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Cost of European Wars.

Great Britain..

The cost of the Crimean | of the population (which, of course, means all war to the parties engaged ages, sexes and conditions) is required to was stated by Mr. Robb to keep up the contingent. Apply that rule to be, in francs, as follows: our country-or say one person to every fifty 1,950,000,000 of our population-and the Free States alone would have about four hundred thousand men to furnish as a standing force, whose absence would scarcely be felt in the avenues 546,000,000 of production and trade. The tables would stand, in round numbers:






Other States...





The cost of the Italian war (1859) given Maine

by the same authority, was:




Germany (placing on a war footing)..



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New Hampshire........... ....

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Here we have an expenditure of eight and one-third thousand millions of francs, or about fifteen hundred millions of dollars, as the sum extracted by taxation from the people Michigan of Europe. Such enormous expenditures are appalling; yet they did not prevent those very Governments from maintaining permanent military establishments of a character which, in this country, would be equivalent to a heavy war footing. How little we know of the burdens of war, after all, when comWhat can be done in case of need has been pared to those borne by the peoples of Euillustrated by our late experiences in placrope! But, to lighten our burdens, light as ing an army of one million of men in the they are, we have the consciousness of a just field. From these experiences none can cause; while in the Old World the sword is drawn in the old cause of crowns and dynas-lion if such a number were required by any doubt our ability to raise one and a half milties, only granting to the people a mere misfortune of foreign interference or invasion. change of masters and tax-gatherers. The It was proclaimed, in sepeople there are nothing but servants to adcession circles, and reitervance the interests of courts and crowns. ated by those organs in EuAs to the forces here rope which were, like the London Times, enavailable for defense and offense, we gaged in the especial work of discouraging have ready means of computation by applying the rules sympathy for the cause of the Union, that the Northern people and Northern wealth would which prevail in Europe-where a given population supplies a given body of men fortain an army of one million of men in the field. not submit to the taxation requisite to main

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of Government on the total valuation of prop- | dollars-all the free-will offerings of a patrierty in the Union, in 1860, viz: $11,296,306,- otic people. Count in the direct losses (esti942 would produce a fund capable of wiping mated at two hundred and twenty millions out our entire National debt in a brief period. of dollars) sustained by the infamous repudiaThe tax imposed on the city of New York, tion of Northern debts by the Southern people, for several years prior to 1862, for municipal months before they could urge the base preand State purposes alone, if assessed for the texts afterwards covered by secession, and it General Government would net an amount will be seen that no people on the earth have, sufficient to pay the annual interest on a Na- in a briefer period, sacrificed more in the cause tional debt of $1,200,000,000. Averse as of their country. The masses are inimical to the people are to taxes, when they see their taxation; but, let them feel that their cause own personal good in taxation they bear any is just and there is no end to the sacrifices necessary burden cheerfully. which they will make. They only ask that the great principle of human rights and a popular Government shall be sustained, in any contest into which they are drawn, to give to it sympathy, men, means, to a limitless extent. Where there is not the clearly defined assurance of a just cause, no nation is more unwilling to sustain heavy burdens than ours.

Still other facts are at hand to show the readiness of the Northern people to submit to patriotic burdens. The amount of contributions in 1861-62 throughout the land, to the outfit of regiments, to the sick and wounded, to bounties, if it could be obtained, would be found to exceed one hundred millions of

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Design of the

THE advance against though upon them devolved

Richmond was arranged for early in July. Scott's design was to push the lines of permanent de

the duty of the main ad-
vance upon Manassas.

Design of the

A strong party-spirit prevailed in and out fense of Washington eventually on to the of Congress as to the best policy to pursue. capital of Virginia, thus at once securing the A majority seemed to demand an immediate safety of the National Capital, the loyalty of advance upon Richmond-the minority deemMaryland, and restoring Virginia to the Un-ed the danger of a defeat too great to warrant ion. The campaign of the northern Poto- such an advance until an army of conquest mac, under Patterson, was organized as a part of the advance, really comprising the centre, while McClellan, in Western Virginia, represented the Federal right. The forces under McDowell, stretching along the Potomac at Washington, comprised the left,

was thoroughly equipped, drilled and effective in transportation, artillery, and with reserves enough for holding every inch of soil secured. That Scott was of this latter class was one reason of the clamor "on to Richmond!" which became a rallying cry, design-,

