Frequent inftances of a like nature occur in the hiftory of the emperors; in that of ALEXANDER's fucceffors; and of many. other countries: Nor can any thing be more unhappy than a defpotic government of that kind; where the fucceffion is disjointed and irregular, and must be determined, on every occafion, by force or election. In a free government, the matter is often unavoidable, and is alfo much lefs dangerous. The interests of liberty may there frequently lead the people, in their own defence, to alter the fucceffion of the crown. And the constitution, being compounded of parts, may ftill maintain a fufficient ftability, by refting on the aristocratical or democratical members, though the monarchical be altered, from time to time, in order to accommodate it to the former.

In an abfolute government, when there is no legal prince, who has a title to the throne, it may fafely be determined to belong to the firft occupier. Inftances of this kind are but too frequent, efpecially in the eastern monarchies. When any

race of princes expires, the will or deftination of the last fovereign will be regarded as a title. Thus the edict of LEWIS the XIVth, who called the bastard princes to the fucceffion in cafe of the failure of all the legitimate princes, would, in such an event, have some authority t. Thus the will of CHARLES

'Tis remarkable that in the remonstrance of the Duke of BOURBON and the legitimate princes, againft this deftination of Louis the XIVth, the doctrine of the original contract is infifted on, even in that absolute government. The FRENCH nation, fay they, choofing HUGH CAPET and his pofterity to rule over them and their pofterity, where the former line fails, there is a tacit right reserved to choose a new royal family; and this right is invaded by calling the bastard princes to the throne, without the consent of the nation. But the Comte de BOULAINVILLIERS, who wrote in defence of the bastard princes, ridicules this notion of an original contract, especially Y y y 2

when

CHARLES the fecond difpofed of the whole SPANISH monarchy. The ceffion of the antient proprietor, especially when joined to conqueft, is likewise esteemed a very good title. The general bond or obligation, which unites us to government, is the intereft and neceffities of fociety; and this obligation is very ftrong. The determination of it to this or that particular prince or form of government is frequently more uncertain and dubious. Prefent poffeffion has confiderable authority in these cafes, and greater than in private property; because of the disorders which attend all revolutions and changes of government †.

We shall only observe, before we conclude, that though an appeal to general opinion may justly, in the fpeculative sciences of metaphyfics, natural philofophy, or aftronomy, be esteemed unfair and inconclufive; yet in all queftions with regard to morals, as well as criticism, there is really no other standard, by which any controverfy can ever be decided. And nothing is a clearer proof that a theory of this kind is erroneous, than to find, that it leads to paradoxes, which are repugnant to the common fentiments of mankind, and to general practice and opinion. The doctrine, which founds all lawful government

when applied to HUGH CAPET; who mounted the throne, fays he, by the fame arts, which have ever been employed by all conquerors and ufurpers. He got his title, indeed, recognized by the states after he had put himself in poffeffion: But is this a choice or contract? The Comte de BOULAINVILLIERS, we may obferve, was a noted republican; but being a man of learning, and very converfant in hiftory, he knew the people were almost never confulted in these revolutions and new establishments, and that time alone beftowed right and authority on what was commonly at first founded on force and violence. See Etat de la FRANCE, Vol. III.

+ The crime of rebellion, amongst the antients was commonly marked by the terms πεωτερίζει», που ως res moliri.

on

on an original contract, or confent of the people, is plainly of this kind; nor has the ableft of its partizans, in profecution of of it, fcrupled to affirm, that abfolute monarchy is inconfiftent with civil fociety, and fo can be no form of civil government at all†; and that the fupreme power in a state cannot take from any man, by taxes and impofitions, any part of his property, without his own confent or that of his representatives ‡. What authority any moral reasoning can have, which leads to opinions fo wide of the general practice of mankind, in every place but this fingle kingdom, 'tis eafy to determine ..

+ See Lock E on government, chap. 7. § 90.

↑ Id. chap. 11. § 138, 139, 140.

The only paffage I meet with in antiquity, where the obligation of obedience to government is afcribed to a promise is-in PLATO in Critone; where SOCRATES refuses to escape from prifon, because he had tacitly promised to obey the laws. Thus he builds a tory confequence of paffive obedience, on a whig foundation of the original contract.

New discoveries are not to be expected in these matters. If no man, till very lately, ever imagined that government was founded on contract, 'tis certain it cannot, in general, have any fuch foundation.

I'

N the former essay, we endeavoured to refute the speculative. fyftems of politics advanced in this nation; as well the religious system of the one party, as the philofophical of the other. We come now to examine the practical confequences, deduced by each party, with regard to the measures of fubmiffion due to fovereigns.

As the obligation to juftice is founded intirely on the interests of society, which require mutual abftinence from property, in order to preserve peace among mankind; 'tis evident, that, when the execution of juftice would be attended with very pernicious confequences, that virtue must be suspended, and give place to public utility, in fuch extraordinary and fuch preffing emergencies. The maxim, fiat Juftitia & ruat Cœlum, let justice be performed, though the universe be deftroyed, is apparently false, and by facrificing the end to the means, shews a prepofterous idea of the subordination of duties. What governor of a town makes any fcruple of burning the fuburbs, when they facilitate the advances of the enemy? Or what general abstains from plundering a neutral country, when the neceffities of war require it, and he cannot otherwise maintain his army? The cafe is the fame with the duty of allegiance;

3

giance; and common fenfe teaches us, that as government binds us to obedience only on account of its tendency to public utility, that duty must always, in extraordinary cafes, when public ruin would evidently attend obedience, yield to the primary and original obligation. Salus populi fuprema Lex, the fafety of the people is the fupreme law. This maxim is agreeable to the fentiments of mankind in all ages: Nor is any one, when he reads of the insurrections against a NERO, or a PHILIP, fo infatuated with party-fyftems, as not to wish fuccess to the enterprize, and praise the undertakers. Even our high monarchical party, in fpite of their fublime theory, are forced, in fuch cafes, to judge, and feel, and approve, in conformity to the rest of mankind.

Refiftance, therefore, being admitted in extraordinary emergencies, the queftion can only be, among good reasoners, with regard to the degree of neceffity, which can justify resistance, and render it lawful or commendable. And here I must confefs, that I shall always incline to their fide, who draw the bond of allegiance the clofeft poffible, and confider an infringement of it, as the laft refuge in defperate cafes, when the public is in the higheft danger, from violence and tyranny. For befides the mischiefs of a civil war, which commonly attends infurrection; 'tis certain, that where a difpofition to rebellion appears among any people, it is one chief cause of tyranny in the rulers, and forces them into many violent mea→ fures, which they never would have embraced, had every one feemed inclined to fubmiffion and obedience. 'Tis thus the tyrannicide or affaffination, approved of by antient maxims, instead of keeping tyrants and ufurpers in awe, made them ten times more fierce and unrelenting; and is now justly, upon

that