public interest may be pursued with some method and constancy. But 'tis needless to reafon any farther concerning a form of government, which is never likely to have place in BRITAIN, and which seems not to be the aim of any party amongst us. Let us cherish and improve our ancient government as much as poffible, without encouraging a paffion for fuch dangerous novelties.

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ESSAY V.

OF THE INDEPENDENCY OF PARLIAMENT.

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LITICAL writers have established it as a maxim, That in contriving any system of government, and fixing the feveral checks and controuls of the conftitution, every man ought to be supposed a knave, and to have no other end, in all his actions, but private intereft. By this intereft we must govern him, and, by means of it, make him co-operate to public good, notwithstanding his insatiable avarice and ambition. Without this, fay they, we shall in vain boast of the advantages of any conftitution, and fhall find, in the end, that we have no fecurity for our liberties or poffeffions, except the good-will of our rulers; that is, we shall have no fecurity at all.

"Tis, therefore, a just political maxim, That every man must be fuppofed a knave; Though at the fame time, it appears fomewhat strange, that a maxim fhould be true in politics, which is falfe in fact. But in order to be fatisfied on this head, we may confider, that men are generally more honeft in their private than in their public capacity, and will go greater lengths to serve a party, than when their own private intereft is alone concerned, Honour is a great check upon mankind: But where a confiderable body of men act together, this check is, in a great meafure, removed; fince a man is fure to be approved of by his

own

own party, for what promotes the common interest, and he foon learns to despise the clamours of his adversaries. To which we may add, that every court or fenate is determined by the greater number of voices; fo that, if felfifh views influence only the majority, (as they will always do) the whole fenate follows the allurements of this feparate intereft, and acts as if it contained not one member, who had any regard to public intereft and liberty.

When there offers, therefore, to our cenfure, and examination, any plan of government, real or imaginary, where the power is distributed among feveral courts, and feveral orders of men, we should always confider the private interest of each court, and each order; and, if we find, that, by the skilful divifion of the power, the private interest must neceffarily, in its operation, concur with the public, we may pronounce that government to be wife and happy. If, on the contrary, the private intereft of each order be not checked, and be not directed to public intereft, we ought to look for nothing but faction, diforder, and tyranny from fuch a government. In this opinion we are juftified by experience, as well as by the authority of all philofophers and politicians both antient and modern.

How much, therefore, would it have furprized such a genius as CICERO, or TACITUS, to have been told, That, in a future age, there should arife a very regular fyftem of mixt government, where the authority was fo diftributed, that one rank, whenever it pleased, might fwallow up all the reft, and engrofs the whole power of the conftitution. Such a government, they would fay, will not be a mixed government. For so great is

the

the natural ambition of men, that they are never satisfied with power; and if one order of men, by pursuing its own intereft, can ufurp upon every other order, it will certainly do so, and render itself, as far as poffible, abfolute and uncontroulable.

But, in this opinion, experience shews that they would have been mistaken. For this is actually the cafe with the BRITISH conftitution. The fhare of power allotted by our conftitution to the house of commons is fo great, that it abfolutely commands all the other parts of the government. The king's legislative power is plainly no proper check to it. For though the king has a negative in the paffing of laws; yet this, in fact, is esteemed of fo little moment, that whatever is voted by the two houses, is always fure to pafs into a law, and the royal affent is little better than a mere form. The principal weight of the crown lies in the executive power. But befides that the executive power in every government, is altogether fubordinate to the legislative; befides this, I fay, the exercise of this power requires an immenfe expence, and the commons have affumed to themfelves the fole power of difpofing of public money. How eafy, therefore, would it be for that house to wreft from the crown all these powers, one after another, by making every grant of money conditional, and choofing their time fo well, that their refufal of fupplies fhould only distress the government, without giving foreign powers any advantage over us? Did the house of commons depend in the fame manner on the king, and had none of the members any property but from his gift, would not he command all their refolutions, and be from that moment abfolute ? As to the house of lords, they are a very powerful fupport to the crown so long as they are, in their turn, fupported by it; but both experience

4

and

and reason shew us, that they have neither force nor authority fufficient to maintain themselves alone, without fuch fupport.

means

How, therefore, shall we folve this paradox? And by what is this member of our conftitution confined within the proper limits; fince, from our very constitution, it must neceffarily have as much power as it demands, and can only be confined by itself? How is this confiftent with our experience of human nature? I anfwer, that the intereft of the body is here restrained by the interest of the individuals, and that the house of commons ftretches not its power, because fuch an ufurpation would be contrary to the interest of the majority of its members. The crown has fo many offices at its difpofal, that, when affifted by the honest and difinterested part of the house, it will always command the refolutions of the whole; fo far at leaft, as to preferve the ancient conftitution from danger. We may, therefore, give to this influence what name we please; we may call it by the invidious appellations of corruption and dependence; but fome degree and fome kind of it are infeparable, from the very nature of the conftitution, and neceffary to the preservation of our mixed government.

Inftead then of afferting † abfolutely, that the dependence of parliament, in every degree, is an infringement of BRITISH liberty, the country-party had better have made fome conceffions to their adverfaries, and have only examined what was the proper degree of this dependence, beyond which it became dangerous to liberty. But fuch a moderation is not to be expected of party-men of any kind. After a conceffion of this nature, all declamation must

+ See Differtation on Parties, throughout.

be