prevailing principle of the common (ie., Roman-Dutch) law-namely, the civil law doctrine of læsio enormis, which was held to apply not only to sales, but to all transactions. The doctrine, however, was abolished by s. 8 of Act 8 of 1879. - Ceylon. There appears to be no ordinance of any date dealing with usury and the rate of interest. In default of direct enactment, therefore, the principles of Roman-Dutch law will apply here, as in the Cape of Good Hope, with this exception, that there is no doubt in this case whether usury is or is not a crime, inasmuch as there is a penal code for Ceylon which does not include usury in its list of offences. The South African Republic.-According to a text book of the Transvaal laws, a person who takes excessive interest is guilty of usury and punished according to the circumstances. The only authority quoted in support of this proposition is Van der Linden, whom, in the case of Dyason v. Ruthven, the court in the Cape of Good Hope refused to follow. As in the Cape of Good Hope, the courts would appear to have power to cut down excessive and usurious interest, although there is no maximum rate. IV.—Chile.—This country stands quite by itself. In the absence of express contract, interest is payable at the rate of 6 per cent., but parties are at liberty to fix their own rate. If, however, the agreed interest exceeds by one half the interest current at the time of the contract, the judge is to reduce it to the amount of such interest. Two monographs on usury have been freely used throughout this article -more freely than would have been permissible if the works in question had been accessible to English readers; they are Der Wucher Historisch und Dogmatisch Bearbeitet, by Dr. H. Blodig, Vienna, 1892, and Der Wucher, by Dr. Leopold Caro, Leipsic, 1893. Both contain a wealth of information on this topic, and the second a very full bibliography. Thanks for much information, most kindly supplied, are due from the writer to (amongst others) his friend Professor Grueber of Munich, M. Ernest Lehr of Lausanne, Professor Hagerup of Christiania, and Mr. T. Barclay of Paris. ADOPTION IN INDIA. [Contributed by JOHN D. MAYNE, ESQ.] JUDGMENT OF THE JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL IN THE CASES OF BALUSU GURULINGASWAMI v. BALUSU RAMALAKSHMAMMA, AND RADHA MOHUN v. HARDAI BIBI (MARCH 9TH, 1899). THIS judgment is curious as showing the sort of questions which perplex the minds of people in India, and is also interesting from the glimpses of comparative jurisprudence which it affords. The point for decision was merely whether an only son could be adopted. But this question, simple as it may appear, has been during the whole of the present century the subject of unending discussion and of conflicting decisions in every court of India. The difficulty arose from the fact that the religious law of Brahmanism has been injected into states of society to which its vital principles are foreign. Its practices are in a general way imitated and accepted, but without any belief in the reasonings on which it is founded. Hence variances are continually arising which the authority of the courts is invoked to restrain or to punish. The present is a remarkable instance of the sort. Vasishtha, one of the early sages, who lived certainly before the Christian era, says, "Let no man give or accept an only son, since he must remain to raise up a progeny for the obsequies of his ancestors." This text itselt presupposes and is founded on a whole cycle of Brahmanical beliefs. The happiness of each man after death depends upon his male offspring. A son, by his very birth, rescues him from the Hindu Hell. A son performs the funeral rites of his father, and presents to the manes of his father and that father's male ancestors those recurrent offerings which are necessary for the repose of the dead. He brings into the world other sons to continue the same services. In the absence of a son his place may be completely supplied by an adoption, provided that adoption is carried out with a rigorous obedience to the rules. Hence the paramount importance of strictly adhering to all the precepts laid down for that end. A breach of these may leave the souls of countless ancestors to suffer in torment, while an adopted son, who is himself no more than a sinful nullity, is performing idle and ineffectual rites. If an only son is adopted, is he a real son or only a phantom? This is a question which for the first time came before the Privy Council last year. In Bengal there was never any doubt upon the point. Pundits and judges alike agreed that such an adoption was absolutely and for all purposes invalid. Mr. Justice Dwas Kanath Mitter, himself a Brahman, and one of the greatest native judges who reached the High Court Bench, in two judgments declared with almost passionate earnestness that adoption was primarily and essentially a matter of religion; that although it resulted in civil rights, its first object was to procure religious benefits; that it was founded on, and must be tested by, religious rules. Both the giving and taking of an only son was a sin, and frustrated the purpose for which it was intended. In Madras an intermediate line was taken. Pundits and judges all declared that such an adoption was forbidden, and therefore was most improper, but that if it was once carried out it was effectual. This apparent contradiction was embalmed in the maxim, Quod fieri non debuit, factum valet. As the courts were only consulted in regard to the secular results of an adoption, they offered no opinion as to the results which might follow to the disembodied spirits. The High Court of Allahabad followed the example of Madras. For many years it seemed as if Bombay was taking the same line. Such adoptions were frequently made, and when they were contested in court they were reprobated and condoned. In 1875, however, Sir Michael Westropp, C. J., brought about a change. In a case which did not actually require a decision upon the point he examined all the authorities bearing upon it, and