See other discussions of arrests in Cuba, as follows: Eugene S. Pelletier, For. Rel. 1896, 631, 633; Glean brothers, id. 632, 634, 640, 641, 650; George Calvar and Peter Duarte, id. 633, 634; Bert S. Skiller, id. 637, 638, 647; Francis J. Larrieu, id. 639, 641; Samuel T. Tolon, id. 641–645, 647, 652-655; Suarez del Villar, id. 645–647, 649, 662; For. Rel. 1897, 483; Manuel Fernandez Chaqueilo, For. Rel. 1896, 645, 648, 649; Oscar Cespedes, id. 662-670; Adolphus Torres, Charles Scott, Jorge W. Aguirre, José L. Cepero, and Luis Someillau, For. Rel. 1897, 483-487. Toward the end of April, 1896, the American schooner Competitor was captured by the Spanish authorities while landing arms and ammunition for the insurgents near San Cayetano, in Cuba. Several persons were taken on board, and in behalf of some of them a right to the protection of the United States was asserted. In behalf of these the consul-general of the United States at Havana claimed a trial under art. 7 of the treaty of 1795 and the protocol of 1877. The Spanish authorities denied the claim, and alleged that they were not entitled to the benefits of the protocol because they were not "residing" in Spanish territory; and they were tried and sentenced by a summary court-martial. On appeal this sentence was annulled, and the case was then proceeded with by an ordinary court-martial, with the rights of counsel and defense guaranteed by the treaty of 1795, the proceeding being in the nature of a preliminary examination. The consulate-general, in reporting this proceeding, observed that the United States, in the case of Sanguily, "declined to recognize the validity of the military jurisdiction in preliminary or at any stage of the proceedings." The Department of State, however, replied that it was not believed that a protest "at this preliminary stage of proceedings" could "be of any avail," and directed that the proceedings be watched and that the "conclusions" of the "preliminary inquest" be reported as soon as they were reached. For. Rel. 1896, 744, 745; S. Doc. 79, 54 Cong. 2 sess. VII. EXPULSION. § 1018. The subject of expulsion is fully discussed elsewhere. See supra, $$ 550-559. For claims on account of expulsion decided by mixed commissions, see For the settlement by Great Britain of claims for deportation from South VIII. ACTS OF PRIVATE PERSONS. 1. GOVERNMENTS, AS A RULE, NOT LIABLE. § 1019. "The act of the subject can never be the act of the sovereign; unless the subject has been commissioned by the sovereign to do it." Case of the Resolution, Federal Court of Appeals, 1781, 2 Dallas, 1. "By the law of nations, if the citizens of one state do an injury to the citizens of another, the government of the offending subject ought to take every reasonable measure to cause reparation to be made by the offended. But if the offender is subject to the ordinary processes of law, it is believed this principle does not generally extend to oblige the government to make satisfaction in case of the inability of the offender." Lincoln, At. Gen., 1802, 1 Op. 106, 107. An alleged Danish vessel was seized by an American vessel as French property, on the south side of the island of St. Domingo, and, whilst awaiting examination, under the American flag, was seized by a British ship and taken to Jamaica and there condemned. It was ruled that as the first captors were not liable for capturing and detaining the vessel long enough for examination, nor for the second capture, and as the Government of the United States is not liable even for the unlawful captures of its subjects, the United States were not bound to indemnify the Danish owner. Lincoln, At. Gen., 1802, 1 Op. 106. The Government of the United States is not liable to foreign governments for misconduct of its private citizens within their jurisdiction, such citizens not being in any sense its representatives. Mr. Forsyth, Sec. of State, to Mr. Calderon de la Barea, Sept. 17, 1839, Governments do not undertake to reimburse persons for the criminal acts January 30, 1875, Mr. Mariscal, Mexican minister at Washington, in a note to Mr. Fish, who was then Secretary of Case of Mexican State, made representations concerning the lynchshepherds. ing (by hanging) of seven Mexican shepherds on November 28, 1873, on a ranch owned by a Mexican near Nueces, Texas. No coroner's inquest, said Mr. Mariscal, was held until the 5th of December, the delay being due, as was alleged, to an Indian invasion; no blame was by the inquest fixed upon anyone, and, although the crime had evidently been committed by many persons and must have left many vestiges, it had been said that there was no means of discovering the murderers. It was alleged by Mr. Mariscal that landowners and other residents of Texas were in various places organized for the purpose of killing shepherds, who were accused of stealing and skinning cattle in order to sell their hides, and that the victims of this system were usually Mexicans, who were made the scapegoats of the criminals. The Mexican consuls at Brownsville and San Antonio had earnestly solicited the proper officers of justice in Texas to investigate and punish the killing of the shepherds in question, but nothing serious in that direction seemed to have been done; and it was, said Mr. Mariscal, suggested that the authorities were for one reason or another indisposed to take such action. In reply to a letter of the Mexican consul at San Antonio, Governor Coke, of Texas, stated that it was a matter of regret that lawlessness prevailed to a great extent in the western and border counties, and that in some degree it could not be reached by the regular authorities, but that "this state of things results necessarily, in a measure, from our form of government." While this was, said Governor Coke, no excuse or justification for the murderers, who ought to be punished, and so far as the executive could bring it about would be dealt with by law, he suggested that Mexican stockmen might avoid these "inflictions" by remaining on the Mexican side of the Rio Grande, or, if they came into Texas, by scrupulously respecting rights of property, which he was informed they had not always done. He added that he would call the attention of the proper officers of the law to the matter, with a view to the prosecution of the offenders if the law had been violated. Mr. Mariscal maintained that these declarations of the executive of Texas revealed not only the powerlessness of the authorities of that State, but also the prejudice which existed against Mexican herdsmen; and he declared that, although efforts had been made to secure the enforcement of the law, nothing of the kind had been obtained. Replying to these