be involved in the quarrel, and while it has been from the commencement of the struggle and is now ready to assist in the restoration of peace between the belligerents, whenever its good offices may be usefully proffered, yet this government does not look with favor upon any premature effort, nor any effort in combination with other neutral powers, which would carry the impression of dictation or coercion in disparagement of belligerent rights. Inquiry having been made of this government, through Her Britannic Majesty's minister at this capital, in the same sense as that addressed to you through Mr. Bucher, an identical answer was returned to Sir Edward Thornton. You will, of course, carefully note and report any tendencies you may observe toward further action by Germany in the direction of South American intervention, either with or without the cooperation of other powers.”

Mr. Evarts, Sec. of State, to Mr. White, min. to Germany, No. 22, July 19, 1879, MS. Inst. Germany, XVI. 486.

In 1879 Mr. S. Newton Pettis, American minister to Bolivia, paid a visit to Lima and to Santiago in the interest of peace between the parties to the war then existing in South America. His mission was avowedly undertaken without the knowledge or direction of his government, and seems to have been limited to the endeavor to make each of the three governments concerned privately acquainted with the others' views with regard to a settlement of differences, especially by arbitration if a direct settlement should be unattainable. "Unauthorized and even rash," said the Department of State," as Mr. Pettis' experiment might appear, the United States could not but rejoice at the result should the knowledge thus gained by the belligerents of each other's views conduce to an eventual settlement." The United States was "not, however, disposed to dictate a peace, or to take any steps looking to arbitration or intervention in disparagement of belligerent rights, or even to urge the conditions under which it may be reached. Its good offices have not been officially tendered, but if sought, on a practical basis of arbitration submitted by the several parties to the struggle, the President would not hesitate to use them in the interest of peace. The Department dismisses, as unbased rumor of a hostile press, the statement in some of the Chilean journals that you have indicated a purpose on the part of this government to end the war by intervention or by arbitration on terms proposed by itself."

Mr. Hunter, Act. Sec. of State, to Mr. Pettis, min. to Bolivia, No. 26, Oct. 1, 1879, MS. Inst. Bolivia, I. 262.

See, also, Mr. Evarts, Sec. of State, to Mr. Pettis, No. 25, Sept. 19, 1879, id. 261.

"The deplorable condition of Peru, the disorganization of its government, and the absence of precise and trustworthy information as to the state of affairs now existing in that unhappy country, render it impossible to give you instructions as full and definite as I would desire.

"Judging from the most recent dispatches from our ministers, you will probably find on the part of the Chilean authorities in possession of Peru a willingness to facilitate the establishment of the provisional government which has been attempted by Señor Calderon. If so, you will do all you properly can to encourage the Peruvians to accept any reasonable conditions and limitations with which this concession may be accompanied. It is vitally important to Peru that she be allowed to resume the functions of a native and orderly government, both for the purposes of internal administration and the negotiation of peace. To obtain this end it would be far better to accept conditions which may be hard and unwelcome than by demanding too much to force the continuance of the military control of Chile. It is