and in subjecting it to a little wholesome criticism, we are anxious, at the outset, that the true state of the question should be clearly understood. There is no question as to the fact, that revelation was vouchsafed at the commencement of our race: for every believer in the inspired writings of Moses must hold that, historically, revelation preceded discovery, and that the world has never been placed in a position in which it could be shown or tested by experience, whether, by his unaided powers, man could have risen from nature up to nature's God. On this point, there is no question, and no room for debate among Christians: they believe that there was a primeval revelation to our first parents in Eden, and that the revelation might be transmitted, more or less pure and entire, through the channel of tradition, to subsequent generations; they admit that the mere fact of His personal converse with them, must have served to make known His glorious being, while it was mainly designed to reveal, not such truths as nature might have taught, but other truths, which, depending on the mere sovereign will and good pleasure of God, could not have been deduced from any natural indication: such as the terms on which the continuance of life should depend in a state of innocency, and again the terms on which the forfeited life might be restored under the covenant of grace. But the question is,-Whether we can or can not adduce from natural phenomena, valid evidence of the being and perfections of God, whether the visible monuments of creation did or did not exhibit to them, and by consequence to us also, undeniable proofs of His eternal power and Godhead, and whether with or without revelation, these manifestations may or may not be referred to for the purposes of theology.

By natural theology we mean, not truths which men did actually excogitate for themselves by their own unaided reason, prior to any supernatural communication-for as Christians, we believe that, historically, revelation was coeval with the origin of our race but truths which have a real and valid evidence, derivable from natural sources, and applicable to their establishment and illustration. It is obviously unfair, in conducting this discussion among Christian men, to use the term natural theology in any other sense; or to impose upon us the task of defending a position which we never held, by saying as Mr. Irons does, that "such a knowledge of God and truth as may be gained, apart from Christianity, by the guesses of enlightened conscience, or by the help of traditional revelation, and those traces of primitive truth which are to be found in all ages, cannot properly be called "natural." We never undertook, nor could we consistently with our belief in Scripture attempt, to show that a knowledge of God was actually acquired from the contemplation of

General Object of Irons' Dissertation.

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nature, without the aid of direct revelation, or its indirect influence as conveyed by tradition; but we hold that a real and valid evidence exists in the works of nature, and that the conclusions of theology rest on as firm a basis as any other natural truths which depend on Inductive Evidence. It is of considerable importance in this, as in every other instance, to form a correct and definite idea of the "status questionis," for the validity of the natural evidence for the being and perfections of God may be most consistently maintained by one who agrees, nevertheless, with Ellis, and Leland, and Halliburton, in admitting the imperfection and insufficiency of natural theology, as well as the historical priority of revelation.

Mr. Irons, who has favoured us with his views on the "Whole Doctrine of Final Causes," is an alumnus of Queen's College, Oxford, and a minister of the Church of England. He seems to be a man of varied accomplishments, and had the permission of the late Dr. Edward Burton to dedicate his Dissertation to him. His style is often rhetorical, sometimes impassioned, while it degenerates occasionally into humorous sallies, somewhat too broad for a grave metaphysical treatise: his religious views seem to be serious and earnest, but associated with certain High Church, if not Tractarian leanings, which lead him to speak of "the guilty extravagances of sectarian folly" as "the ghastly activities of some exulting maniac,"-of" the scattered tribes of Israel as apostate or rebellious," and of the "Church of this long exalted land" as "Judalı remaining faithful with her God," and the danger resulting from the modern tendency to "individualize Christianity, thereby making individuals every thing and the Church nothing." These," and similar remarks, combined with those in which he speaks. approvingly of Mr. Newman's project for the restoration of Chorepiscopi seem to indicate a sympathy in the author's mind with the spirit of the late Oxford movement. Friendly as he is, however, to the dignity of his Apostolic Church, he seems to have a deep interest in the sufferings of the poor, and is favourably distinguished from some others by his frank disavowal of all desire either to restrain the education of the common people or to limit the philosophical studies of their future pastors, since he not only represents the decay of learning as "a fatal loss" to the Church, but declares it to be " the plainest Christian duty to instruct the uninformed, and alleviate, so far as our power extends, the curse of ignorance which afflicts mankind.”

These are enlightened and liberal views: They show that Mr. Irons, however wedded to the Church of England, has no sympathy with those who would proscribe philosophy, or discourage education, and that he is alive to the peculiar danger arising, in the present times, from the patronage of science by Popish

VOL. VII. NO. XIII.

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and infidel partizans. We wish that we could speak of his own contribution to the education of the public mind with unqualified approbation; but believing, as we do, that it is defective in its argument, and dangerous in its tendency, we deem it a duty which we owe to the cause of truth, to vindicate the evidence of design from the exceptions which he has raised against it.

The general object of his Dissertation, in so far as it relates to the doctrine of Final Causes, may be best stated in his own words:

:--

"A long consideration of the modern doctrine of Final Causes, and of that natural theology of which it is the declared basis, has led to the conclusions which I have here attempted to establish. I have become deeply persuaded that Revelation must be defended on far higher grounds than those which are usually taken. My design, therefore, is, to set forth, in the clearest manner, that though Atheism is an impossibility, and irreligion misery, yet that man, by his unassisted natural powers, could never have certainly determined any one truth of theology or religion. I would have the Deist left to his own theological resources, that the futility of his attempts might show him the necessity of Revelation. I would prove that a strictly natural theology is unattainable: so that all men who feel that some theology is indispensable may be unable to avoid the conclusion in favour of Revelation."

