"You are instructed, therefore, in case you should be asked to employ your good offices either singly or in conjunction with the representatives of other powers, to give your assistance in promoting the work of reconciliation.

"But as it is more probable, especially after a recent letter of Mr. Seward, that foreign advice is not likely to be accepted, you will refrain from offering it unasked. Such being the case, and supposing the contest not to be at once ended by signal success on one side or by the return of friendly feeling between the two contending parties, her Majesty's government have to consider what will be the position of Great Britain as a neutral between the two belligerents.

"So far as the position of Great Britain in this respect toward the European powers is concerned, that position has been greatly modified by the Declaration of Paris of April 16, 1856."

Earl Russell, British for. sec., to Lord Lyons, British min. at Washington,
May 18, 1861, 55 Brit. & For. State Papers, 550; Dip. Cor. 1861, 131.

"The steadfast determination of the [British] government neither to say nor do anything which could reasonably be construed into an interference [in the civil war in the United States] was tested in November, 1862, when it was proposed by the Emperor of the French that the courts of France, Russia, and Great Britain should tender their good offices to both belligerents, in the hope of preparing the way for an accommodation. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in addressing himself to the British government, dwelt on the innumerable calamities and immense bloodshed' which attended the war, and on the evils which it inflicted upon Europe. The two contending parties, he said, had up to that time fought with balanced success, and there appeared to be no probability that the strife would soon terminate. He proposed, therefore, that the three courts should join in recommending an armistice for six months, during which means might be discovered for effecting a lasting pacification. The British government declined to take part in such a recommendation, being satisfied that there was no reasonable prospect of its being entertained by that of the United States."

Bernard, The Neutrality of Great Britain during the American Civil War, 467-468.

The proposal was also rejected by Russia, unless it should be found to be acceptable to both parties. (Dip. Cor. 1863, II. 765, 768.)

"As soon as the news of the second battle of Bull Run reached England, Palmerston sent a note to Russell in which he spoke precisely but unsympathetically of the result as a very complete smashing of the Federals. He also suggested that, in case Baltimore or Washington should fall into the hands of the Confederates,

it would be time for Great Britain and France to address the contending parties and recommend an arrangement upon the basis of separation. Russell expressed the opinion that what was known. already would warrant‘offering mediation to the United States, with a view to the recognition of the independence of the Confederates.' October 30, 1862, he [Louis Napoleon] instructed the French ambassadors to Great Britain and to Russia to invite those powers to join France in requesting the belligerents to agree to an armistice of six months, so as to consider some plan for bringing the war to an end.. . Great Britain promptly and unqualifiedly declined

the proposition.
The complete change of mind on the part
of Palmerston and Russell was probably due to three facts, which
they had not anticipated: The smashing' of the Federals at Bull
Run did not demoralize the Washington Government or lead to
other results that were expected; the Confederates had lost in Mary-
land the prestige they had won in Virginia; and the preliminary
proclamation of emancipation showed that the war was to become
positively antislavery. . Russia's reply to Napoleon was also
discouraging. She was unwilling to adopt the proposed course be-
cause she believed that it would not lead to peaceful results; yet if
France and Great Britain should agree to act together on this ques-
tion, Russia's reprsentative at Washington would be instructed to
lend to his colleagues, if not his official aid, at least moral support.""

Bancroft, Life of Seward, II. 304, 307, 308, citing 2 Walpole's Russell,
349; Dip. Cor. 1862, 405; Dip. Cor. 1863, I. 3.
"Your private letter of October 7th has been received. There was no
mystery in the Department's reply to Prince Gortschakoff. His ad-
mirable letter was throughout responsive to our own past communi-
cations through Mr. Clay to Russia. We are not prepared to accept
counsels of mediation with the rebels, although they were gener-
ously offered. We could not, without rudeness, distinctly decline
them. We were grateful for the generosity of the Czar, so strik-
ingly in contrast with that of some other potentates, and at the same
time thought it proper to avoid any seeming excitement resulting from
it. The occasion was a proper one for showing that, as we are not
provoked by European hostility, we are not unnaturally flattered by
European friendship." (Mr. F. W. Seward, Acting Sec. of State, to
Mr. Harvey, No. 16 (private), Nov. 5, 1861, MS. Inst. Portugal,
XIV. 219.)

