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THING is more surprising to those, who confider hu

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man affairs with a philofophical eye, than to see the eafiness with which the many are governed by the few; and to obferve the implicit fubmiffion with which men refign their own fentiments and paffions to those of their rulers. When we enquire by what means this wonder is brought about, we shall find, that as FORCE is always on the fide of the governed, the governors have nothing to fupport them but opinion. "Tis: therefore, on opinion only that government is founded; and this maxim extends to the moft defpotic and most military governments, as well as to the most free and most popular. The foldan of EGYPT, or the emperor of ROME, might drive his harmless fubjects, like brute beafts, against their fentiments and inclination: But he must, at least, have led his mamalukes, or: prætorian bands, like men, by their opinion.

Opinion is of two kinds, viz. opinion of INTEREST, and opinion of RIGHT. By opinion of intereft, I chiefly underftand the sense of the public advantage which is reaped from government; together with the perfuafion, that the particular government, which is established, is equally advantageous with

any

any other that could easily be settled. When this opinion prevails among the generality of a state, or among those who have the force in their hands, it gives great fecurity to any govern

ment.

PERTY.

Right is of two kinds, right to POWER and right to PROWhat prevalence opinion of the first kind has over mankind, may easily be understood by observing the attachment which all nations have to their ancient government, and even to those names which have had the fanction of antiquity. Antiquity always begets the opinion of right; and whatever disadvantageous fentiments we may entertain of mankind, they are always found to be prodigal both of blood and treasure in the maintenance of public juftice. This paffion we may denominate enthusiasm, or we may give it what appellation we please ; but a politician, who should overlook its influence on human affairs, would prove himself but of a very limited understanding. There is, indeed, no particular, in which, at first sight, there may appear a greater contradiction in the frame of the human mind than the present. When men act in a faction, they are apt, without any shame or remorse, to neglect all the ties of honour and morality, in order to serve their party; and yet, when a faction is formed upon a point of right or principle, there is no occafion where men discover a greater obstinacy, and a more determined sense of justice and equity. The fame social difpofition of mankind is the cause of both these contradictory appearances.

'Tis fufficiently understood, that the opinion of right to property is of the greatest moment in all matters of government.

A noted

A noted author has made property the foundation of all government; and most of our political writers feem inclined to follow him in that particular. This is carrying the matter too far; but still it must be owned, that the opinion of right to property has a great influence in this fubject.

Upon these three opinions, therefore, of public intereft, of right to power, and of right to property, are all governments founded, and all authority of the few over the many. There are indeed other principles, which add force to these, and determine, limit, or alter their operation; fuch as felf-intereft, fear, and affection: But ftill we may affert, that these other principles can have no influence alone, but suppose the antecedent influence of those opinions above-mentioned. They are, therefore, to be esteemed the fecondary, not the original principles of government.

For, firft, as to felf-intereft, by which I mean the expectation of particular rewards, distinct from the general protection which we receive from government, 'tis evident that the magistrate's authority must be antecedently established, or, at least be hoped for, in order to produce this expectation. The prospect of reward may augment the authority with regard to fome particular perfons; but can never give birth to it, with regard to the public. Men naturally look for the greatest favours from their friends and acquaintance; and therefore, the hopes of confiderable number of the ftate, would never center in any particular set of men, if these men had no other title to magistracy, and had no feparate influence over the opinions of mankind. The fame obfervation may be extended to the other VOL. I.

any

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two

two principles of fear and affection. No man would have any reason to fear the fury of a tyrant, if he had no authority over any but from fear; fince, as a fingle man, his bodily force can reach but a small way, and all farther power he poffeffes must be founded either on our own opinion, or on the presumed opinion of others. And though affection to wisdom and virtue in a sovereign extends very far, and has great influence; yet he must be antecedently supposed invested with a public character, otherwife the public efteem will ferve him in no ftead, nor will his virtue have any influence beyond a narrow sphere.

A Government may endure for feveral ages, though the balance of power, and the balance of property do not agree. This chiefly happens, where any rank or order of the state has acquired a large share of the property; but, from the original conftitution of the government, has no fhare of the power. Under what pretext would any individual of that order affume authority in public affairs? As men are commonly much attached to their ancient government, it is not to be expected, that the public would ever favour fuch ufurpations. But where the original conftitution allows any fhare of power, though fmall, to an order of men, who poffefs a large share of the property, 'tis eafy for them gradually to ftretch their authority, and bring the balance of power to coincide with that of property. This has been the cafe with the house of commons in

ENGLAND.

Moft writers, who have treated of the BRITISH government, have fuppofed, that as the houfe of commons reprefents all the commons of GREAT BRITAIN; fo its weight in the scale is

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proportioned to the property and power of all whom it reprefents. But this principle must not be received as abfolutely true. For though the people are apt to attach themselves more to the house of commons, than to any other member of the conftitution; that house being chofen by them as their reprefentatives, and as the public guardians of their liberty; yet are there inftances where the house, even when in oppofition to the crown, has not been followed by the people; as we may particularly obferve of the tory house of commons in the reign of king WILLIAM. Were the members of the house obliged to receive inftructions from their conftituents, like the DUTCH deputies, this would entirely alter the cafe; and, if fuch immense power and riches, as those of the whole commons of BRITAIN, were brought into the scale, 'tis not easy to conceive, that the crown could either influence that multitude of people, or withstand that overbalance of property. 'Tis true, the crown has great influence over the collective body of BRITAIN in the elections of members; but were this influence, which at present is only exerted once in seven years, to be employed in bringing over the people to every vote, it would foon be wafted; and no skill, popularity or revenue, could fupport it. I must, therefore, be of opinion, that an alteration, in this particular, would introduce a total alteration in our government, and would foon reduce it to a pure republic; and, perhaps, to a republic of no inconvenient form. For though the people collected in a body like the ROMAN tribes, be quite unfit for government, yet when dispersed in small bodies, they are more fufceptible both of reason and order; the force of popular currents and tides is, in a great measure, broke; and the public

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