the other Government, that may have arisen since the beginning of the late insurrection in Cuba and prior to the exchange of ratifications of the present treaty, including all claims for indemnity for the cost of the war," the United States on its part engaging to "adjudicate and settle the claims of its citizens against Spain relinquished in this article." By the act of March 2, 1901, Congress provided for the appointment of five commissioners, who were to "adjudicate said claims. according to the merits of the several cases, the principles of equity and of international law." In the discussions before the commission, certain treaty stipulations were constantly invoked. By Art. VI. of the treaty between the United States and Spain, of 1795, it was stipulated that each party should "endeavor, by all means in their power, to protect and defend all vessels and other effects belonging to the citizens or subjects of the other, which shall be within the extent of their jurisdiction by sea or by land, and shall use all their efforts to recover, and cause to be restored to the right owners, their vessels and effects which may have been taken from them within the extent of their said jurisdiction, whether they are at war or not with the Power whose subjects have taken possession of the said effects." By Art. VII. of the same treaty it was "agreed that the subjects or citizens of each of the contracting parties, their vessels or effects, shall not be liable to any embargo or detention on the part of the other, for any military expedition or other public or private purpose whatever." In addition to these there was the protocol of 1877, in relation to judicial procedure. The Commission announced, after hearing argument, the following general conclusions: "1. Under Article VII. of the treaty of Paris the United States assumed the payment of all claims of her own citizens for which Spain would have been liable according to the principles of international law. It follows, therefore, that the sole question before this Commission is that of the primary liability of Spain, which is not in any way enlarged by the agreement of the United States to adjudicate and pay such claims. "2. Although the late insurrection in Cuba assumed great magnitude and lasted for more than three years, yet belligerent rights were never granted to the insurgents by Spain or the United States so as to create a state of war in the international sense which exempted the parent government from liability to foreigners for the acts of the insurgents. "3. But where an armed insurrection has gone beyond the control of the parent government, the general rule is that such government is not responsible for damages done to foreigners by the insurgents. If, however, it be alleged and proved in any particular case before this Commission that the Spanish authorities by the exercise of due diligence might have prevented the damages done, Spain will be held liable in that case. "4. This Commission will take judicial notice that the insurrection in Cuba which resulted in intervention by the United States and in war between Spain and the United States passed, from the first, beyond the control of Spain and so continued until such intervention and war took place." Statement of the president of the Spanish Treaty Claims Commission, Mr. William E. Chandler, Nov. 24, 1902, concurred in by Commissioners Diekema and Wood, S. Doc. 25, 58 Cong. 2 sess. Commissioners Maury and Chambers dissented as to paragraphs 1, 2, and 4. (S. Doc. 25, 58 Cong. 2 sess. 10, 12.) The propositions were repeated by the Commission in a statement of April 28, 1903, without change of form, except that the second sentence of proposition 3 was transposed to the foot of proposition 4; and all the propositions were reaffirmed on December 5, 1903. The Venezuelan Government is not liable under international law to pay damages for the acts of unsuccessful revolutionists whom it could not by the exercise of due diligence control. Ralston, umpire, case of Sambiaggio, Italian-Venezuelan Mixed Commis sion, protocol of February 13, 1903, Ralston's Report, 666; case of This ruling was followed by Duffield, umpire, case of Van Dissel & Co., 3. ASSERTIONS OF LIABILITY; GRANTS OF COMPENSATION. § 1046. The mere revolutionary state" of a part of Mexico can not be accepted by the United States as a defense to a claim on Mexico for injuries inflicted on citizens of the United States in Mexico in violation of treaty engagements. Mr. McLane, Sec. of State, to Mr. Butler, min. to Mexico, June 20, 1834, "Unfortunately, many of the nations of this hemisphere are still self- Jackson, annual message, Dec. 7, 1835, Richardson's Messages, For claims for damages for injuries inflicted by insurgents, which have "I have the honor to inform you that by a decree of this government, dated the 27th ultimo, the payment is ordered of the claims for damages caused by the sacking of Callao in November, 1865, by the revolutionary forces of Colonel Prado. The awards have been made by a mixed commission appointed by the diplomatic corps resident in Lima, and the minister for foreign affairs of Peru. "Two citizens of the United States are among the claimants and will be paid directly by this government. No expenses have been incurred by this legation in the prosecution of the claims." Mr. Brent, chargé at Lima, to Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, No. 252, March 14, 1871, MS. Desp. from Peru. In April, 1871, the American steamer Montijo was seized by revolutionists in Colombia. On the 21st of the following June Mr. Fish instructed the American minister at Bogota to apply for reparation in the case. The seizure was, he said, a piratical act for which it was expected that the authors would be held to be judicially accountable, and in this relation he specially referred to Article VIII. of the treaty between the United States and New