Britain would not be pledged, by what Canning had proposed, to war, "so would anything now done by the Executive here leave Congress free hereafter to act or not, according as the circumstances of the emergency may require." On the 25th of November Adams prepared a draft of observations upon the communications lately made by Baron Tuyll. The draft was discussed and amended, and under date of the 27th of November was read to Baron Tuyll. It contained a full exposition of the policy of the United States and concluded with the declaration, "That the United States of America, and their Government, could not see with indifference, the forcible interposition of any European power, other than Spain, either to restore the dominion of Spain over her emancipated colonies in America, or to establish monarchical governments in those countries, or to transfer any of the possessions heretofore or yet subject to Spain in the American hemisphere, to any other European power." See Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, VI. 177, 185, 186, 192, 194, 199, 200, 205, 206. See, also, Mr. Adams, Sec. of State, to Mr. Rush, min. to England, No. 77, As to Adams's reply to Baron Tuyll's note Oct. 16, 1823, see Proceedings V. MONROE'S MESSAGE, DECEMBER 2, 1823. $ 936. "At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through the minister of the Emperor residing here, a full power and instructions have been transmitted to the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg, to arrange, by amicable negotiation, the respective rights and interests of the two nations on the northwest coast of this continent. A similar proposal has been made by his Imperial Majesty to the Government of Great Britain, which has likewise been acceded to. The Government of the United States has been desirous, by this friendly proceeding, of manifesting the great value which they have invariably attached to the friendship of the Emperor, and their solicitude to cultivate the best understanding with his Government. In the discussions to which this H. Doc. 551-vol 6————26 interest has given rise, and in the arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion has been judged proper for asserting as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers. [Paragraph 7, message of December 2, 1823.] "It was stated at the commencement of the last session that a great effort was then making in Spain and Portugal to improve the condition of the people of those countries, and that it appeared to be conducted with extraordinary moderation. It need scarcely be remarked that the result has been, so far, very different from what was then anticipated. Of events in that quarter of the globe with which we have so much intercourse, and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are, of necessity, more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective Governments. And to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between these new governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security. "The late events in Spain and Portugal show that Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced than that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on any principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed, by force, in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such interposition may be carried, on the same principle, is a question in which all independent powers whose governments differ from theirs are interested, even those most remote, and surely none more so than the United States. Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting, in all instances, the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to these continents, circumstanaces are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course." [Paragraphs 48 and 49, inessage of Dec. 2, 1823.] President Monroe's annual message, Dec. 2, 1823, Am. State Papers, For. See President Monroe to Jefferson, Dec. 1823, 15 Proceedings of the Mass. 66 first consideration from the country, directed to Engla. in the first instance, with power, to attend, any congress, that may be conven'd, on the affrs of S. am: or Mexico, might have the happiest effect. You shall hear from me further on this subject." "The logical conclusion seems to be that the conception of the Monroe Doctrine and much of its phraseology came from Adams, and that the share of Monroe did not extend beyond revision." (Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, 87.) CONTE VI. CONTEMPORARY ACTS AND EXPOSITIONS. § 937. "By direction of the President of the United States, you are authorized to proceed to London as soon as possible with the despatches herewith committed to you for the minister of the United States at that place. "After delivering them, you will hold yourself in readiness to proceed, and, under the directions of Mr. Rush, and of Mr. Brown, if he shall arrive in Paris in season to give them, will proceed to any place where a European congress may be held with a view to the consideration of the affairs of Spain and South America. You will thence report to me all such information relating to the proceedings at such congress as you shall deem it may be useful to make known to this Government. You will assume no public character, but take passports as a private citizen of the United States, from the minister of the United States in England or France, as circumstances may require. And you will take all proper precautions for avoiding any appearance or suspicion of your being employed on a public agency. At the conclusion of the meeting of such congress, the occasion for your agency on this service will cease, and you will return to the United States. You will be particularly careful to secure your correspondence from disclosure, either by access to your own papers, or by inspection of it in the process of conveyance." Mr. Adams, Sec. of State, to Mr. Alexander McRae (secret), Dec. 15, 1823, See, also, Mr. Adams, Sec. of State, to Mr. Rush, min. to England, No. 2 January 20, 1824, Mr. Clay introduced in the House the following joint resolution: "That the people of these States would not see, without serious inquietude, any forcible interposition by the Allied Powers of Europe in behalf of Spain, to reduce to their former subjection those parts of the continent of America which have proclaimed and established for themselves, respectively, independent governments, and which have been solemnly recognized by the United States." On May 26 Mr. Clay announced that he "should continue to abstain from pressing upon the attention of the House his resolution, and should allow it to sleep, where it now reposes, on the table." The reason he gave for this decision was that the resolution " proposed an expression of the feelings of Congress in regard to an attack supposed to be meditated by Allied Europe upon the independence of Spanish America; that events since the President's message tended to show that "if such a purpose was ever seriously entertained, it had been relinquished," and that to pass the resolution "in the absence of any sufficient evidence" of such an inimical design might be thought unfriendly, if not offensive." Annals of Congress (1823-24), I. 1104; II. 2763. See Cong. Debates, 19 "The amount of it [Mr. Monroe's declaration] was, that this Government could not look with indifference on any combination among other Powers, to assist Spain in her war against the South American states; that we could not but consider any such combination as dangerous or unfriendly to us; and that, if it should be formed, it would be for the competent authorities of this Government to decide, when the case arose, what course our duty and our interest should require us to pursue." Mr. Webster, Mar. 27, 1826, in House of Rep., Cong. Debates, 19 Cong. 1 sess., II., part 2, p. 1807. "It has sometimes been assumed that the Monroe doctrine contained some declaration against any other than democratic-republican institutions on this continent, however arising or introduced. The message will be searched in vain for anything of the kind. We were the first to recognize the imperial authority of Dom Pedro in Brazil, and of Iturbide in Mexico; and more than half the northern continent was under the scepters of Great Britain and Russia; and these dependencies would certainly be free to adopt what institutions they pleased, in case of successful rebellion, or of peaceful separation from their parent States." (Dana's note, Dana's Wheaton, § 67, note 36.) "It [the Monroe doctrine] has been said, in the course of this debate, to have been a loose and vague declaration. It was, I believe, sufficiently studied. I have understood, from good authority, that it was considered, weighed, and distinctly and decidedly approved, by every one of the President's advisers at that time. Our Government could not adopt on that occasion precisely the course which England had taken. England threatened the immediate recognition of the provinces, if the allies should take part with Spain against them. We had already recognized them. It remained, therefore, only for our Government to say how we should consider a combination of the allied powers, to effect objects in America, as affecting ourselves; and the message was intended to say, what it does say, that we should |