be abandoned; and a ferious calm enquiry into the proper degree of court-influence, and parliamentary dependence would have been expected by the readers. And though the advantage, in such a controversy, might poffibly remain to the countryparty; yet the victory would not be fo compleat as they wish for, nor would a true patriot have given an entire loose to his zeal, for fear of running matters into a contrary extreme, by diminishing too far the influence of the crown. It was, therefore, thought beft to deny, that this extreme could ever be dangerous to the constitution, or that the crown could ever have too little influence over members of parliament.

All questions concerning the proper medium between extremes are very difficult to be decided; both because it is not easy to find words proper to fix this medium, and because the good and ill, in such cases, run so gradually into each other, as even to render our fentiments doubtful and uncertain. But there is a peculiar difficulty in the prefent cafe, which would embarrass the most knowing and most impartial examiner. The power of the crown is always lodged in a single perfon, either king or minister; and as this perfon may have either a greater or less degree of ambition, capacity, courage, popularity or fortune, the power, which is too great in one hand, may become too little in another. In pure republics, where the power is

+ By that influence of the Crown, which I would justify, I mean only, that arifing from the offices and honours which are at the disposal of the crown. As to private bribery, it may be confidered in the fame light as the practice of employing spies, which is fcarce juftifiable in a good minifter, and is infamous in a bad one: But to be a fpy, or to be corrupted, is always infamous under all minifters, and is to be regarded as a fhameless prostitution. POLYBIUS juftly esteems the pecuniary influence of the fenate and cenfors in giving offices to be one of the regular and conftitutional weights, which preserved the balance of the ROMAN government. Lib.6. cap. 15. diftributed

VOL. I.

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distributed among several affemblies or fenates, the checks and controuls are more regular in their operation; because the members of fuch numerous affemblies may be prefumed to be always nearly equal in capacity and virtue; and 'tis only their number, riches, or authority, which enter into confideration.. But a limited monarchy admits not of any fuch ftability; nor is it poffible to affign to the crown fuch a determinate degree of power, as will, in every hand, form a proper counter-balance to the other parts of the conftitution. This is an unavoidable disadvantage, among the many advantages, attending that fpecies of government.

ESSAY VI.

WHETHER THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT INCLINES MORE TO ABSOLUTE MONARCHY, OR TO A REPUBLIC.

In

T affords a violent prejudice against almost every science, that no prudent man, however sure of his principles, dares to prophesy concerning any event, or foretell the remote confequences of things. A physician will not venture to pronounce concerning the condition of his patient a fortnight or month after: And still lefs dares a politician foretel the situation of public affairs a few years hence. HARRINGTON thought himself so sure of his general principle, That the balance of power depends on that of property, that he ventured to pronounce it impoffible ever to re-establish monarchy in ENGLAND: But his book was scarce published when the king was reftored; and we see that monarchy has ever since subsisted upon the fame footing as before. Notwithstanding this unlucky example, I will venture to examine a very important question, viz. Whether the BRITISH government inclines more to abfolute monarchy, or to a republic; and in which of these two species of government it will most probably terminate? As there feems not to be any great danger of a fudden revolution either I fhall at least escape the shame attending my temerity, if I fhould be found to have been mistaken. G 2

way,

Thofe

Those who affert, That the balance of our government inclines towards abfolute monarchy, may support their opinion by the following reafons. That property has a great influence on power cannot poffibly be denied; but yet the general maxim, That the balance of one depends on the balance of the other, must be received with feveral limitations. 'Tis evident, that much lefs property in a single hand will be able to counter-balance a greater property in several hands; not only because it is difficult to make many persons combine in the fame views and measures; but also because property, when united, caufes much greater dependance, than the fame property, when dispersed. An hundred perfons, of 1000 l. a year a-piece, can confume all their income, and no body shall ever be the better for them, except their fervants and tradesmen, who juftly regard their profits as the product of their own labour. But a man poffeffed of 100,000l. a year, if he has either any generosity, or any cunning, may create a great dependance by obligations, and ftill a greater by expectations. Hence we may observe, that in all free governments any subject exorbitantly rich has always created a jealousy, even though his riches bore no manner of proportion to the riches of the ftate. CRASSUS's fortune, if I remember well, amounted only to about fixteen hundred thou fand pounds in our money; and yet we find, that though his genius was nothing extraordinary, he was able, by means of his riches alone, to counter-balance, during his life-time, the power of POMPEY as well as that of CESAR, who afterwards became mafter of the world. The wealth of the MEDICIS made them mafters of FLORENCE; though, 'tis probable, it was very inconfiderable, compared to the united property of that opulent republic.

Thefe

These confiderations are apt to make one entertain a very magnificent idea of the BRITISH fpirit and love of liberty; fince we could maintain our free government, during fo many centuries, against our fovereigns, who, befides the power and dignity and majefty of the crown, have always been poffeffed of much greater riches than any fubject has ever enjoyed in any commonwealth. But it may be faid, that this spirit, however great, will never be able to fupport itself against that immenfe property, which is now lodged in the king, and which is ftill encreasing. Upon a moderate computation, there are near three millions at the difpofal of the crown. The civil lift amounts to near a million; the collection of all taxes to another million; and the employments in the army and navy, together with ecclefiaftical preferments, to above a third million: An enormous fum, and what may fairly be computed to be more than a thirtieth part of the whole income and labour of the kingdom. When we add to this immenfe property, the increafing luxury of the nation, our proneness to corruption, together with the great power and prerogatives of the crown, and the command of fuch numerous military forces, there is no one but must despair of being able, without extraordinary efforts, to fupport our free government much longer under all these disadvantages.

On the other hand, those who maintain, that the byafs of the BRITISH government leans towards a republic, may support their opinion by very specious arguments. It may be faid, that though this immenfe property in the crown, be joined to the dignity of first magiftrate, and to many other legal powers and prerogatives, which should naturally give it a greater influence; yet it really becomes lefs dangerous to liberty upon

that