pronounced a very strong opinion that such adoptions were invalid. The next time the case arose for decision he presided over a full bench court, which held the adoption to be invalid, and the decision has of course been followed in all subsequent cases. Finally, in 1898, two appeals to the Privy Council from Madras and Allahabad raised the point directly, and in a single judgment of a most elaborate and exhaustive character the committee held that such adoptions were valid. The factum valet subterfuge was dismissed with little ceremony. Lord Hobhouse pointed out that an act which is distinctly forbidden must be illegal, and that if it is illegal before it is done it cannot become legal by being done. On the other hand, the spheres of morals and of law are different, and moral reprobation does not constitute a legal prohibition. He then discussed the text of Vasishtha, with the result that it was considered to be directory and not mandatory. The rest followed as a matter of course. As a legal curiosity the problem ceases to be interesting when it is solved. But it is still worth asking how the problem ever arose. Why did such a number of people quietly and unhesitatingly do an act which every one agreed was sinful and improper? The obvious answer is, that the people who thought such an act improper did not do it, and those who did it did not think it improper. In Bengal people do not adopt only sons because Brahmanism is a living belief, and the great majority of the class who make adoptions either themselves entertain the same convictions as Mr. Justice Dwas Kanath Mitter or are guided by those who do. Among the Dravidian races of Southern India, Brahmanism as a religion does not exist; the belief in a future state, where happiness can be affected by ceremonies performed on earth, is unknown. The uses of a son begin and end in the upper world. The motives which dictated Vasishtha's prohibition are unintelligible to them. In Bombay, as in Madras and in other large districts of India, adoption is practised for the secular results following from it, and the most essential rules of the Sanskrit writers are disregarded. It is remarkable that the full bench case which decided in Bombay that the adoption of an only son was illegal was given in respect to a family of Singhayets, whose caste sprung from a schism against Brahmanism. When another such case arose in the same caste the legal point was uncontested, but the existence of a usage in the caste to make such adoptions was asserted and proved. Throughout India the Brahmans are a powerful and influential class. Their Hinduism is a respectable and fashionable thing, and is adopted and imitated by the classes who aim at a good position in society. Their secular usages are borrowed, but the beliefs which give vitality to the rules governing these usages do not exist. Probably the greatest, but most unconscious, merit of the Privy Council is that it is gradually separating the religious from the secular elements of Hindu law, and moulding it into a system which is tolerable to those who regulate the ordinary affairs of their life by rules which they do not understand. only a phantom? This is a question which for the first time came before the Privy Council last year. In Bengal there was never any doubt upon the point. Pundits and judges alike agreed that such an adoption was absolutely and for all purposes invalid. Mr. Justice Dwas Kanath Mitter, himself a Brahman, and one of the greatest native judges who reached the High Court Bench, in two judgments declared with almost passionate earnestness that adoption was primarily and essentially a matter of religion; that although it resulted in civil rights, its first object was to procure religious benefits; that it was founded on, and must be tested by, religious rules. Both the giving and taking of an only son was a sin, and frustrated the purpose for which it was intended. In Madras an intermediate line was taken. Pundits and judges all declared that such an adoption was forbidden, and therefore was most improper, but that if it was once carried out it was effectual. This apparent contradiction was embalmed in the maxim, Quod fieri non debuit, factum valet. As the courts were only consulted in regard to the secular results of an adoption, they offered no opinion as to the results which might follow to the disembodied spirits. The High Court of Allahabad followed the example of Madras. For many years it seemed as if Bombay was taking the same line. Such adoptions were frequently made, and when they were contested in court they were reprobated and condoned. In 1875, however, Sir Michael Westropp, C. J., brought about a change. In a case which did not actually require a decision upon the point he examined all the authorities bearing upon it, and pronounced a very strong opinion that such adoptions were invalid. The next time the case arose for decision he presided over a full bench court, which held the adoption to be invalid, and the decision has of course been followed in all subsequent cases. Finally, in 1898, two appeals to the Privy Council from Madras and Allahabad raised the point directly, and in a single judgment of a most elaborate and exhaustive character the committee held that such adoptions were valid. The factum valet subterfuge was dismissed with little ceremony. Lord Hobhouse pointed out that an act which is distinctly forbidden must be illegal, and that if it is illegal before it is done it cannot become legal by being done. On the other hand, the spheres of morals and of law are different, and moral reprobation does not constitute a legal prohibition. He then discussed the text of Vasishtha, with the result that it was considered to be directory and not mandatory. The rest followed as a matter of course. As a legal curiosity the problem ceases to be interesting when it is solved. But it is still worth asking how the problem ever arose. Why did such a number of people quietly and unhesitatingly do an act which every one agreed was sinful and improper? The obvious answer is, that |