Such being the avowed object of his Dissertation, he states and answers the question thus:

"The question with me is,-Could this conclusion (that there is design in nature, and that God is the author of it,') have been arrived at by the natural faculties of man? Is there such a force in what are called the Evidences of Design' as to compel a fair reasoner to acquiesce in the being of a God on natural principles? I firmly believe, and shall endeavour to prove, that there is not."-" I am as sure as any one can be of the truth of the assertion that there is design in nature, and that God is the author of it. But I dispute the validity of this argument, (Paley's.) Can the natural theologian, on natural grounds, certainly prove that there is design? We may safely defy him to the trial. Let him look about into nature: he will find thousands of facts which demonstrate undeniably the mutual adaptation' and fitness' of various things to one another; but few persons will be apt to allow that adaptation' and 'design' are synonymous words." -"Indeed, I go so far as to believe that it is almost an impossibility in the nature of things, that design should ever be certainly known, however acutely it may be guessed at, unless the Designer himself revealed it. An argument from design' depends upon an a priori assumption of a knowledge of the character and mind of the Designer." "It is an effort on the part of a creature of a day' to trace out the designs of the Eternal! to comprehend the plans of the Incomprehensible !"

6

Study of Final Causes utterly discarded by Mr. Irons. 19

And, in accordance with these views, the author ventures to characterize it in such terms as these:"This fallacious argument;"-" a verbal sophism ;"-" wholly untenable as an argument;"" the fictitious argument from design,"-" the pretended theology of the doctors of design." And he tells us,"I am anxious to make it as plain as truth can be made, that the whole 'Argument from Design' is a fallacy."—"From which it is easy to gather this inference, that natural theology, so far as it depends on this argument, is a groundless speculation."

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We are not to suppose, indeed, that Mr. Irons utterly discards the study of final causes-for he has a theory of his own on the subject which may claim our attention for a little ere we bring our remarks to a close: but meanwhile, we may be permitted to pause and express our wonder that a clergyman of the Church of England, or indeed of any Christian denomination, should have thought it incumbent on him to speak in such terms as we have quoted, of that kind of evidence, which far more than any other has impressed the public mind with the Being and Perfections of God. Mr. Irons must be sensible that he has undertaken a very grave responsibility; and we should think that he can hardly fail to have some misgivings, when he reflects, that he is opposing the all but unanimous sentiment of the Christian Church. Was it that scepticism, however willing, had proved too weak to achieve the victory for herself, that the alumnus of Queen's College put on his armour to do battle with Paley? He seems to have anticipated our question: "Some Christians," he says, may be alarmed at an attack on natural religion: but this I cannot but attribute to very partial views of the subject. I would at once anticipate an objection which will be raised by manyWhy should we attempt to make men dissatisfied with any arguments which prove, or seem to prove, truths, and especially truths of such importance as those of theology? To which I answer: That if there were not, as there are, many other reasons, this is sufficient, that it is impossible to foresee the consequences of enlisting error in the service of truth." He was aware, then, that he was making" an attack on natural religion"-an attack which might alarm some Christians, and even make men dissatisfied with certain arguments which seemed to prove the truths of theology and yet he perseveres, because believing the argument from design to be utterly fallacious, he thinks that the truth cannot require such service. In a matter of such solemn interest, a minister of religion must have weighty reasons, indeed, to warrant him in making such an attack. It remains for us to inquire what arguments Mr. Irons has advanced, and whether he has really succeeded in overthrowing a proof which satisfied the minds of Newton and Butler, Tillotson and Paley.

After an Introduction on the character of Modern Deism, and an exordium, developing the nature of his argument, he offers the following precis or outline of his plan :

I. (1)" I shall first consider the question of causation generally and critically, that I may arrive at a definition of the true idea of a CAUSE. This will lead to a decision on the nature of the connexion of cause and effect.

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(2) And as it is plain that no principles can be a good basis for theological science, which are inconsistent with practical religion, that doctrine of causation which will be at this point established, will be applied to morals, in order to illustrate the free agency of man.

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(3) We shall open the consideration of the modern doctrine of Final Causes, by comparing it with the ancient doctrine of the same

name.

"II. The second part of this dissertation will be occupied by the examination.

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(1) Of the theological argument from Final Causes: in order to show its fallacy:

"(2) Of the argument a posteriori (which is frequently confounded with the arguments from Final Causes,') and

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(3) Of the argument a priori, in order to ascertain their precise value the former of which, as being the more popular, will occupy the larger share of our attention.

"III. In the third part I shall endeavour

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(1, 2) To establish the theological doctrine of Final Causes on the more accurate principles of the ancients; and show the legitimate use of the modern doctrine; and

(3) I shall, finally, vindicate the position that the truths of revelation are eternal and necessary truths of reason' spiritually discerned,' i.e., not cognizable by sense."

his own:

Such is the general outline of his scheme. It is impossible for us, within our assigned limits, to examine and expose everything in his reasonings that might be worthy of critical animadversion. We cannot enlarge on his general views of causation, further than by stating, that while, in our opinion, he misapprehends the theory of Hume and Brown, he offers the following definition of "The simplest idea of a cause is that which of itself makes anything begin to be"-but as a mere instrument can never do so, all mere physical or material agencies are excluded, and "the right and complete definition of a cause is a living being which has a power of spontaneous action, that is to say, an intelligence." We can only indicate the wide difference which subsists between this view and that of the Westminster Divines, who, far from evincing the slightest jealousy of second causes, expressly acknowledge their operation, and seek only to subordinate them to the Supreme. "He ordereth things to fall out