Mr. Parker's Translations. 357 readers, we naturally feel that Mr. Parker himself has the first claims upon our notice, as being of the two least likely to have enjoyed the pleasure of a previous acquaintance with them. He has invited us to speak freely by his motto-which, like the rest of his ancient lore, is somewhat the worse for the wear— πάταξον μὲν, ἄκουσον δέ. And we will treat him better than he expects, for we have heard him patiently before we struck. Mr. Theodore Parker, then, (to speak our minds with becoming plainness,) is grossly ignorant of German, and no great master of English; and, therefore, when he undertakes to translate out of the former language into the latter, his version cannot reasonably be expected to be either elegant or correct. He has, however, a great deal of diligence and activity-which it were well if he would bestow aright; and a tolerably sound, though narrow understanding, which, if he would add to it a little modesty and sense of religion, might make him ultimately useful, or at least inoffensive. We shall give a specimen or two of his qualifications as a translator and critic. A very little will suffice; and the reader will readily calculate the stature of the Hercules of Roxbury from the measure of his foot. In vol. i. p. 390, we are astounded by the information that the Jews distinguish the characters used in their MSS. into the TAM and the WELSH. "Of a noble race was Shenkin:" yet we guess that the warmest-headed antiquarians of the Principality would be somewhat surprised to find that their country had played so conspicuous a part in Hebrew literature. The word which Mr. Parker had before him was Welsche, which a very slight knowledge of German (not to require even a slight knowledge of biblical criticism) might have taught him to translate "Italian." But he was writing a book of reference, and therefore felt it unnecessary to consult authorities. In the same volume, p. 153, he gives the following translation from Eichhorn: "Epiphanius, or rather an apocryphal writer, to judge from the foolish things with which his narrative is overlaid," &c. The work referred to is Epiphanius' book De ponderibus et mensuris, the authenticity of which the reader, who trusts (as hereafter few readers will) to Mr. Parker's accuracy, will be surprised to find questioned by Eichhorn-especially upon such grounds. But if he will compare the original, he will find a fitter object for his astonishment: "Epiphanius-leider ein apokryphischer Schriftsteller, wegen der vielen Albernheiten womit er seine Erzählungen überladen hat," &c. Could not Mr. Parker turn a dictionary, and find that leider meant “unhappily?" Indeed, he is specially unfortunate in his attempts upon Eichhorn. In vol. ii. p. 31, he makes Eichhorn say of the book of Genesis: "Read it as two historical works of the old world, the air of its age and country breathes in it. Forget the age you live in, and the knowledge it affords you-still you cannot enjoy the book in the spirit of its origin; dream not of that." Eichhorn's own words are: "Lies es als zwei historische Werke der Vorwelt, und athme dabei die Luft seines Zeitalters und Vaterlandes. Vergiss also das Jahrhundert in dem du lebst, und die kenntnisse die es dir darbietet und karst du das nicht, so lass dir nicht träumen, das du das Buch in Geist seines Ursprungs geniessen werdest."* Again, at p. 82: "It stops with God, the ultimate cause, as if he were supposed to be the immediate cause. And even for us, who have inquired into the causes of things, the name of God, in these cases, is often indispensable to fill up the blank, when we do not design to say, that God has interrupted the course of things!" "Und für uns, die wir die ursachen der Dinge erforscht haben, ist in diesen Fällen der Name Gottes oft ein entbehrliches Füllwort, und keine Anzeige dass Gott den Lauf der Dinge immer unterbrochen habe." t Yet Mr. Parker is not without a rival as a translator in the great Republic. He has at least an equal in a Mr. Kaufman, who has done Tholuck the honour of rendering his commentary upon St. John's Gospel into English, wherein he felicitously turns the Latin word "Theologastri" into the elegant newEnglish compound" Belly-theologues." De Wette himself is a very different sort of a person from his conceited and ignorant translator. Indeed, the German and the American have hardly any thing in common, except their contempt for orthodoxy, and disbelief of Revealed Religion. But these are much more calm, settled, and rational in the former than in the latter; less noisy and offensive, and perhaps, too, more hopeless. De Wette is one of the best learned and most painstaking compilers of a learned and painstaking generation. With less of imagination in his temper than some of the more vivacious of his brethren, and consequently seldom dazzling his readers with new hypothetical discoveries, he has, where his unchristian prejudices do not warp his judgment, a considerable share of masculine good sense and discernment, and possesses no small share of those sound sterling qualities of a critic to which Gesenius owed his well-earned reputation. The real utility of his work in many respects—and it is indeed an admirable digest of critical information-makes it only the more dan *Read it as two historical works of the ancient world, and breathe in it the air of its age and country. Forget the century in which you live, and the knowledge that it affords you. If you cannot do this, dream not of enjoying the book in the spirit of its origin." "And to us, who have searched into the causes of things, the name of God is, in such cases, often a superfluous expletive, and no indication that God has ever interrupted the course of things." De Wette's Fundamental Maxim. 359 sup gerous in others; and the fact that so serviceable a work plies a felt deficiency in our sacred literature, makes it needful for us to warn those, who are likely to avail themselves of its help, of the antichristian principles which pervade it in every part. His fundamental maxim, stated broadly at the very outset, § 4. (vol. i. p. 3, of the translation) is, that the Bible is to be treated as an uninspired book—a mere human phenomenon, to be classed with other similar phenomena of historical and religious documents. To set out from any other point he considers grossly unscientific, and to involve a petitio principii, a needless and illiberal incumbrance of criticism with theology! Surely it cannot be necessary to spend many words in exposing the palpable unfairness of such talk as this. If-as seems manifest almost upon a mere inspection-inspiration, being admitted as a real fact, ought in reason to have some influence in determining the proper mode of interpreting inspired documents, it is impossible to deliver adequate rules of interpretation in such cases, without resolving the prior question as to their inspiration, or considering it as resolved already. The course generally adopted by orthodox critics, has been to suppose it resolved in the affirmative; and, in reality, the