"Zanzibar Gazette," April 7th, 1897. (TRANSLATION.) DECREE. DATED 29th OF SHAWAL, 1314. FROM SEYYID HAMOUD BIN MAHOMED BIN SAID TO ALL HIS SUBJECTS. "Whereas it is expedient to make further provision for the good government of Our subjects in the interior of the Islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, We hereby enact as follows: "I. The Island of Zanzibar is divided into the three following districts (Wilayat), which shall supersede all previous existing administrative divisions: "1. The District of Kokotoni, bounded on the North-West and East by the sea, and on the South by a straight line which, starting from a point on the West Coast half a mile to the South of Nnanjale, shall run to a point on the East coast one mile to the North of the village of Pongwi. "2. The District of Mwera, bounded to the North by the Southern boundary of the District of Kokotoni, on the South and West by the sea, and on the East by a line which, starting in a Northerly direction from Sungi Inlet, shall cross the high road from Zanzibar to Chwaka a quarter of a mile to the west of the village of Indijani, and shall run in a straight line to the North till it meets the Southern boundary of the District of Kokotoni. "3. The District of Chwaka, bounded on the North by the Southern boundary of the District of Kokotoni, on the East, South, and South-west by the sea, and on the west by the Eastern boundary of the District of Mwera. "Except where otherwise provided, all adjacent islands and inlets shall be held to belong to the District to whose coast they are in closest proximity. "II. The City of Zanzibar, including Ngambo and the Islands in Zanzibar harbour, is excluded from the jurisdiction of the Wali of Mwera, whose powers shall be exercised within it by Our First Minister. "III. We hereby place over each of the Districts above mentioned an Arab official who shall have the rank of Wali, and direct all Cadis, Akidas, Sheikhs, headmen, and other local authorities within the boundaries of the District assigned to him, to regard him as Our representative, and to exercise any powers now vested in them subject to his supervision and direction. All are to obey his orders. "IV. The Walis shall form and constitute in each of their Districts a District Court of summary jurisdiction to be called the District Court, which shall henceforth be the chief court of the District, but from which an appeal shall always lie to Ourselves or to such Judge or public Authority as We may from time to time see fit to delegate. "V. The powers of the present Walis in Chaki-Chaki and Weti in Our Island of Pemba shall be identical with those of the Walis hereby appointed over the Island of Zanzibar. "VI. The following are appointed hereby Walis : : "For the District of Kokotoni, to reside at Kokotoni, Suleiman bin Hamid. For the District of Mwera, to reside at Mwera Bridge, Serhan bin Nasr. For the District of Chwaka, to reside at Chwaka, Hilal bin Mahomed. "Written by his order by his slave Salim bin Mahomed. "(Sď.) HAMOUD BIN MAHOMED BIN SAID." Proclamation abolishing Slavery in Kismayo, Brava (Merka), and Mogadishu. (TRANSLATION.) "IN THE NAME OF GOD THE MERCIFUL, THE COMPASSIONATE. Seal of "FROM BARGASH BIN SACED:- "To all who may see this of Our friends the inhabitants of Kismayo, Brava (Merka), Mogadishu and its dependencies, be it known, God having brought about the departure of the Egyptians from Our Dominions in Kismayo, that on re-establishing Our Government and Kingdom We have decreed the abolition of Slavery throughout Our Dominions in the Benadir and the District of Kismayo, and We have commanded Our Governors to see that this order is enforced, and that slaves are not permitted to pass through the territory above named. "Written by Zahr with his hand this 17th day of El Haj 1292 (15th January 1876). This is from me written with his own hand. "(Sig.) BARGASH BIN SACED." PROCLAMATION. "Whereas under the Zanzibar Order in Council, 1897, Section 47, Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General has power to make regulations for the peace, order, and good government of British subjects and other persons subject to the said order, it is hereby notified that the Consul-General has, in virtue of the power aforesaid, made the following regulations : "1. Every British subject or British protected person being the occupier of a house in the towns of Chaki-Chaki, Weti, and Jembangone in the Island of Pemba shall maintain a light over the front door of his house from sunset to sunrise. "2. The owner or occupier of every such house shall also keep the street thoroughly clean and free from dirt and refuse of every kind opposite the whole frontage of his house. "3. The police of His Highness the Sultan are charged with the execution of these regulations; and if any British subject or British protected person contravenes either of them, he shall, on conviction before a court of competent jurisdiction, be liable to be punished with a fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with imprisonment which may extend to two months, or both. "4. The said regulations are hereby declared to be 'urgent,' and shall come into operation in Chaki-Chaki, Weti, and Jembangone respectively within seven days after their publication in each of these towns. "(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE, "H.M. Agent and Consul-General." THE STATUS OF ENGLISH TRADING COMPANIES