representations, Mr. Fish, on February 19, 1875, took the ground that a government is not "answerable in pecuniary damages for the murder of individuals by other individuals within its jurisdiction." It was, said Mr. Fish, undoubtedly the duty of a government to prosecute such offenders according to law by all the means in its power; but if this duty was honestly and diligently fulfilled, the obligations of the government were discharged. "Though the crime," said Mr. Fish, "by which the Mexican shepherds are alleged to have lost their lives may not be without precedent, it seems obviously unreasonable, in view of the peculiar condition of the quarter where it was perpetrated, to expect that it would certainly be punished. This seems especially true when it is taken into consid eration that, under the system of law which pervades this country, no person can be arrested upon suspicion of having committed a crime, except upon the affidavit of a credible witness. The affidavit referred to must specify the name of the accused party. It is not alleged in your note that the course adverted to was pursued in this Mexicans in Texas and Americans in Mexico who engage in business near the border must not at present, or perhaps for some time to come, expect either government to insure them against all the risks inseparable from such enterprises." case. Mr. Mariscal, March 9, 1875, stated that he concurred in the principle that a government was not answerable in pecuniary damages for the murder of individuals by other individuals within its jurisdiction, but that the ground on which he alleged liability in the present case was "the denial of justice, or rather the absolute lack of its administration." The authorities, as he maintained, had been altogether negligent; nothing had been done even to save appearances. Although the families of the murdered men, who resided in a foreign country, had made no sworn complaint, it was the duty of the authorities to investigate a fact so well known as that of the murder of the shepherds in question, which had been published and commented upon by the newspapers; but weeks and months had passed but nothing was done. In reply, on April 6, 1875, Mr. Fish said: “ Murder, in this country, can only be prosecuted upon information, under oath, as to the fact and as to the perpetrators. This Department is not aware that there has been any such information in this case. Had there been, and had the proper authorities then refused or neglected to prosecute the offenders, there would have been ground for the charge that there had been a denial of justice. At present there has been no such denial, as there has been no application in that shape only in which it can legally be entertained." Mr. Mariscal, in a note of the 17th of April, declared that he was unable to subscribe to this conclusion, in view of the fact that there had been an absolute neglect on the part of the authorities to examine into the case. Mr. Mariscal observed that if the public authorities were under no obligation to take measures for the detention of a murderer, crime would often go unpunished, especially in the case of a foreigner, who would leave no relatives or friends behind willing to undertake the task of furnishing evidence in regard to the crime; and that the difficulty would be greatly increased in a country in which a prejudice prevailed against a certain class of foreigners, such as had been manifested in Texas against Mexicans. The case was revived by Mr. Romero, Mexican minister at Washington, in a note of July 17, 1888, in response to which Mr. Bayard, on the 13th of August, declared that the position taken by the Depart ment of State in 1875, as defined in Mr. Fish's notes, was still believed to be sound in international law. Mr. Mariscal, Mexican min., to Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, Jan. 30, 1875, For. Rel. 1875, II. 954; Mr. Fish to Mr. Mariscal, Feb. 19, 1875, id. 973; Mr. Mariscal to Mr. Fish, March 9, 1875, id. 978; Mr. Fish to Mr. Mariscal, March 18, 1875, id. 980; Mr. Mariscal to Mr. Fish, March 29, 1875, id. 981; Mr. Fish to Mr. Mariscal, April 6, 1875, id. 982; Mr. Mariscal to Mr. Fish, April 17, 1875, ibid; Mr. Romero, Mexican min., to Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, July 19, 1888, For. Rel. 1888, II. 1306; Mr. Bayard to Mr. Romero, Aug. 13, 1888, id. 1308. As to the case of the lynching of José Ordiña, a Mexican citizen, by certain residents of Arizona, who sought to obtain information from him concerning stolen animals and who "by mistake let him hang too long," see Mr. Blaine, Sec. of State, to Mr. Zamacona, Mexican min., Nov. 15, 1881, For. Rel. 1882, 407. Lamar's Case. José D. Lamar was naturalized in the United States in 1881, and in the same year went to Santo Domingo, where he became, in partnership with his mother, the owner of a sugar plantation. In 1886 he shot and killed a Dominican negro named Rosario, with whom he had had an altercation and who had attacked him with a knife. Lamar immediately gave himself up to the local authorities, who took him into custody and set out for Sabana Grande, the chief town of the district, which was four miles distant. On their way they were twice attacked by bands of Rosario's relatives, who were, however, beaten off. After a detention of forty-eight hours at Sabana Grande, Lamar was taken under escort to Santo Domingo city, it being apprehended that his life was in danger in the former place. He complained that on his way to Santo Domingo city his arms were pinioned, and that when he reached the capital he was humiliated by being taken through the public streets. He also complained of the condition of the cell in which he was confined. He afterwards sought to make a claim. against the Government of the Dominican Republic for $100,000 in gold for (1) imprisonment for fifty-eight days, (2) losses for interruption of work on his plantations and depredations thereon, and (3) losses on account of being obliged to sell his estate and take up another line of business. The Department of State held that the only plausible grounds on which a claim could be based were (1) unjustifiable maltreatment by the officers of the Government, and (2) the refusal or neglect of the Dominican authorities to protect him in the enjoyment of his estate after his release. It was held that the case would not admit of the first of these contentions. The circumstances, said the Department of State, far from showing enmity and a disposition to persecute, indicated great solicitude and exertion on the part of the Dominican authorities to protect their prisoner from the vengeance of Rosario's friends. There appeared to be noth |