Design of the Advance,

ed to force the Commander-in-Chief out of his known policy of delay. That it prevailed so far as to induce an onward movement in July, appeared to be assured; but, it is not certain that Scott would have failed to order that advance had there been no clamor for it. The expiration of the service of the first seventy-five thousand men called out, doubtless induced the Commander in-Chief to use them in throwing his permanent lines forward as far as Manassas Junction, which, being in his possession, must compel the evacuation, by the enemy, of Fredericksburg. Thus the direct way to Richmond for a fall campaign would be opened along two railroad routes, while the centre and left columns could, at their leisure, push down from their respective bases. That nothing further than to dislodge the enemy from Manassas was Scott's immediate purpose that no actual advance "on to Richmond," was arranged for-we deem to be a fixed fact. This being conceded, the censures heaped upon the War Department for its inefficient transportation pass for naught; while the loss of the field at Bull Run assumes no greater dimensions than the loss of the movement on Manassas, for which Patterson doubtless was responsible. For the demoralization which followed that extraordinary defeat, the disintegration of the army by the expiration of the time of the three-months regiments will be found to have been the prime cause, for which there was little or no remedy. In passing judgment on the disaster at Bull Run, the mistake has been committed of considering it the loss of a campaign against Richmond. As no "campaign" was designed none was lost; only a check was experienced in extending our lines around Washington and pushing the enemy back from the Potomac, from Cumberland to Fredericksburg on the Rappahannoc. That check was, in truth, a sad repulse, leaving our lines in an exposed condition; but, it served to convince the country of the wisdom of Scott's early determination not to press the advance against Richmond until the volunteers were converted into steady and efficient soldiers.

The arrangements for an onward movement became apparent as early as July 4th, when

The Advance.

large requisitions were made for transportation, munitions and stores.* By July 10th the camps east of the Potomac in the vicinity of the Capital began to break up, and regiment after regi ment passed over the bridges, and down to Alexandria by transports. It was not, however, until July 10th, that the order was issued (General Order No. 15) detailing special instructions for the march. Three days' cooked rations were to be in haversack; all regimental baggage not absolutely necessary was dispensed with. The Army of Advance, was, on that day, announced to be organized as follows:

The Grand Army.

GENERAL COMMANDING. Brigadier-General Irwin McDowell.


Captain James B. Fry, Assistant Adjutant-General.
First Lieutenant H. W. Kingsbury, Major C. S. Brown, Ma-

jor James S. Wadsworth, Aids.

Major W. H. Wood, Acting Inspector-General.

Major J. G. Barnard, Lieutenant F. E. Prime, Engineers. Captain A. W. Whipple, Lieutenant H. L. Abbott, Lieutenant H. S. Putnam, Topographical Engineers.

Captain 0. H. Tillinghast, Assistant Quarter-master.
Captain H. F. Clark, Commissary of Subsistence.
W. S. King, surgeon.

D. L. Magruder, Assistant Surgeon.

Brigadier-General Daniel Tyler, commanding.

Colonel E. D. Keyes, commanding.

First regiment Connecticut volunteers, Colonel Burnham. Second regiment Connecticut volunteers, Colonel Terry. Third regiment Connecticut volunteers, Colonel Chatfield. Second regiment Maine volunteers, Colonel Jameson. Eighth regiment New York volunteer battery, Captain Varian.

Second regiment United States cavalry, company B, Lieu. tenant Tompkins.

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Colonel J. B. Richardson commanding. Second regiment Michigan volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Chipman.

Third regiment Michigan volunteers, Colonel McConnell. First regiment Massachusetts volunteers, Colonel Cowdin. Twelfth regiment New York volunteers, Colonel Walrath. SECOND DIVISION.

Colonel David Hunter, commanding.


Colonel Andrew Porter, commanding. Battalion United States infantry (Second, Third and Eighth), Major G. Sykes.

Battalion United States marines, Major J. G. Reynolds. Eighth regiment New York State militia, Colonel Lyons. Fourteenth regiment New York State militia, Colonel Wood.

Twenty-seventh regiment New York volunteers, Colonel W. H. Slocum.

Second regiment United States cavalry, companies G and L, Major T. N. Palmer.

Fifth regiment United States artillery, company, light battery, Captain Ransom.

West Point battery, Captain C. Griffin.


Colonel A. E. Burnside, commanding.

First regiment Rhode Island volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. Pitman.

Second regiment Rhode Island volunteers, Colonel Slocum. Seventy-first regiment New York State militia, Colonel Martin.

Second regiment New Hampshire volunteers, Colonel Marston.

Second regiment Rhode Island volunteers, (light battery) Captain W. H. Reynolds.

Second regiment United States artillery, section of company A, Lieutenant A. S. Webb.

FOURTH DIVISION. (Reserves). Brigadier-General T. Runyon, commanding. First regiment New Jersey militia, Colonel Johnson. Second regiment New Jersey militia, Colonel Baker. Third regiment New Jersey militia, Colonel Napton. Fourth regiment New Jersey militia, Colonel Miller. First regiment New Jersey volunteers, Colonel Montgomery. Second regiment New Jersey volunteers, Colonel McLean. Third regiment New Jersey volunteers, Colonel Taylor.


