39, 40. How the house is constituted, 59. Vindicate
the right of taxation against the attempts of the crown,
44, 49. And of the lords, 82. See Taxation. They
cannot vote by proxy, 222. Enjoy a freedom of de-
bate superior to that ever possessed by any popular
assembly, 230. They are debarred from any share in
the executive authority, 276. Are thence led to serve
the people faithfully, 278, 279. Striking instances of
this in the laws they have framed at particular times,
334, 335, et seq. And in their watching their execution,
353, 355. Have impeached the servants of the crown
and judges, 356. Their proceedings in the case of sir
John Coventry, 359. See Parliament and Representa-
tive. Abridge their own personal privileges, 363. Do
strict justice on their own members, ibid. Their at-
tacks on the crown's prerogative defeated by the lords,
387. They in their turn defeat the like attempts from
the lords, 389.
Commonwealths, the people in them apt to be misled by
favourite leaders, 194, 195. The division of the exe-
cutive authority, that takes place in them, makes it very
difficult to lay it under proper restraint, 215.
people unavoidably betrayed by those whom they trust
with power, 267, 270, 274. Revolutions always con-
cluded, in them, in a manner disadvantageous to pub-
lic liberty, 319. See Revolutions. The laws to secure
the liberty of the citizens, besides being imperfect, are
not even carefully executed, 337, et seq. Cannot sub-
sist without certain arbitrary powers, contrary to the
liberty of the citizens, 408. Do not admit the liberty
of speaking and writing, and, perhaps, cannot, 411.
The power of the government supposed by law to be
unbounded, till stopped by some positive regulation,
435. By what means commonwealths generally lose
their liberties, 463. Great difficulty for the people in
them to preserve their rights, 463, 464. See Rome
and Geneva.
Conquest, the, is the real æra of the formation of the
sent English government, 8.
Constitution, English, the æras of its formation, 8, 38, 56,
79. Being different from that of all other free states,
cannot fall into ruin from the same causes, 458. Causes
that operate for its preservation, 466. Endangered by
the office of Columbus to Henry VII., 473. Farther
reasons of its future preservation, 480. How it rises
again, after being in a manner overwhelmed, ibid.
Dangers to which it may be exposed, 481. In what
circumstances it may be looked upon as annihilated,
483. Meddling with it, upon the score of improve-
ment, may prove very dangerous experiments, 455,
491. See Crown. Would have been altered by grant-
ing the Americans their claims, 511. See Taxation.
Seems to diffuse a spirit of order and justice among the
lower classes of people, 518. Such an one wished for
by the politicians of antiquity, 522.
Consuls, the æra of their creation, and nature of their
office, 319. Unrestrained power, 268, 339.
Rome.
Coronation oath, 81.
Coventry, sir John, his case, 359.
commons, and their bill, ibid.
Courts of law, in England, their names and functions, 107,
108. Kept by parliament under strict rules, 367. The
great impartiality of their proceedings, 362, &c. See
Laws and Jury.
Cromwell, his fruitless attempts to form a popular assem-
bly obedient to him, 416.
Crown, its power much superior in England after the Con-
quest to what it was in France, 13. The barons com-
pelled to unite with the commonalty, to restrain its
power, 22. Its present constitutional prerogative, 68.
Restraints it lies under, 72, 75. Totally dependent on
the people for its supplies, 72. Usefulness of its power
in preventing any citizen or popular leader from ac-
quiring a degree of power dangerous to public liberty,
199. Instances of it, 208. Is not to make open pro-
posals to parliament for their assent or dissent, 230.
May send messages to each house, and to what effect,
232. Unites in itself the whole executive authority,
277. Thereby produces a union in a common cause
among all orders of subjects, 280. Is like an ever
subsisting Carthage, that maintains the virtue of the
representatives of the people, 283. Farther illustration
of the same fact, 349, 360. The power of Crowns has
not produced these effects in other countries, 379.
Instances of this, 380. The stability of the executive
power of the English crown, 383. Is a great peculi-
arity of it, 387. Is not a subject to be explained here
otherwise than by facts, 387. Its power alternately
defended by the two houses, ibid. The secret forbear-
ance of the two houses from invading its prerogative,
391. Remarkable instances of this, 394, 395, 396.
Its secure power rendered conspicuous in the facility
with which it dismisses great men from their employ-
ments, 398. Not so in other monarchies, 399. The
facility with which it dismisses the parliament, 401.
Never attacked except by persons who positively laid
claim to it, or at least upon national grounds, 404.
Its power more secure in itself, but not so indelibly an-
nexed to the person of an individual as in other coun-
tries, 405. The secret causes of its peculiar stability
form a subject more properly belonging to philosophy
than to politics, 406. Great advantages result from
this stability, 407. I. The numerous restraints it is
able to bear, and great freedom it can allow the sub-
ject at its expense, ibid. II. The liberty of speaking
and writing, 411, 412. III. The unlimited freedom of
debate in parliament, 414. IV. The union among all
orders of subjects in defence of public liberty, 421.