Granada of December 12, 1846, which provided that vessels belonging to citizens of the contracting parties should not be liable to seizure for any military expeditior or for any other purpose without the allowance of compensation. When such an act, therefore, was committed in the waters of Colombia by unauthorized persons, the obligation of that Government to make amends might, said Mr. Fish, be regarded as unquestionable. The case was subsequently referred to arbitration, and an award was made in favor of the claimants. In the course of his decision the umpire said: "It was, in the opinion of the undersigned, the clear duty of the President of Panama, acting as the constitutional agent of the Government of the Union, to recover the Montijo from the revolutionists and return her to her owner. It is true that he had not the means of doing so, there being at hand no naval or military force of Colombia sufficient for such a purpose; but this absence of power does not remove the obligation." Moore, Int. Arbitrations, II. 1421, 1444; For. Rel. 1871, 230; For. Rel. 1872, 146. In this case an amnesty was granted to the offenders by the President of the State of Panama; but, while this circumstance was much insisted upon in the argument before the arbitrators as a ground of liability, it was not the ground upon which the United States directed that the claim be presented to the Colombian Government. The umpire referred to the amnesty in his decision, but stated that the other ground, as above quoted, was a "stronger reason" for holding Colombia liable. In the case of Messrs. Ulrich and Langstroth, who claimed compensation from Mexico for forced loans exacted from them by insurgents at Monterey, Mr. Fish said: "There is no doubt of the accountability of the Mexican Government pursuant to public law. If a country receives strangers within its limits, it thereby incurs a liability to protect them from violence, not only on the part of its own authorities, but ordinarily also from violence on the part of insurgents. This latter ground of liability may be regarded as continuing at least until the government of a neutral country, whose citizens may be aggrieved in the course of the hostilities, shall recognize the insurgents as entitled to belligerent rights. There was no such recognition by this Government at the time when the claimants adverted to sustained the injuries of which they complain. This, however, though the general rule, is subject to obvious exceptions. Perhaps the rule should not always apply to persons domiciled in a country, and rarely to such as may visit a region notoriously in a state of civil war, or even to such part of a country as may virtually be dominated by savage tribes. The rule of the law of nations is that the government which refuses to repair the damage committed by its citizens or subjects, to punish the guilty parties, or to give them up for that purpose, may be regarded as virtually a sharer in the injury and as responsible therefor." Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Foster, min. to Mexico, No. 21, Aug. 15, 1873, MS. Inst. Mexico, XIX. 18. Mr. Fish added that it was not, however, necessary to rely on public law only for reparation in the case, since it might, as he argued, be claimed under articles 8 and 14 of the treaty of 1831. (Ibid.) "Your despatch No. 72, of the 23d ultimo, has been received. "The elaborate note of Mr. Lafragua to you of the 13th ultimo, which accompanied it, in answer to your application for amends to Messrs. Ulrich and Langstroth, for what are called loans which were forced from them by Mexican insurgent authorities in Nueva Leon, has been read with the attention due to the pains which must have been taken to prepare that paper and with the interest which could not fail to be excited by the elevation of its sentiments and the clearness of its expression. "It has not, however, by its reasoning convinced me that the Mexican Government should be exempt from accountability for those acts. This exemption is claimed, in the first place, because that government did its best towards protecting the inhabitants in the disaffected region generally from the violence of the insurgents, and therefore should be absolved from accountability for any particular acts of theirs against individuals. "If it be allowed that the efforts of that government on the occasion adverted to were exemplary, leaving nothing to be desired, an admission warranted indeed by its ultimate triumph, the assumption that victory exonerated it from any obligations which it had previously incurred in the insurgent region, can not be acquiesced in. "It may, in general, be true that when foreigners take up their abode in a country, they must expect to share the fortune of the other inhabitants and can not expect a preference over them. While, however, a government may construe, according to its pleasure, its obligation to protect its own citizens from injury, foreign governments have a right and it is their duty to judge whether their citizens have received the protection due to them pursuant to public law and treaties. It may be the abstract right of a government to exclude foreigners entirely from its territories. This right, however, has rarely been exercised in modern times. Whenever it is waived, this step imparts to the government, to whom the foreigners may owe their allegiance, the right of seeing that the duty of the other government towards them is fulfilled. An acknowledgment of this right is not, under the circumstances, as Mr. Lafragua seems to suppose, tantamount to making unjust and invidious discriminations in favor of foreigners and against citizens. It can not be acknowledged, as Mr. Lafragua maintains, that diplomatic interference in such cases necessarily annihilates or trenches upon the peculiar functions of the judiciary of a country. In cases of a denial of justice the right of |