Colonel Dixon S. Miles, commanding


Colonel Lewis Blencker, commanding. Eighth regiment New York volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Stahel.

Twenty-ninth regiment New York volunteers, Colonel Von Stein wehr

Garibaldi Guard New York volunteers, Colonel d'Utassy. Twenty-seventh regiment Pennsylvania volunteers, Colonel Max Einstein.


Colonel T. A. Davies, commanding. Sixteenth regiment New York volunteers, LieutenantColonel S. Marsh.

Seventeenth regiment New York volunteers, Colonel


Eighteenth regiment New York volunteers, Colonel Jackson. Thirty-first regiment New York volunteers, Colonel C. C.


Thirty-second regiment New York volunteers, Colonel Mat


Second regiment United States artillery, company G., light battery, Lieutenant Greer.

Second regiment United States artillery, company A, battery, Captain W. F. Barry.

This general organization was maintained

Siege Train, battery of eight rifled thirty-two pounders, throughout the succeeding conflict, though Captain T. Seymour, of Fort Sumter.

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tion only a short time previous to Franklin's | mishers, firing at them one arrival. Franklin had turned off at the rifle shot, which did no Cross-Roads to cut off communication on harm." the railway at Sangster. Wilcox's brigade pushed on to Fairfax Station, while Heintzelman with Howard's brigade and Captain Lowe's cavalry remained at the Cross-Roads. About two P. M. Wilcox occupied Fairfax Station, securing eleven prisoners. He reported that a large number of infantry and horse escaped towards his left. As Franklin was in that direction, he hoped for their capture, but no further prisoners were secured.

Miles marched by the Little River turnpike. This division found much obstruction in the way, but moved rapidly forward and kept pace with the other columns.

Attack on Fairfax Court House.

On the morning of the 17th McDowell ordered a direct movement upon Fairfax, where the enemy, it was supposed, would make a firm stand. The place was represented as fortified, and held by a heavy body of troops under General Bonham, of South Carolina. Hunter's division was chosen for the main attack, and the second brigade (Colonel Burnside) was given the advance. "The first barricade, made of trees felled and thrown across the road, delayed the head of the division only a few minutes. This was encountered about three miles from the Court House. It was cautiously examined by the skirmishers, (Second Rhode Island,) but no sign of a rebel force was discovered. The pioneers soon cleared the road with their axes. The barricade was erected at the foot of a long hill, the top of which was covered with a dense thicket, affording an excellent covert for sharp-shooters. The second barricade, of a similar character, was quickly cleared. The third barricade was more formidable. It was at the entrance of a deep cut in the road, commencing about half-way up a steep hill, crowned on one side with a thick woods and on the other by an open field. To pass this a road was made through the field, enabling the army to pass around it. At this point there were stationed two hundred rebel cavalry, who, without waiting to ascertain the strength of the advancing force, fled upon the first appearance of the skir

Attack on Fairfax Court House.

At this point it was ascertained that, one half-mile ahead, a regular fortification, with a strong battery, was planted, defended by about two thousand men. Further reports by the people magnified the rebel force in and around Fairfax Court House until three regiments were made to number ten or twelve thousand. McDowell resolved to drive in directly upon them, let them number any amount-feeling secure in the mettle of his men. The reported fortification was encountered about half a mile from the Court House. It consisted of a single intrenchment, extending for about four hundred yards on each side of the road, pierced for eight guns. The embrasures were formed of sand-bags, and so placed as to command the road. The works stretched along the top of a steep hill, at the foot of which meandered a muddy creek. The trees upon the hill-side for a distance of an eighth of a mile had been cut down to allow no cover from the guns. These works had been occupied for about three weeks by the Second and Third South Carolina regiments, under Bonham. The Second Rhode Island men were the first in the intrenchments. The whole rebel force fell back toward Centreville-but one prisoner being secured, a South Carolina officer. Abundant evidence abounded to prove how rapid must have been the retreat, Sacks of flour, meat, clothing, arms, equipments and camp utensils, everywhere were scattered over the ground, and the campfires, prepared for the noon meal, were still brightly burning. The main body of Bonham's force had left with haste only about two hours before the arrival of the head of Burnside's column.

At the moment of its occupation firing was heard off to the left, where Miles' division encountered and quickly sent flying the Fifth Alabama regiment, securing all its tents, stores, &c. Tyler's brigades reached Germantown (one mile west of Fairfax) but a few moments too late to bag the South Carolinians, who passed through the village only about one half-hour prior to the arrival of Keyes' regiments. The enemy had appeared

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