V. The unlimited freedom allowed to the people of
meddling with government affairs, 422. VI. The im-
partiality with which justice is administered, without
respect to persons, 424. VII. Needlessness of an
armed force to support its power, 428. VIII. Its
strict respect even for the letter of the law, 438. IX.
The lenity used in the administration of criminal jus-
tice may, perhaps, be ascribed in great part to the
general security which the stable power of the crown
gives to the whole machine of government, ibid. The
great power the crown formerly derived from its domi-
nions beyond sea, supplied afterwards by hidden cir-
cumstances at home, 442. Instances of this great
power without the support of an armed force, ibid.
443. It keeps the military power in a surprising state
of subjection to the law, 447. Instances of this, 448.
Really could not, in the general situation of things,
derive any assistance from a standing army against the
people, 451. The method it should adopt for setting
aside the present constitution, 454. Its power is wholly
annexed to the civil branch of its office, 455. Hints
concerning its effectual foundations, 456. Prevents the
English constitution from being destroyed in the same
manner the Roman republic was, 460. The great
usefulness of its veto power, 472. Considerations on
the attempts to abridge its prerogative, 484. In what
circumstances these attempts might be brought to suc-
ceed, ibid. A comparison between its prerogative, and
that of the kings of Sweden, before the last revolution,
486. The abridging of its prerogative might not an-
swer the expectations of those politicians who wish for
it, 488, et seq.
Sketches of the dangers to public li-
berty that might arise therefrom, 491. The rule to be
followed in pursuing such attempts, 496. How de-
pendent on the people for its supplies, see Taxation.
Debate, freedom of, secured by the bill of rights, 94. See
Propounding. How conducted in the English parlia-
ment, 65, 264. The unlimited freedom exercised in the
English parliament not followed by any bad conse-
quences, and why, 418, 419.
Democracy, remarks on, 51.
Dictators, their great power, 259, 340. Their absolute
power was often useful, 408. See Rome.
Dissolution of the parliament, its effects, 63. Easily
effected by the crown in England, 403.
Edward I., surnamed the English Justinian, 29.
Elections, laws relating to them, 60, 94. Grenville's bill
for deciding contested elections, 95. Advantages
arising from the right of the people to elect represen-
tatives, 284, 307. See People.
Elizabeth, queen, the inquisitorial court of High Commis-
sion, established during her reign, 44.
Emancipation of sons, in Rome, manner of, 135.
England, the power of the king becomes very great at the
æra of the Conquest, 13. The lords or barons much
dependent on the crown, 14. Are thence compelled
to unite in a common cause with the people, 22. Dif-
ferent from France, in forming one compact united
kingdom, 25. This circumstance favours the establish-
ment of public liberty, ibid. A peculiarity of its
government, viz. the advantageous manner to public
liberty in which revolutions, have constantly been
concluded, 331, et seq. The strictness with which
laws favourable to the liberty of the subject are exe-
cuted, 350, et seq. See Commons. Remarkable im-
partiality in the courts of law, 368. Instances quoted,
369, 371. Farther strictures on the same subject. 426.
Singular law-doctrine, concerning the authority of go-
vernment, and the liberty of the subject, 437. The
people's situation different from that of the people in
Rome, 461. See People. The balance of the people
in government is connected with the right of property,
466. See Taxation. Divisions among the people never
carried very far, 516. The lower class possessed of a
considerable spirit of order and justice, 520.
Equity, courts of; an inquiry into the meaning of the
word, and their real office, 132. A court of this kind
existed in Rome, 133. See Prætor. Remedies afforded
by the English courts of equity, 138. How these
courts were first instituted, 139. The opposition they
met, 140. Their method of proceeding to enforce ap-
pearance, and submission to their decrees, 141. Are
kept within much more strict bounds than the prætor's
equity court was in Rome, 142. Farther definition of
their office, 146.
Executive power, lodged in the king, is more easily re-
pressed when confined to a sole indivisible seat, 210,
et seq.-is taken out of the hands of the representatives
of the people, 276. Great advantages thence arising,
278. See Crown.
Faire sans dire, the motto quoted, 513.
Favourite of the people, how prevented in the English
constitution from acquiring a power dangerous to pub-
lic liberty, 201, et seq. See Commonwealth.
Felton, his answer to the bishop of London, 177.
Feudal government introduced in France through a long
series of events and years, 10. Is introduced suddenly
and at once in England by the Conquest, 13. Conse-
quences of this difference, 15.
France, the feudal government was established in it very
slowly, 10. The crown was at first elective, 11. The
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