which our friends in this hemisphere engage themselves entirely independent of all control or counsel of the United States. We have no armies for the purpose of aggressive war; no ambition for the character of a regulator. Our Constitution is not an imperial one, and does not allow the Executive Government to engage in war except upon the well considered and deliberate decree of the Congress of the United States. A Federal Government consisting of thirty-six equal States, which are in many respects self-governing, cannot easily be committed by its representatives to foreign wars, either of sympathy or of ambition. If there is any one characteristic of the United States which is more marked than any other, it is that they have from the time of Washington adhered to the principle of nonintervention, and have perseveringly declined to seek or contract entangling alliances, even with the most friendly States." Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Kilpatrick, min. to Chile, No. 9, June 2, 1866, MS. Inst. Chile, XV. 333; Dip. Cor. 1866, part 2, p. 413. 6. COLOMBIA. § 949. See, as to the Isthmus of Panama, and the treaty of 1846, supra, Chap. XI. "Mr. Salazar, the minister from Columbia [sic], stated lately, by order of his govt., that a French agent was expected at Bogota, having already arrived at the port, with power to treat with his govt. respecting its independence. He observed that his govt. had been advised, from an authentic source, that the govt. of France would acknowledge its independence on one condition, the establishment of monarchy, and leave the person to be placed in that station to the people of Colombia; that Bolivar would not be objected to if preferred by them. He asked, should the proposition be rejected and France become hostile in consequence, what part the U. States would take in that event? What aid might they expect from us? The subject will of course be weighed thoroughly in giving the answer. The Executive has no right to compromit the nation in any question of war, nor ought we to presume that the people of Columbia will hesitate as to the answer to be given to any proposition which touches so vitally their liberties." President Monroe to Mr. Madison, Aug. 2, 1824, 7 Writings of Monroe, 30, 31. 66 It was hoped that the attempt to bring about a more harmonious condition of things" between Colombia and Spain, and one better calculated to inure in benefits to the Spanish-American state in its intercourse with its former parent country," would be successful. (Mr. Evarts, Sec. of State, to Mr. Dichman, min. to Colombia, No. 30, Feb. 18, 1879, MS. Inst. Colombia, XVII. 76.) 7. CUBA. (1) DECLARATIONS OF POLICY. $ 950. “Of all the European powers, this country prefers that Cuba and Porto Rico should remain dependent on Spain. If the war should continue between Spain and the new republics, and those islands should become the object and the theater of it, their fortunes have such a connection with the prosperity of the United States that they could not be indifferent spectators; and the possible contingencies of such a protracted war might bring upon the Government of the United States duties and obligations, the performance of which, however painful it should be, they might not be at liberty to decline." Mr. Clay, Sec. of State, to Mr. Everett, min. to Spain, No. 1, April 27, 1825, MS. Inst. U. States Ministers, X. 297. 66 The United States I could not consent to the occupation" of Cuba and On December 20, 1825, Mr. Clay addressed a note to the ministers of Colombia and Mexico, requesting them to prevail upon their respective governments to suspend any expedition which both or either of them might be fitting out against the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico until the sense of the Congress of Panama might be known on the subject. The President considered that such suspension might have a favorable effect upon the cause of peace, and it was also recommended by other considerations. The Colombian Government promised a substantial compliance with this request, and a copy of its reply was communicated to the Russian Government with view to incite that Government to new efforts to bring about peace between Spain and her colonies. The Mexican Government appears to have received the request of the United States unfavorably. Mr. Clay, Sec. of State, to Mr. A. H. Everett, min. to Spain, April 13, 1826, See, also, Mr. Clay to Mr. Middleton, Dec. 26, 1825, Am. State Papers, "The Government of the United States has always looked with the deepest interest upon the fate of those islands, but particularly of Cuba. Its geographical position, which places it almost in sight of our southern shores, and, as it were, gives it the command of the Gulf of Mexico and the West India seas; its safe and capacious harbours; its rich productions, the exchange of which, for our surplus agricultural products and manufactures, constitutes one of the most extensive and valuable branches of our foreign trade, render it of the utmost importance to the United States that no change should take place in its condition which might injuriously affect our political and commercial standing in that quarter. Other considerations, connected with a certain class of our population, make it the interest of the southern section of the Union that no attempt should be made in that island to throw off the yoke of Spanish dependence, the first effect of which would be the sudden emancipation of a numerous slave population, the result of which could not but be very sensibly felt upon the adjacent shores of the United States. "On the other hand, the wisdom which induced the Spanish Government to relax in its colonial system, and to adopt with regard to those islands a more liberal policy, which opened their ports to general commerce, has been so far satisfactory in the view of the United States, as, in addition to other considerations, to induce this Government to desire that their possession should not be transferred from the Spanish Crown to any other power." Mr. Van Buren, Sec. of State, to Mr. Van Ness, min. to Spain, No. 2, Oct. 2, 1829; MS. Inst. U. States Ministers, XIII. 19; 26 Br. & For. State Papers, 1149. See publications in 26 Br. & For. State Papers (1837-38), 1124–1159, including: Mr. Forsyth (Madrid) to Mr. Adams (Sec.), Nov. 20, 1822; Mr. Forsyth (Madrid) to Mr. Adams (Sec.), Dec. 13, 1822; Mr. Adams to Mr. Forsyth, Dec. 17, 1822; Mr. Forsyth to Mr. Adams, Feb. 10, 1823; Mr. Adams to Mr. Nelson, Apr. 28, 1823 (suggesting purchase of Cuba); Mr. Appleton (Cadiz) to