thing objected to by De Wette, is, not that we resolve such questions at all, or consider them as resolved, (though this be the specious pretence,) but that we do not consider them as resolved already in the negative. But there is a form which this objection sometimes takes which deserves more respectful consideration-partly for its own sake, and partly for the sake of those by whom it has been propounded. "The Bible," it is said, "must be examined and interpreted before the question of its inspiration can be satisfactorily determined; to assume, therefore, its inspiration, during the preliminary examination, is to assume a point still to be proved." Yet it needs no special subtilty of thought to see through this finespun fallacy. For, since the object of the preliminary examination here supposed is to discover whether or no the Bible agree with the claims it makes itself, we must, for that very reason, expound it, as far as we can, in accordance with these claims. For (sufficient external evidence being assumed) we are to admit or reject its authority, according as it seems to agree or disagree with those claims. But in such a procedure the point assumed is not taken for granted. It is in the condition of an hypothesis which we are verifying by an induction of experiments. Suppose we had to judge, for example, from internal evidence, of the authenticity of some of the plays of Euripides: How else could we institute the inquiry but by considering whether or not the style and sentiments were such as (supposing him to have written them) might fairly be expected from that author? In this case it would certainly be reasonable to apply, for instance, the philosophy of Anaxagoras to the elucidation of obscure passages; to take his terms in the same sense as was manifestly put upon them in his acknowledged works; in short, to admit as valid grounds of interpretation all the consequences which would naturally flow from the supposition of their authenticity. The ultimate conclusion would then be so far from being vitiated that the proof would accumulate in proportion as the peculiarities capable of being explained by the simple supposal of authenticity increased in variety and number. In the same way, then, when we are examining the Bible, we should try whether, supposing it to be inspired, it may have been written as it is; and thus, if there be peculiar modes of speech and methods of information, which, though not to be expected in a human composition, are yet very proper in a divine, we shall not err against any rule of sound logic in constructing it according to them. Another gross fallacy involved in De Wette's View of the Principles of Biblical Criticism, consists in the cool assumption that the Bible, Homer, the Vedas, and the Zendavesta, are all phenomena of the same class-an assumption based, as far as we can find, only upon the admitted truth of many general resemblances between mythology and the history of miracles, and justified by the total omission of the countervailing fact of many special points of essential distinction. Now, while no sceptical hypothesis can possibly explain these latter, the existence of the former is not only no objection to the Christian theory, but seems even to flow from it as a corollary. We shall occupy the remainder of the present Article by attempting, in a brief space, to place this important truth intelligibly before the reader's mind. The family of Jacob appear to have been originally a people distinguished in no respect above their neighbours by the cultivation of literature and arts. Their mode of life in the patriarchal times, and the troubled circumstances of their state at a later period, were not such as to favour the study of Philosophy, or encourage the pursuit of abstract Science. Nor does it appear that the Israelites themselves were much disposed towards such inquiries. Nevertheless, it cannot be reasonably denied that this people professed, at a very remote period, and retained for many ages, a system of pure Theism as their creed; and institutions of ceremonial and political religion unparalleled amongst their contemporaries for simplicity and wisdom. As far as we can collect from the most extensive survey of ancient history, it seems evident that the tendency of the human mind, and of the generally Economy of Divine interpositions. 361 received maxims of legislation which must have prevailed when this system and these institutions were preserved in Israel, were not such as can reasonably be supposed to have created the Mosaic economy. For the tendency of the human mind in all nations-and apparently its natural tendency in this nation also -was strong towards Idolatry and Polytheism; and the maxims of legislation universally received elsewhere were in favour of gratifying that tendency. Nor is there any ground for supposing that this semi-barbarous and secluded people did, or could, reason out for themselves such a system of religion as is developed in the very earliest of their Sacred Books. These books themselves present to us an explanation of this phenomenon, which it is so difficult to account for otherwise. They tell us that this pure system of faith and morals was imparted to, and maintained amongst, the patriarchs and their progeny by supernatural interpositions of the Deity; and, if this account be admitted, it undoubtedly affords an explanation of the difficulty. Let us consider, then, some consequences which will flow from an admission of this account. These Divine interpositions, which we suppose were made primarily for the benefit of former men, and not for us, the slow and dry philosophers of the nineteenth century-would they not then be made in that form and manner which might appear most affecting and intelligible to the persons of that age? If so, the whole economy of such interpositions must exhibit, in its form and manner, a condescension to the modes of thought and feeling which sprang from the circumstances of that period for which it was originally calculated. The essential disparity between the divine or angelic natures and the human makes it necessary that, where a communication takes place, some medium of communication must be selected. Is it, then, unreasonable to expect that that medium should in fact be the one selected, which the tempers, customs, states of knowledge, or even prejudices of the men of those times, would render most easily apprehended by them? Hence it follows that the true records of such interpositions might naturally be expected to bear many characters of resemblance to the purely mythic narratives of other ancient peoples. Those mythic legends were indeed created by the longings and imaginations of the human mind in certain imperfect states of civilization. They are faithful mirrors of the tastes and ideas prevalent in such circumstances, and represent the wonders which they feign in a light reflected from the temper and mental habits of the mythologist and his hearers. They must, therefore, be allowed to indicate to us the forms under which the popular mind, |