"There are speculations in the European press of propositions by some of
the southern European powers to the states of northern Europe,
for their concurrence in representations to be made to us, with a
view to produce a deflexion from the policy of maintaining the
union, which has been hitherto so constantly pursued. While we at-
tach no credit to these rumors, the President nevertheless expects
that you will be watchful of any such designs. There is only one
road to peace in this country, and that is the one which the gov
ernment has adopted under the inspiration of the will of the na-

tion." (Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Cameron, min. to Russia, No. 6, June 23, 1862, MS. Inst. Russia, XIV. 264.) "The explanations of the views of the Russian government made to you by Prince Gortchacow, and his assurances of its fidelity and constancy towards the United States are deeply interesting and eminently gratifying. . . . Naturally the first thought which, in a time of apparent danger to our country, occurs to a foreign friend is the desirableness of an adjustment or arrangement of the strife. This suggestion is enforced by a contemplation of the calamities and sufferings which are wrought upon the battlefield. The generous mind, glowing with friendly zeal, refuses to admit the fact, however obvious, that composition of such troubles is impossible. This has been the case, especially with the excellent Russian minister plenipotentiary here. He has for some time pressed upon us the same sentiments which were expressed to you by Prince Gortchacow. Mr. Adams has informed us that Baron Brunnow, at London, has equally urged them, though with great delicacy, upon him. The Russian government need not doubt for a moment that the President will hail the first moment when any proposition of peace can be made which will arrest the strife without a sacrifice of the nation's Constitution and life. That period can not now be far off." (Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Taylor, chargé at St. Petersburg, No. 5, Nov. 22, 1862, MS. Inst. Russia, XIV. 297.)

Dec. 14, 1862, Mr. Seward enclosed to Mr. Taylor, for the latter's information, a copy of his No. 263, of Dec. 13, 1862, relative to the proposal of the French Emperor to Great Britain to unite in recommending an armstice. (Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Taylor, chargé at St. Petersburg, No. 8, Dec. 14, 1862, MS. Inst. Russia, XIV. 301.)

With reference to "the report of an intended new design" on the part of the French Emperor "to propose mediation in our civil war," Mr. Seward wrote: "Any such proceeding would meet with a prompt and decided answer from the United States. The principle of foreign mediation in our affairs can not be, in any form or under any circumstances, admitted. You will make this explanation, or refrain from making it, in the exercise of your own discretion." (Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Dayton, min. to France, No. 621, July 30, 1864, Dip. Cor. 1864, III. 134–135.)

A copy of the foregoing instruction was sent to Mr. Adams, at London. (Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Adams, min. to England. No. 1058, Aug. 1, 1864, MS. Inst. Gr. Br. XIX. 411.)

"I leave the French proposal to take its place among the incidents already past of the lamentable civil war of which we again think we are beginning to see an approaching end."

Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Adams, min. to England, No. 414, Nov. 30, 1862, Dip. Cor. 1863, I. 2.

See circular of Mr. Seward to the diplomatic officers of the United States, No. 20, Aug. 18, 1862, giving the views of the President as to any possible attempt at intervention or mediation by European powers in the American civil war. (Dip. Cor. 1862, 176.)