ABROAD. [Contributed by EDWARD MANSON, ESQ.] THE whole world is now become the hunting-ground of English jointstock enterprise; and as its pioneers, bent on exploration and exploitation, push their way into the territories of every British colony and foreign state,—survey mankind, if not in the poetic, in the scientific sense, from China to Peru, the question at once presents itself and presses for solution, What is the status of the English company in these colonies or foreign lands which it invades; what its contracting powers, what its rights and liabilities generally? The question, like most questions of international law, is one not free from difficulty. Little is to be found in English text-books or English law reports bearing upon the subject. It is in America that the principles which govern the extra-territorial status of corporations have for the most part been considered, and this for a very natural reason. As in Greece the intermingling of the varied polities flourishing side by side generated the science of politics, so in America the inter-state trading of corporations has forced the question of their status into a more rapid maturity. The status of an ordinary person, an individual, depends, speaking generally, on the law of the country of his domicile—the law, that is, which he has elected to be governed by, by fixing his permanent residence or home there and this principle is equally applicable to a corporation; for a corporation, whether it is a railway or a club or a municipality or a charity or a trading company, is a legal persona-an artificial persona, invisible and intangible, it is true, but still a persona, with an independent legal existence as real in law as that of an individual. The main difference is in capacity. The capacity of an ordinary person is not limited the capacity of a corporation is limited by the objects for which it is constituted-objects defined by its special Act or charter or memorandum of association, and outside the circumscribed area of which it is smitten with impotency; but for purposes of domicile this distinction may be disregarded. For the purposes of domicile a corporation is just an incorporeal legal persona. What, then, is the domicile of such a corporation? The domicile of its members has clearly nothing to do with the domicile of the corporation. This is a corollary from the above proposition of its independent legal existence as a persona distinct from the individuals who from time to time compose it. We may also predicate this of it, that the domicile must be somewhere within the territories of the sovereign state creating the corporation; but given this limitation of area, there is still considerable difficulty in fixing the domicile of a corporation, and for this reason, that being without a body it cannot be located in any particular spot. It has only an artificial residence or home, not a natural one. It does not dwell, for instance, at a particular place by merely having an agent there (Corbett v. General Steam Navigation Company, 4 H. & N. 482), nor does it necessarily dwell, in the case of a trading company, at its registered office (Calcutta Jute Mills Company v. Nicholson, L. R., I Ex. D. 428); it dwells where its principal business is managed or carried on its administrative business, that is: thus the Great Northern Railway Company's domicile is at King's Cross (its principal office), and not at any other place where it may happen to have a station or works. So the Great Western Railway Company dwells at its principal station at Paddington, that being the place where the directors meet, the secretary resides, general meetings are held, and whence orders emanate (Adams v. Great Western Railway, 6 H. & N. 404). The better opinion, according to Mr. Dicey (Conf. of Laws, 156), seems to be that a corporation has, following the analogy of an individual, one principal domicile at the place where the centre of its affairs is to be found, and that the other places in which it may have subordinate or branch offices correspond, as far as analogy can be carried out at all, to the residence of an individual (Conf. Harding v. Chicago & Alton Railway Company, 80 Mo. 659). Having got thus far, the next question which arises is, What is the power of a corporation to do business in a country other than that in which it is domiciled? It is an elementary proposition that laws have no force beyond the territories of the sovereignty which enacts them. Hence a corporation can have no legal existence outside the territories of the sovereignty which created it. The corporation, being an artificial person, exists only in contemplation of law and by force of the law; and where that law ceases to operate and is no longer obligatory, the corporation can have no existence. It may send agents into other countries to do business, but the corporation itself cannot migrate. If it attempts to do so-to go beyond the jurisdiction of the laws which bind and hold it together-it dissolves into its original elements, and the persons who constitute it become mere individuals (Land It has been held in America that notwithstanding the fiction of law that a corporation dwells only in the state of its creation, and cannot migrate therefrom, yet a corporation formed in one state may be made a domestic corporation of another state in which it has offices and transacts its business (Young v. South Tredegar Iron Company, 85 Tenn. 189). |