and tempers of men, that confequences almost as general and certain may be deduced from them, on most occasions, as any which the mathematical fciences afford us.

The ROMAN government gave the whole legislative power to the commons, without allowing a negative either to the nobility or confuls. This unbounded power the commons poffeffed in a collective, not in a representative body. The confequences were: When the people, by fuccefs and conqueft, had become very numerous, and had spread themselves to a great distance from the capital, the city-tribes, though the most contemptible, carried almost every vote: They were, therefore, most cajoled by every one who affected popularity: They were fupported in. idleness by general diftributions of corn, and by particular bribes, which they received from almost every candidate: By this means they became every day more licentious, and the CAMPUS MARTIUS was a perpetual scene of tumult and sedition: Armed flaves were introduced among these degenerate citizens; so that the whole government fell into anarchy, and the greatest happiness which the ROMANS could then hope for, was the defpotic power of the CESARS. Such are the effects of democracy without a representative.

A Nobility may poffefs the whole, or any part of the legiflative power of a ftate, in two different ways. Either every nobleman shares the power as part of the whole body, or the whole body enjoys the power as compofed of parts, which have each a distinct power and authority. The VENETIAN aristocracy is an inftance of the first kind of government: The POLISH of the fecond. In the VENETIAN government the whole body of nobility poffeffes the whole power, and no nobleman has any authority which he receives not from the whole. :

In the POLISH government every nobleman, by means of his fiefs, has a peculiar hereditary authority over his vaffals, and the whole body has no authority but what it receives from the concurrence of its parts. The distinct operations and tendencies of these two. fpecies of government might be made most apparent even a priori. A VENETIAN nobility is infinitely preferable to a POLISH, let the humours and education of men. be ever so much varied. A nobility, who poffefs their power in common, will preserve peace and order, both among themselves and their fubjects; and no member can have authority enough to controul the laws for a moment. The nobles will preserve their authority over the people, but without any grievous tyranny, or any invafion of private property; because such a tyrannical government promotes not the intereft of the whole body, however it may that of fome individuals. There will be a distinction of rank between the nobility and people, but this will be the only distinction in the ftate. The whole nobility will form one body, and the whole people another, without. any of those private feuds and animofities, which spread ruin and defolation every where. 'Tis eafy to see the disadvantages of a POLISH nobility in every one of these particulars.

'Tis poffible fo to conftitute a free government, as that a fingle person, call him doge, prince, or king, shall possess a very large share of power, and shall form a proper balance or counterpoife to the other parts of the legiflature. This chief magistrate may be either elective or hereditary; and though the former institution may, to a fuperficial view, appear the most advantageous; yet a more accurate inspection will discover in it greater inconveniencies than in the latter, and fuch as are founded on causes and principles eternal and immutable. The VOL. I. filling

D

filling of the throne, in fuch a government, is a point of too great and too general intereft, not to divide the whole people into factions: From whence a civil war, the greateft of ills, may be apprehended, almost with certainty, upon every vacancy. The prince elected must be either a Foreigner or a Native: The former will be ignorant of the people whom he is to govern; suspicious of his new subjects, and suspected by them; giving his confidence entirely to ftrangers, who will have no other care but of enriching themselves in the quickest manner, while their mafter's favour and authority are able to fupport them. A native will carry into the throne all his private animofities and friendships, and will never be regarded, in his elevation, without exciting the sentiments of envy in those, who formerly confidered him as their equal. Not to mention, that a crown is too high a reward ever to be given to merit alone, and will always induce the candidates to employ force,.. ör money, or intrigue, and every finifter method to procure the votes of the electors: So that fuch an election will give no better chance for fuperior merit in the prince, than if the ftate had trufted to birth alone for determining their fovereign.

It may therefore be pronounced as an univerfal axiom in politics, That an hereditary prince, a nobility without vaffals, and a people voting by their reprefentatives, form the best MONAR-.. CHY, ARISTOCRACY, and DEMOCRACY. But in order to prove more fully, that politics admit of general truths, which are invariable by the humor or education either of fubject or fovereign, it may not be amifs to obferve fome other principles ` of this fcience, which may feem to deferve that character.

It may eafily be obferved, that though free governments have been commonly the most happy for those who partake of their

freedom

freedom; yet are they the moft ruinous and oppreffive to their provinces: And this obfervation may, I believe, be fixed as a maxim of the kind we are here fpeaking of. When a monarch extends his dominions by conqueft, he foon learns to confider his old and his new subjects as on the fame footing; because, in reality, all his fubjects are to him the fame, except the few friends and favourites, with whom he is perfonally acquainted. He does not, therefore, make any distinction between them in his general laws; and, at the fame time, is no less careful to prevent all particular acts of oppreffion on the one as on the other. But a free state neceffarily makes a great distinction and. must always do fo, till men learn to love their neighbours as well as themselves. The conquerors, in fuch a government, are all legislators, and will be fure fo to contrive matters, by restrictions of trade, and by taxes, as to draw fome private, as well as public, advantage from their conquefts. Provincial governors have also a better chance in a republic, to escape with their plunder, by means of bribery or interest; and their fellowcitizens, who find their own ftate to be inriched by the spoils of the fubject-provinces, will be the more inclined to tolerate fuch abuses. Not to mention, that it is a neceffary precaution in a free state to change the governors frequently; which obliges these temporary tyrants to be more expeditious and rapacious, that they may accumulate fufficient wealth before they give place to their fucceffors. What cruel tyrants were the ROMANS over the world during the time of their commonwealth! "Tis true, they had laws to prevent oppreffion in their provincial magistrates; but CICERO informs us, that the RoMANS could not better confult the intereft of the provinces than by repealing thefe very laws. For in that cafe, fays he, our

magiftrates, having intîre impunity, would plunder no more than would fatisfy their own rapacioufnefs; whereas, at prefent, they must also fatisfy that of their judges, and of all the great men of ROME, whofe protection they ftand in need of. Who can read of the cruelties and oppreffions of VERRES without horror and aftonishment? And who is not touched with indignation to hear, that after CICERO had exhausted on that abandoned criminal all the thunders of his eloquence, and had prevailed fo far as to get him condemned to the utmost extent of the laws; yet that cruel tyrant lived peaceably to old age, in opulence and ease, and, thirty years afterward, was put into the profcription of MARK ANTHONY, on account of his exorbitant wealth, where he fell, with CICERO himfelf, and all the most virtuous men of ROME? After the diffolution of the commonwealth, the ROMAN yoke became easier to the provinces, as TACITUS informs us*; and it may be obferved, that even fome of the worft emperors, DOMITIAN†, for instance, were very careful to prevent all oppreffion of the provinces. In TIBERIUS's time, GAUL was esteemed richer than ITALY itfelf: Nor, do I find, during the whole time of the ROMAN monarchy, that the empire became less rich or populous in any of its provinces; though indeed its valour and military discipline were always upon the decline. The oppreffion and tyranny of the CARTHAGINIANS over their subject ftates in AFRICA went fo far, as we learn from POLYBIUS §, that not content with exacting the half of all the produce of

* Ann. lib. 1. cap. 2.

+ SUET. in vita DOMIT.

1 Egregium refumendæ libertati tempus, fi ipfi florentes, quam inops, ITALIA, quam imbellis urbana plebs, nihil validum in exercitibus, nifi quod externum cogitarent. TACIT. Ann. lib. 3.

. Lib. 1. cap. 72.