In a circular to the diplomatic officers of the United States, March 9, 1863, Mr. Seward transmitted a copy of concurrent resolutions of Congress concerning intervention in the civil war. These resolutions recited that it appeared from the diplomatic correspondence submitted to Congress that a proposition, friendly in form, looking to pacification through foreign mediation, had been made to the United States by the Emperor of the French and promptly declined by the President, and that, as the idea of mediation or intervention in some shape might be regarded by foreign governments as practicable, and as such governments might thus be led to proceedings tending to embarrass the friendly relations existing between them and the United States, it seemed fit, in order to remove all chance of misunderstanding on the subject and to secure for the United States the full enjoyment of that freedom from foreign interference which was one of the highest rights of independent states, for Congress to declare its convictions on the subject. The resolutions concluded by announcing it as the "unalterable purpose" of the United States that the war would be "vigorously prosecuted, according to the humane principles of Christian states, until the rebellion shall be overcome."

Dip. Cor. 1863, II. 812-814.

As to rumors of intervention on the part of France, see Dip. Cor. 1862, 173 et seq.

The French minister of foreign affairs declared that no thought of intervention was entertained. (Dip. Cor. 1862, 404.)

"Your despatch of August 20th has been submitted to the President. I give you herewith extracts from Mr. Dayton's latest communication treating of French proposals for British intervention in our affairs, and of the condition of Mexico. We are quite sure that the French government can not practice insincerity in its official communications with us. You will perceive, therefore, that what your informant in Scotland told you in regard to the Emperor is erroneous. You have confirmed the expectations which we had entertained concerning the opinion of Great Britain in regard to the proceedings of the Emperor in relation to Russia, and in relation to Mexico. What seems difficult to understand here, however, is that Great Britain gives no indications of concurrence in these opinions, and that the press of the country seems to become more intolerant of the United States the more clearly the failure of the intervention is revealed." (Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Adams, min. to England. No. 700, Sept. 5, 1863, MS. Inst. Great Britain, XIX. 5.)

"The correspondence which took place between this government and that of Her Majesty at an early stage of the insurrection shows that the United States deemed the formation of a mutual engagement by Great Britain with France, that those two powers would act in concert with regard to the said insurrection to be an unfriendly proceeding, and that the United States, therefore, declined to receive from

either of those powers any communication which avowed the existence of such an arrangement. I have, therefore, now to regret that Earl Russell has thought it necessary to inform this government that Her Majesty's government have found it expedient to consult with the government of France upon the question whether Her Majesty's government will now recognize the restoration of peace in the United States.

"It is a further source of regret that Her Majesty's government avow that they will continue still to require that any United States cruisers which shall hereafter be lying within a British port, harbor, or waters, shall be detained twenty-four hours, so as to afford an opportunity for any insurgent vessel, she actually being within the said port, harbor, or waters, to gain the advantage of the same time for her departure from the same port, harbor, or waters."

Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Sir F. Bruce, Brit. min., June 19, 1865, Dip.
Cor. 1865, I. 407, 408.

"The fact that the national attachment of this country to France is so pure, and so elevated, constitutes just the reason why it could be more easily supplanted by national insult or injustice than our attachment to any other foreign state could be. It is a chivalrous sentiment, and it must be preserved by chivalrous conduct and bearing on both sides. I deduce from the two positions which I have presented a conclusion which has the most solemn interest for both parties, namely, that any attempt at dictation-much more any aggression committed by the govenment of France against the United States-would more certainly and effectively rouse the American people to an attitude of determined resistance than a similar affront or injury committed by any other power. There is reason to believe that interested sympathizers with the insurrection in this country have reported to the French government that it would find a party here disposed to accept. its mediation or intervention. I understand that they reckon upon a supposed sympathy between our Democratic citizens and the French government. It may as well be understood as soon as possible that we have no Democrats who do not cherish the independence of our country as the first element of Democratic faith, while, on the other hand, it is partiality for France that makes us willingly shut our eyes to the fact that that great nation is only advancing towards, instead of having reached, the democratic condition which attracts us in some other countries."

Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Dayton, min. to France, No. 278, Dec.
29, 1862, Dip. Cor. 1863, I. 639, 640-641.

See Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Adams, min. to England, No. 771,
Nov. 30, 1863, Dip. Cor. 1863, II. 1321.