that very account. Were BRITAIN a republic, and were any private man poffeffed of a revenue, a third, or even a tenth part as large as that of the crown, he would very juftly excite jealoufy; because he would infallibly have great authority in the government: And fuch an irregular authority, not avowed by the laws, is always more dangerous than a much greater authority, which is derived from them. A man poffeffed of ufurped power, can fet no bounds to his pretenfions: His partizans have liberty to hope for every thing in his favour: His enemies provoke his ambition, with his fears, by the violence of their oppofition: And the government being thrown into a ferment, every corrupted humour in the ftate naturally gathers to him. On the contrary, a legal authority, though very great, has always fome bounds, which terminate both the hopes and pretenfions of the perfon poffeffed of it: The laws must have provided a remedy against its exceffes: Such an eminent magistrate has much to fear, and little to hope from his ufurpations: And as his legal authority is quietly submitted to, he has small temptation and small opportunity of extending it farther. Besides, it happens, with regard to ambitious aims and projects, what may be observed with regard to fects of philofophy and religion. A new fect excites such ferment, and is both oppofed and defended with such vehemence, that it spreads always faster, and multiplies its partizans with greater rapidity, than any old established opinion, recommended by the fanction of the laws and of antiquity. Such is the nature of novelty, that where any thing pleases it becomes doubly agreeable, if new; but if it difpleafes, it is doubly difpleafing, upon that very account. And, in moft cafes, the violence of enemies is favourable to ambitious projects, as well as the zeal of partizans.

It may further be faid, that though men be very much governed by intereft; yet even interest itself, and all human affairs, are entirely governed by opinion. Now, there has been a very fudden and a very sensible change in the opinions of men. within these last fifty years, by the progress of learning and of liberty. Most people, in this island, have divefted themselves,. of all fuperftitious reverence to names and authority: The clergy have much lost their credit: Their pretenfions and doctrines have been ridiculed; and even religion can scarce fupport itself in the world. The mere name of king commands little refpect; and to talk of a king as GOD's vicegerent on earth, or to give him any of those magnificent titles, which formerly dazzled mankind, would but excite laughter in every one.. Though the crown, by means of its large revenue, may maintain its authority in times of tranquillity, upon private interest and influence; yet as the least shock or convulfion must break all these interests to pieces, the kingly power being no longer supported by the fettled principles and opinions of men, will immediately diffolve. Had men been in the fame difpofition at the revolution, as they are at prefent, monarchy would have run a great risque of being entirely lost in this island.

Durft I venture to deliver my own fentiments amidst these opposite arguments, I would affert, that unless there happen fome extraordinary convulfion, the power of the crown, by means of its large revenue, is rather upon the increase; though, at the fame time I own, that its progrefs feems very flow, and almost insensible. The tide has run long, and with some ra-. pidity, to the fide of popular government, and is just beginning, to turn towards monarchy..

'Tis well known that every government must come to a period, and that death is unavoidable to the political as well as to the animal body. But, as one kind of death may be preferable to another, it may be enquired, whether it be more defirable for the BRITISH conftitution to terminate in a popular government, or an abfolute monarchy? Here I would declare frankly, that though liberty be infinitely preferable to flavery, in almost every cafe; yet I should much rather wish to see an abfolute monarch than a republic in this ifland. For, let us confider, what kind of republic we have reason to expect. The queftion is not concerning any fine imaginary republic, of which a man may form a plan in his clofet. There is no doubt, but a popular government may be imagined more perfect than absolute monarchy, or even than our present conftitution. But what reafon have we to expect that any fuch government will ever be established in BRITAIN, upon the diffolution of our monarchy? If any fingle perfon acquire power enough to take our constitution to pieces, and put it up a-new, he is really an abfolute monarch; and we have had already an inftance of this kind, fufficient to convince us, that such a person will never free

refign his power, or establish any government. Matters, therefore, must be trusted to their natural progress and operation; and the house of commons, according to its prefent conftition, must be the only legislature in fuch a popular government. The inconveniences, attending fuch a fituation of affairs, present themselves by thousands. If the house of commons, in fuch a cafe, ever diffolves itself, which is not to be expected, we may look for a civil war every election. If it continues itself, we shall fuffer all the tyranny of a faction, fubdivided into new factions. And as fuch a violent govern

ment

ment cannot long fubfift, we fhall, at laft, after infinite convulfions, and civil wars, find repofe in abfolute monarchy, which it would have been happier for us to have established peaceably from the beginning. Abfolute monarchy, therefore, is the easiest death, the true Euthanafia of the BRITISH CONftitution.

Thus, if we have reafon to be more jealous of monarchy, because the danger is more imminent from that quarter; we have also reason to be more jealous of popular government, because that danger is more terrible. This may teach us a leffon of moderation in all our political controversies.

ESSA Y VII.

OF PARTIES IN GENERAL.

Fall veen, who to F all men, who diftinguish themselves by memorable at chievements, the first place of honour feems due to LEGISLATORS, and founders of ftates, who transmit a system of laws and inftitutions to fecure the peace, happiness, and liberty of future generations. The influence of useful inventions in the arts and sciences may, perhaps, extend farther than those of wife laws, whofe effects are limited both in time and place; but the benefit arising from the former is not so sensible as that which proceeds from the latter. Speculative fciences do, indeed, improve the mind; but this advantage reaches only to a few perfons, who have leifure to apply themfelves to them. And as to practical arts, which increase the commodities and enjoyments of life, it is well known, that mens happiness confifts not fo much in an abundance of these, as in the peace and fecurity with which they poffefs them; and thofe bleffings can only be derived from good government. Not to mention, that general virtue and good morals in a state, which are fo requifite to happinefs, can never arife from the most refined precepts of philofophy, or even the feverest injunctions of religion; but muft proceed entirely from the virtuous education of the youth, the effect of wife laws and institutions.

I muft,