Mr. Adams, July 10, 1823; Mr. Nelson to Mr. Clay (Sec.), July 10, 1825; Mr. Clay to Mr. Everett, Apr. 27, 1825; Mr. Nelson to Mr. Bermudez, June 22, 1825; Mr. Bermudez to Mr. Nelson, July 12, 1825 (stating that Spain would not part with Cuba); Mr. Everett to Mr. Clay, Sept. 25, 1825; Mr. Everett to Mr. Clay, Aug. 17, 1827; the Spanish minister at London to the minister of state, June 1, 1827; Mr. Everett to Mr. Clay, Dec. 12, 1827; confidential memorandum of Mr. Everett for the Spanish secretary of state, Dec. 10, 1827, stating, among other things, that the Government of "His Catholic Majesty can not of course be ignorant, of the movements commenced a few months ago by the British Ministry, in conjunction with the Spanish refugees in London, and now in a course of execution, for the purpose of revolutionizing the Island of Cuba and the Canaries," saying that the United States would not consent to Cuba passing to any third power, and complaining of discrimination against the United States; Mr. Van Ness (Mad rid) to Mr. Forsyth (Sec.), Aug. 10, 1836, speaking of rumors of disquiet in Cuba; Mr. Van Ness to Mr. Forsyth, Dec. 10, 1836, as to the effect of Sqanish political changes on Cuba; Mr. Stevenson (London) to Mr. Forsyth, June 16, 1839, as to conversation with Lord Palmerston, Mr. S. protesting against foreign interference in Cuba; Mr. Eaton (Madrid) to Mr. Forsyth, Aug. 10, 1837, stating that Mr. Villiers, British minister in Spain, disclaimed the idea of Great Britain taking Cuba. "This Government has been given to understand that if Spain should persevere in the assertion of a hopeless claim to dominion over her former colonies, they will feel it to be their duty as well as their interest to attack her colonial possessions in our vicinity-Cuba and Porto Rico. Your general instructions are full upon the subject of the interest which the United States take in the fate of those islands, and particularly of the latter [former]. They inform you that we are content that Cuba should remain as it now is, but could not consent to its transfer to any European power. Motives of reasonable state policy render it more desirable to us that it should remain subject to Spain rather than to either of the South American States. Those motives will readily present themselves to your mind. They are principally founded upon an apprehension that, if possessed by the latter, it would, in the present state of things, be in greater danger of becoming subject to some European power than in its present condition. Although such are our own wishes and true interests, the President does not see on what ground he would be justified in interfering with any attempts which the South American States might think it for their interest, in the prosecution of a defensive war, to make upon the islands in question. If indeed an attempt should be made to disturb them by putting arms in the hands of one portion of their population to destroy another, and which, in its influence, would endanger the peace of a portion of the United States, the case might be different. Against such an attempt the United States (being informed that it was in contemplation) have already protested, and warmly remonstrated in their communications, last summer, with the Government of Mexico. But the information lately communicated to us, in this regard, was accompanied by a solemn assurance that no such measures will, in any event, be resorted to, and that the contest, if forced upon them, will be carried on, on their part, with strict reference to the established rules of civilized warfare." Mr. Van Buren, Sec. of State, to Mr. Van Ness, min. to Spain, Oct. 13, 1830, MS. Inst. U. States Ministers, XIII. 184; 26 Br. & For. State Papers, 1152. H. Doc. 551—vol 6– -29 "Should you have reason to suspect any design on the part of Spain to transfer voluntarily her title to the island [Cuba], whether of ownership or possession, and whether permanent or temporary, to Great Britain, or any other power, you will distinctly state that the United States will prevent it, at all hazards, as they will any foreign military occupation for any pretext whatsoever; and you are authorized to assure the Spanish Government that in case of any attempt, from whatever quarter, to wrest from her this portion of her territory, she may securely depend upon the military and naval resources of the United States to aid her in preserving or recovering it." Mr. Forsyth, Sec. of State, to Mr. Vail, min. to Spain, No. 2, July 15, To the same effect, Mr. Upshur, Sec. of State, to Mr. Irving, min to Spain, Early in 1843 a special messenger was sent to Havana to deliver in person to Mr. Campbell, the United States consul, a letter from a person of high standing in Cuba in relation to conditions there. The name of the writer of the letter was not disclosed, and he maintained an air of great secrecy, representing that he was in honor bound not to reveal to the local authorities in Cuba what he had made known to his correspondent in the United States. He declared that the situation in Cuba was dangerous and critical, and that the authorities of the island were incompetent to meet the crisis; that, in spite of the treaty of 1817 between Great Britain and Spain, the slave trade had been carried on in full vigor up to 1841; and that the British ministry and abolition societies, finding themselves foiled or eluded by the Spanish authorities, had resolved upon the total and immediate ruin of the island, and were through their agents offering independence to the creoles on condition that they would unite with the colored people in effecting a general emancipation of the slaves and in converting the government into a black military republic under British protection. With 600,000 blacks in Cuba and 800,000 in her own West India islands, Great Britain, it was said, would strike a death blow at the existence of slavery in the United States, and, intrenched at Havana and San Antonio, would be able to close the two entrances to the Gulf of Mexico and even to prevent free passage of the commerce of the United States over the Bahama bank and through the Florida channel. Upon the strength of the last census in Cuba, the writer of the letter inferred that the white creoles would be able to preserve their rights in the future Ethiopico-Cuban republic, and that the Spaniards would leave the island at once; but he expressed the opinion that the mass of the white population in Cuba in easy circumstances, including Spaniards, would always prefer the flag of the United States to that of England. In commu |